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Introduction
Political institutions are inextricably linked with economic performance, a relation-
ship that goes both ways. Institutions drive growth by, for instance, securing prop-
erty rights and enforcing contracts. Institutions themselves are determined by the
dynamics of economic growth since, for instance, contract enforcement depends on
wealth.
The prominence of institutions in understanding economic performance dates
to the seminal work of North (1990). His work spurred a new empirical tradition
that broadly links country-level aggregates of growth, like income per capita, with
measures of institutional quality, like the rule of law (e.g. Knack and Keefer 1995;
Rodrik et al. 2004). While the data revealed that institutions may play an even
bigger role in a nation’s prosperity than initial conditions, like biogeography, it re-
mained silent on how to achieve good institutions. In response another research
tradition developed concurrently, focusing on specific cases of institutional failure
and corrective policy interventions. The realization that bad governance and corrup-
tion were severely undermining poverty alleviation efforts was a major motivation
for this approach.
Our enhanced understanding of institutions has no doubt contributed to the
large reductions in poverty (from 50% to 21% of citizens in developing countries
since 1981). However, challenges remain. Inequality is rising fast (OECD 2011);
in 2000 the income levels of the richest and poorest countries differed by a factor
of 200, in 2014 that factor was nearly 250.1 In light of these dynamics, it is of
critical importance to examine and reexamine where and why institutions fail. Are
today’s development challenges inherited from history or artefacts of the modern
world? What are the implications of dysfunctional institutions for key aspects of
socio-economic development, like education and democracy?
This thesis answers these questions with four empirical essays on the economic
determinants and consequences of political institutions. It opens with a broad per-
spective on the link between the state throughout history and the past and current
economic performance of nations. Remaining chapters focus on a particular form of
institutional failure “endemic corruption” with illustrations of its harmful impact on
key development areas: human capital formation and democracy. More specifically,
chapters two and three identify causal links between public sector wages, monitoring
1In 2000, the GDP per capita of the richest country in the world, Qatar, was 112,283 USD and
that of the poorest, The Democratic Republic of Congo, was 518 USD. In 2014 Qatar’s per capita
GDP was 139,456 USD and the Central African Republic’s was 566 USD. [World Bank data: GDP
in constant 2011 international dollars using PPP rates].
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and incentives and corruption in education. The final chapter examines the clien-
telistic structure of electoral politics showing that local politicians influence national
elections by vote buying and electoral fraud.
The historical role of institutions
The experience with state institutions has been put forth as one of the important
correlates of the current wealth distribution in the world. In order to capture the
modern day nations' accumulated experience of large-scale political organization,
Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman (2002) have created the State antiquity index.
This index reflected all forms and changes of government above tribal level, between
1-1950 CE, for each of 159 countries defined by modern-day borders. The authors
showed that this indicator of state experience was positively associated with 1995
income and with the 1960-1995 GDP growth rate. Other studies confirmed this
empirical pattern, besides demonstrating that this “persistence of fortune” is not a
localized phenomenon, but is reinforced by migration between countries (Putterman
and Weil, 2010).
The examples of former colonies that have gained independence late in the 20th
century and are therefore much younger and inexperienced states than European
states like the United Kingdom and France are in line with these findings. However,
there are states that do not fit this pattern: countries with old institutions that
consolidated as far back as antiquity (e.g. Iraq, Syria, India) perform much more
poorly today than the much younger European states.
In Chapter 1, “State History and Economic Development: Evidence from Six
Millennia” (with Ola Olsson and Louis Putterman), we investigate this issue and
we attempt to make two distinct contributions to the literature. First, we provide
a complete state history index from its first origin around 3500 BCE up until the
present day. We extend the index from 1 CE backwards in time to the first origins
of states around 3500 BCE and also code the 1950-2000 CE period. We follow the
methodology in the original effort by Bockstette el al. (2002). This combines three
dimensions of state development: 1) The existence of a state above tribal level; 2)
Whether rule is internally or externally based; 3) The territorial coverage of the state
in relation to current national borders. The three indicators were coded for each of
the 159 countries in our sample and for each 50- year period from the origin of the
first states around 3500 BCE, yielding a panel data set with 17,490 country-period
observations.
Second, we investigate how our extended state history index is related to indi-
cators of long-run economic development. Our theoretical foundation is a modified
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version of the Malthusian growth model where we include the rise of a state that
taxes its population and provides public goods that enhance productivity. The key
hypotheses from the model are that the levels of productivity and population density
have a concave and possibly an inverted u-shaped relationship with the extent of
state history. This is particularly true in the pre-industrial era, but the non-linear ef-
fects of state experience are predicted to persist to this day. In the empirical section,
we then confirm that the relationship between our state history index and levels of
economic development has the shape of an inverted u, implying that the very young
and very old states have the least developed economies whereas the richest countries
have intermediate state history scores.
These results are only suggestive of the positive role of fiscal capacity in eco-
nomic growth and the hindering role of early centralized power giving unlimited
prerogatives to rent-seeking elites. Despite this limitation, the additional data and
more flexible econometric specifications enhance the ability of state institutions to
predict past and current economic performance.
Economics determinants and consequences of corruption
The relevance of historical approaches is naturally limited for today’s policy chal-
lenges. One of the most difficult and pervasive current institutional failures that
require urgent policy action is corruption. The most widely used definition of cor-
ruption is “the abuse of private office for personal gain”. This includes, but is not
limited to bribery; trading favours and gaining non-meritorious benefits through
personal connections are common manifestations of corruption. According to Trans-
parency International's Corruption Perception Index, more than two thirds of the
world struggle with endemic corruption in most areas, from education and health,
to business and elections. With few exceptions, corruption is bad for economic de-
velopment, because it creates inefficiencies in the allocation of resources and talent,
and, to the extent that it prevents the poor from accessing public services (OECD,
2014) and is developing countries, it deepens inequality. While it is most preva-
lent in developing countries, corruption also poses threats in richer countries, for
instance, through the capture of the democratic process by vote buying or lobbying.
Yet, despite intensified policy importance and academic study, corruption remains
poorly understood. The biggest progress has been made in the measurement of
corruption and its costs, ranging from perception–based surveys, to more objective
metrics like audit-revealed missing funds. But all the political and academic efforts
to understand and to reduce corruption have so far yielded more questions than
answers (Olken and Pande, 2009).
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Among these, how corruption responds to change in the bureaucrats' wage, and
what are the distributional consequences of fighting corruption are some underex-
plored topics of particular interest to policy makers.
Corruption in Education
Chapter 2, “The Impact of an Unexpected Wage Cut on Corruption: Evidence
from a “Xeroxed” Exam”(with Mikael Lindahl and Andreea Mitrut) investigates
the effects of wages on corruption in the public sector, exploring a quasi-natural
experiment generated by an unexpected 25% wage cut incurred by the public sector
employees in Romania in 2010. The cut was announced in May, just one month
ahead of the national high-school exit exam (the Baccalaureate) and it affected all
public sector employees, including teachers. The ensuing question is whether the
wage drop generated an increase in corruption for exam grades. The prevalence of
corruption at the Baccalaureate exams was notorious and was attributed to the high-
stakes character of the exam (it accounts for up to 100% of the university/college
admission score) and the poor remuneration of teachers in general.
We do not observe the corrupt transactions at this exam, but we know that scores
are corruption-inflated. Hence, our strategy is to use a Difference-in-Differences
strategy to compare the change in the Baccalaureate exam outcomes (mainly the
school level average grades and passing rates of the standardized Romanian language
exam) from 2007 to 2010 between public and private schools. We choose private
schools as a comparison group, as the latter category was not affected by the policy.
Our results show a positive and significant change in the exam outcomes between
public and private schools, which we attribute to an increase in incentives to engage
in corrupt activities in 2010 relative to previous years. In particular, we find a wage
cut-driven effect equivalent to a 0.26 S.D. increase in exam scores and an increase
in school-level Romanian exam pass rates by 3.3 percentage points. The estimated
effects are equivalent to a nearly 4% increase in both exam outcomes. We employ
different falsification tests and sensitivity analysis to lend further credibility to our
results. The findings are also in line with the post–2010 exam unprecedentedly
high number of allegations and trials for fraud and bribery by school principals and
teachers connected with the Baccalaureate.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper that identifies a causal relationship
between a wage cut in the public sector and corruption activities.
In Chapter 3, “Fighting Corruption in Education: What Works and Who Ben-
efits”, (with Mikael Lindahl and Andreea Mitrut), we follow-up on the exam cor-
ruption, by exploiting another policy change that came in 2011. Following these
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trials and the accompanying media scandals, the Romanian Ministry of Education
launched a large corruption-fighting campaign. The campaign consisted of two dis-
tinct components: 1) increasing the threat of punishment for teachers and students
caught taking/giving bribes and 2) closed-circuit TV (CCTV) monitoring of the
exam centers to prevent mass-cheating in the exam rooms. The CCTV monitoring
introduction was gradual, with 25 counties installing cameras in 2011 and the re-
mainder 17 counties in 2012. Hence, we use the quasi-experimental variation of the
camera introduction and the characteristics of the Baccalaureate exam to answer
two questions: 1) Was the campaign an effective means to reduce corruption? 2)
Were students from different backgrounds differentially affected by the campaign?
Firstly, we find that the monitoring and punishment worked (as the pass rates
nearly halved between 2010 and 2011). Comparing score changes between counties
that installed camera early and those that installed it later, we find that the addi-
tional effect of the cameras was an 8% drop in exam passing rates. Secondly, we also
compare the drop in exam performance between students from poor families with
those from non-poor backgrounds. Our findings contradict our original expecta-
tion that fighting corruption should close the score gap between poor and non-poor
students. The results indicate that the anti-corruption measures made the already
underperforming poor students relatively worse off than non-poor students. The
campaign induced an increase in achievement gaps also between low and high- abil-
ity student, as well as between male and female student. Thirdly, using data from
an elite university, we show that the monitoring significantly reduced the chances
of admission for poor students, hence confirming most of the results found for the
Baccalaureate.
This paper contributes additional evidence to the literature on anti-corruption
policies (e.g. Ferraz and Finan, 2011; Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2003; Duflo et al.,
2012). Our perhaps most important contribution is the estimated impact of fighting
corruption on equality of educational opportunity, a topic much less explored.
Corruption in Elections
The last part of the thesis shifts focus on elite’s capture of the democratic freedoms.
Chapter IV, “The Benefits of Local Party Alignment in National Elections”,
provides robust evidence that local officials deliver votes for their parties in national
elections, quite plausibly through corrupt means.
In this paper I compare electoral outcomes between localities aligned with the
party in government and those unaligned. Much of the elections literature has found
larger intergovernmental transfers for aligned localities, but no significant benefits
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for national politicians associated with these favours (e.g. Brollo and Nannicini,
2012).
To overcome the issue of endogenous alignment, I use a Regression Discontinuity
Design with closely-contested Romanian local elections in June 2012. In terms
of outcomes, I examine the turnout and vote shares at the July 2012 referendum
launched by the governing coalition to dismiss the president, and the November 2012
legislative elections.
I find up to 5.4 percentage points increased turnout in government-aligned lo-
calities at the referendum. Turnout was crucial in the first polls, as a minimum
participation of 50% of all voters was required for validating the referendum. By
contrast, I find no electoral alignment advantage in turnout or vote shares in subse-
quent parliamentary elections.
The referendum alignment effect is driven by rural areas, with less educated
and more manipulable voters. This along with the contrasting results at legislative
elections, and extra heterogeneity tests suggest that local politicians mobilize voters
successfully when: i) the voter commitment problem is overcome (unlike the vote,
turnout is observable); ii) vote buying is common; iii) there is weak local competi-
tion and monitoring of incumbents. I also show suggestive evidence that after the
referendum, government transfers increase in aligned localities and higher referen-
dum turnout also drives higher legislative elections turnout and vote shares for the
government coalition.
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1 Introduction
History has shown that economic development often thrives in states where gov-
ernments guarantee the rule of law and provide public goods for their citizens. In
order to reach a deeper understanding of why some countries have good government
and others do not, social scientists have become increasingly interested in studying
the long-run patterns of institutional development within states. The roots of coun-
tries’ contemporary failures or successes have often been traced back to “critical
junctures” far back in history.1
In this paper, we analyze how state development has interacted with economic
development. More specifically, we attempt to make two distinct contributions to
the literature. First, we provide a complete state history index from its first ori-
gin around 3500 BCE up until the present day. Initially developed by Bockstette,
Chanda and Putterman (2002) for 159 countries, the index covered the period 1-1950
CE. We extend the index from 1 CE backwards in time to the first origins of states
around 3500 BCE and also code the 1950-2000 CE period, which was previously
missing from the time series.
Second, we investigate how our extended state history index is related to indi-
cators of long-run economic development. Our theoretical foundation is a modified
version of the Malthusian growth model where we include the rise of a state that
taxes its population and provides public goods that enhance productivity. The key
hypotheses from the model are that the levels of productivity and population density
have a concave and possibly an inverted u-shaped relationship with the extent of
state history. This is particularly true in the pre-industrial era, but the non-linear ef-
fects of state experience are predicted to persist to this day. In the empirical section,
we then confirm that the relationship between our state history index and levels of
economic development has the shape of an inverted u, implying that the very young
and very old states have the least developed economies whereas the richest countries
have intermediate state history scores.
For the first of these objectives - the creation of a state history index for the
BCE-period, we follow the methodology in the original effort by Bockstette el al.
(2002). This combines three dimensions of state development: 1) The existence of
a state above tribal level; 2) Whether rule is internally or externally based; 3) The
territorial coverage of the state in relation to current national borders. The three
indicators were coded for each of the 159 countries in our sample and for each 50-
year period from the origin of the first states around 3500 BCE, yielding a panel
1See for instance North (1990), Acemoglu at al (2005 and 2012), and Besley and Persson (2009).
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data set with 17,490 country-period observations. The details of the sources for and
construction of the index are described further below.
Our second objective hinged crucially on extending the state history data ini-
tially compiled by Bockstette et al. (2002). Their study was the first to show a
significant correlation between state history and recent growth rate and between
state history and income level. The numerous studies that followed strengthened
the evidence that current development is positively related to state experience. Al-
though subsequent versions of the index used in these papers expanded the set of
countries, none coded the history of states BCE.
With these developments in mind and with the new data on the extended state
history index, we revisit the relationship between the degree of exposure to state
institutions and current output. We show that the relationship between state history
and current income per capita is concave rather than linear, and that this is due
to the inclusion of state experience before the Common Era. Thus, in addition
to young, inexperienced states, very old states also incur economic disadvantages
relative to states with around 2000 years of state experience.
Our inquiry is supported by the empirical observation that old states like Iraq,
Turkey and China are poorer today than younger states like Britain, Denmark and
Japan, a fact that remained unexplained in previous work. The early experience
of the former was uncoded in the previous data, which effectively forced very old
states to take similar values with intermediate states, such as England (the U.K.).
Building on previous literature, we contribute additional knowledge about the
influence of early political and societal development on modern economic develop-
ment. We show that along with young states, a very long state experience also
comes with economic disadvantages relative to countries with intermediate state
experience. We show that this more complex relationship primarily underlies the
economic development indicators (population density and urbanization) and tech-
nology adoption in 1500 CE, but it also feeds into current economic performance.
Moreover, the relationship for current outcomes is robust to adjusting the index for
the ancestral lines of post-1500 migrant populations.2
The work clearly involves several methodological challenges. For instance, how
should a state be defined? In this regard, we follow the tradition of Service (1962),
Carneiro (1981), Johnson and Earle (2000) and others, distinguishing between bands,
chiefdoms, and full-fledged states. Unlike the other forms of governments, states are
further characterized by a centralized government with the ability to collect taxes,
2Olsson and Paik (2013) hint at this relationship, showing a “reversal of fortune” of countries
that made an early Neolithic transition. This idea of reversal was also discussed by Acemoglu et
al. (2001) and Hariri (2012).
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enforce laws, and mobilize forces for war. Using this definition, most sources seem
to be in rough agreement about the time when states arise in different countries.
Accompanying this paper is an extensive online data appendix where we motivate
the coding for each country-period observation.
Another issue concerns the unit of analysis, which is the territory delimited by
modern-day country borders, for 159 contemporary countries in the sample. It is
a well-known fact that the borders of current countries sometimes have very little
resemblance with the geopolitical logic in ancient times.3 However, to the extent that
researchers are interested in tracking the histories of countries in order to understand
contemporary levels of development, the modern configuration of countries is still a
natural point of departure.4
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we provide an overview of the
literature on the definition of a state and the relationship of state history to economic
development. In section 3, we present our theoretical framework. In section 4 we
present the new data and the principles guiding its construction. In section 5, we
carry out an econometric analysis of the relationship between economic development
and state history. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
2.1 State history and economic development
It is a well established empirical fact that history has shaped the contemporary
economic development of nations in numerous ways. Whether initial biogeographic
endowment and transition to agriculture (e.g. Hibbs and Olsson, 2004; Olsson and
Hibbs, 2005, Galor and Moav, 2007) or past technology adoption (Comin et al.
2006, 2009), early and productive starts have been typically shown to translate into
better income and institutions in present times.
The experience with state institutions has been put forth as one of the important
correlates of the current wealth distribution in the world. Specifically, from its
original development, the State antiquity index of Bockstette et al. (2002) has been
shown to be positively associated with 1995 income and with the 1960-1995 GDP
3Although this is a valid critique of the approach used here, there are also instances of countries
where states have evolved in close proximity to current borders, at least for some periods of time
(e.g. Norway, Sweden, and Japan).
4A potential alternative to using country borders could have been to divide the world into
equal-sized grid cells and then study the history of states in each such cell. State history has been
coded at the grid-cell level for sub-Saharan Africa after 1000 CE by Depetris-Chauvin (2014). For
the present study, this would entail a very different type of analysis with its own methodological
challenges. We leave this for future work.
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growth rate. Bockstette et al.’s aim was to use presence and duration of experience
with macro polities as one of several potential indicators of societal complexity and
level of technological advancement. The authors were interested in investigating the
effect of early social and technological development on post-WW2 economic growth
rates, and they assumed that the impact of very early experience would decay over
time, so they did not attempt to code information on state presence before 1 CE
or after 1950. They coded all countries with substantial populations for which
relevant economic growth and other indicators were available, resulting in a sample
of 104 countries, of which their analysis focused especially on 70 non-OECD member
countries.
Roughly the same data set was also used by Chanda and Putterman (2005),
and Chanda and Putterman (2007). Bockstette et al.’s data were subsequently ex-
panded to include more ex-Communist countries (Iliev and Putterman, 2007), more
African countries (Cinyabuguma and Putterman, 2011), and a few other countries
for which complementary income or other required data had initially been viewed
as unreliable. Based on this extended dataset, Putterman and Weil (2010) demon-
strated that the ability of state history to predict current levels of development is
greatly strengthened by replacing the state history that transpired on a given coun-
try’s territory by the weighted average state history of the places in which current
residents’ ancestors lived in the past. This adjustment was motivated by the large
movements of populations especially from “Old World” continents to the Americas,
Australia and New Zealand after 1500. Chanda, Cook and Putterman (2014) apply
the same procedure to demonstrate “persistence of fortune” of ancestral lines in for-
mer colonies that display a “reversal of fortune” (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson,
2002) in the absence of such ancestry and migration accounting.5
In short, previous work has largely agreed on a positive association between long-
run state history and current development. However, as scholars have acknowledged,
the present shares complex links with the past. For instance, pre-1500 economic ad-
vantages seem to have become relative disadvantages among colonized countries
during the colonial era (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2002). As of late,
this idea of reversal has been revisited in two studies that are particularly relevant
to our paper: Hariri (2012) presents compelling evidence that early (precolonial)
experience of state institutions in countries outside Europe prevented them from
5The state history data have also been employed in a number of other studies, receiving focal
attention in Ang (2013a, 2013b), playing important roles in Ahlerup and Olsson (2012), Hariri
(2012), Ertan, Putterman and Fiszbein (2012), and Daniele (2013), and being included as a control
in a number of other studies. None of the above studies attempts to extend the information on
states to include the BCE years or fill in the last half of the 20th Century.
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transplanting democratic institutions brought by European colonizers, leaving in-
stead an “autocratic legacy” in these countries. Olsson and Paik (2013) reveal a
negative association between the time from Neolithic transition and current income
levels in the Western agricultural core - Europe, North Africa and Southwestern
Asia.
Furthermore, the long-run persistence literature has begun to reveal nonlineari-
ties in how events in the very distant past affect economic development. For instance,
the migration out of Africa is argued to have generated a wide array of genetic di-
versity levels in human populations around the world. In turn, predicted genetic
diversity displays an inverted-u shape relationship with indicators of economic de-
velopment, including per capita income in 2000 (Ashraf and Galor, 2013).
Thus, in light of these recent developments, allowing for a more flexible relation-
ship between state history and contemporaneous levels of development is a natural
extension to the literature. In the theoretical section below, we present a formal
model of how states affect and are affected by economic development during the
agricultural era.
2.2 Defining the “state”
How do we know when a state has emerged? The first challenge stems from the
question of how to define the state, hardly a novel dilemma in social sciences. The
classical understanding of the “state” comes from Weber (1919), who defined it as
an entity which “upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical
force in the enforcement of its order” (Weber, 1978, p. 54). This implies that we
should be looking for evidence of the initial monopolization of power within a certain
territory.
However, there is also the question of the extent of this original jurisdiction:
how large is the population or the territory subject to the power monopoly? Is,
for instance, a village with 100 tribesmen, led by a chief, large enough to classify
as “state”? It appears that we need to find an appropriate threshold to distin-
guish between small and large scale political organization. Therefore we adopt the
convention that, although simple chiefdoms fall short of being states, a paramount
chiefdom which incorporates multiple individually substantial chiefdoms can be un-
derstood as a form of incipient state. Hence we decided to begin according partial
weight when a polity reaches this level. By this convention, for instance, the land
of what is today Belgium came under large-scale political organization for the first
time between 59 and 52 BCE, when it was integrated in the Roman Empire.
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This agrees with established sociological and anthropological taxonomies of hu-
man societies throughout their evolution. For instance, Johnson and Earle (2000)
proposed a division of societies into small-scale local group (further divided into
family, village and the Big Man group) and larger-scale regional polity, which can
be a chiefdom or a state. This distinction goes back even earlier, to Charles Tilly:
“the term [state] includes city-states, empires, theocracies, and many other forms
of government, but excludes tribes,” (Tilly, 1990, p. 1) and to Service’s (1962)
proposed typology of bands/tribes/chiefdoms/states.6
2.3 State history, fiscal capacity and the economy
The key assumption underlying our story of reversal of fortune is that up to a point,
accumulated state history favors capacity building, taxation and the provision of
public goods, which in turn spur economic growth. But beyond a certain level,
state experience is conducive to the build-up of extractive institutions and the rise
of powerful elites that appropriate tax revenue rather than turn it into public goods
and thereby undermine the entire economy. This assumption has three distinct
implications that need to hold for it to be valid: 1) that fiscal capacity is conducive
to economic growth; 2) that young, inexperienced states lack the ability to build a
solid tax infrastructure; 3) that leaders in old, very experienced states often tend to
misuse the tax revenue at the expense of the economy, despite having access to a
solid fiscal capacity. We discuss these elements in turn below:
Firstly, there is increasing evidence that a consolidated bureaucracy enables fi-
nancing large public projects and technological innovation, and investments in ef-
fective warfare, thus spurring economic growth. This is empirically supported by
recent studies on the historical role of state capacity, revealing strong correlations
and potential causal links between administrative infrastructure, high taxes and
economic prosperity (Besley and Persson, 2013; Dincecco and Katz, 2014).
Secondly, there is widespread agreement that a short state history generally
implies weaker fiscal capacity. This has recently been discussed among others by
Tilly (1990), Collier (2009), and Besley and Persson (2013).
However, the third supposition that older and more autonomous states are more
predisposed to develop and maintain abusive power structures, while intuitively
appealing, is less evident. The idea that states naturally develop from a basic need
to sustain collective action in large communities, particularly in response to attacks
by predators, is advanced by Tilly (1990) and Olson (1993). Olson goes on to argue
that in the face of theft from “roving bandits”, it is welfare enhancing to have one
6We thank Jacob Gerner Hariri for useful references on the matter of state definition.
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member of the community set himself up as a dictator that collects taxes which he
uses partly for defense, but mostly as selfish rent extraction. This autocrat then
becomes a “stationary bandit”, interested to advance productivity and income only
to the extent that he can extract more rents. This would work in the long run if
the autocrat was able to commit to always provide a certain level of public goods
like defense, private property and insurance against the risk of expropriation of his
subjects. However, by nature of dictatorships, there are no commitment devices for
an autocrat. Thus, the autocrat is susceptible to breaking his promises when he
takes a short-term view of his reign when, for instance, his position is uncertain,
or when there is no clear heir to his throne. The autocrat then extracts even more
rents, behaving like a “roving bandit”. Hence, concludes Olson, in an autocracy
good economic performance is unsustainable in the long run.
Complementary data-based evidence comes from Hariri (2012) who presents
causal estimates of the effect of state history on autocracy. Using an instrumental
variable approach, he shows that older indigenously formed states are more likely to
develop autocratic institutions than later states, his main proposed channel being
that older states more successfully fend off attempts at colonization, and hence do
not transplant democratic institutions from western colonizing powers.
Besley and Persson (2013) and Dincecco and Katz (2014) take the view that
political regimes characterized by non-inclusive institutions and regime instability
do not even manage to build fiscal capacity.7 In a similar spirit, Gennaioli and Voth
(2014) argue that success in warfare in early history was not necessarily contingent
on military investment, and therefore did not stimulate tax collection as much as it
did in the past five centuries (with the advent of the military revolution).8
The oldest states were indeed subject to numerous regime changes due to raids,
internal strife and shifts in the locus of power.9 However, we take a slightly different
angle, in the spirit of Olson (1993), and argue that even if older states had built bu-
reaucratic infrastructure, their propensity to be autocracies under regime instability
led to over-extraction of tax rents to the detriment of economic activity.
Similar conclusions stem from the finding that economic development in countries
with old civilizations typically lag behind the countries with an intermediate length
of state history like the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries, discussed
7Using 1600-1913 data from 11 European countries, Dincecco and Katz (2014) present causal
evidence that historical reforms of tax centralization and, to some extent, constraints on the exec-
utive led to higher tax revenue, improved infrastructural power, which then stimulated economic
growth. By contrast, states with more autonomous regional authorities generated smaller revenues.
8A classic example is that of China’s “Warring States” period, 475 - 221 BCE)
9We capture regime instability and power fragmentation in our Statehist index through a down-
grade in the origin of the rule and territorial components of our index.
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in recent work by Olsson and Paik (2013).10 According to the authors, the main
reasons for this “Western reversal of fortune” since the onset of agriculture were
institutional: the old civilizations developed autocratic, hierarchical societies that
were not conducive to the emergence of democracy and innovation, which became
critical factors for economic growth during the modern era.11 The more periph-
eral regions, which were slower to develop state institutions, were furthermore less
exposed to raids by roaming armies and to incursions by migrating peoples.
In what follows, we build this assumption into a new version of the Malthusian
growth model of Ashraf and Galor (2011) and present supporting empirical evidence
for the model’s predictions.
3 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we present the key features of our theoretical framework. The basic
setting is the Malthusian growth model of Ashraf and Galor (2011). We assume a
geographically well defined region where a population has made the transition to
an agricultural, sedentary society. In the section below, we only outline in detail
the new assumptions. A full characterization of the behavior and dynamics of the
model are presented in the Appendix.
The specific aim of the model is to propose a mechanism for how states interact
with economic development during the agricultural era. The key novel features of
the model are that we introduce the rise of an early state which taxes individuals but
also provides public goods. Both fiscal capacity as well as the centralization of power
increase with accumulated state experience. The centralization of power initially has
a positive impact on the effective provision of public goods and economic growth
but might eventually transform into having a negative impact when the constraints
and checks against governments become too weak.
3.1 State history
Let us begin by specifying that states only come into existence when population den-
sity has passed a critical level L˜/X = P˜ > 0, where L is the adult population size,
X is the amount of land and P is the population density. This assumption reflects
10Olsson and Paik (2013) present preliminary evidence showing that similar reversals appear to
have been in place also in East Asia and in Sub-Saharan Africa.
11Wittfogel’s (1957) “hydraulic hypothesis” makes the related argument that the old riverine
civilizations were autocratic due to the technological nature of large-scale irrigation. See also Ace-
moglu and Robinson (2012) for an analysis of how countries with inclusive, democratic institutions
eventually tend to dominate countries with extractive, autocratic institutions.
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the stylized fact that the first state formations emerged in areas with densely popu-
lated (and sometimes environmentally circumscribed) agricultural populations. An
organization in states with a king, a government and centrally provided public goods
was indeed most often a natural adaptation to Malthusian population pressures.12
Let st be an indicator of whether a state exists or not at time t such that we can
also define a stock of cumulative state history index Sτ as:
st =
{
1 if Pt ≥ P˜
0 if Pt < P˜
; Sτ =
τ∑
t=0
(1 + ρ)t−τ · st
τ is thus the contemporary time period and the starting date is t = 0 when a
first state was founded. The scores on the st-indicator are depreciated by a time
discount factor ρ ≥ 0 where time t ranges from the initial period 0 to the current
date τ : t ∈ {0, ...τ}. The depreciation process implies that state experience closer
to the current period τ is more important for the ability to provide public goods
and broadcast centralized power than experiences further back in time.
3.2 Behavior
Let us imagine an overlapping generations framework where a representative indi-
vidual lives for two periods, childhood and adulthood. All key choices are made in
adulthood. The individual has a utility function given by ut = c
γ
t · n1−γt where ct
is the individual’s level of consumption at time t with an associated preference pa-
rameter γ and nt is the (continuous) number of children of each adult person. One
unit of time might be thought of as a generation.
The adult individual farmer earns an income yt which can be used for either
child-rearing, consumption, or paying a tax to a state. The budget constraint is
ct + µnt ≤ yt − stθ(St). The parameter µ > 0 is the cost of rearing one child
and stθ(St) ≥ 0 is a lump-sum tax where st is the binary indicator defined above,
describing whether there is a state or not during the particular period t. The tax
level θ(St) is a positive function of the historical accumulated experience of a state
St ≥ 0. We will define taxation and the involvement of a state in the economy
further below.
12In a related paper, we show empirically that the timing of Neolithic transition is the most
important factor in the emergence of states and strongly influences the accumulation of state
experience (Olsson et al., 2015). In this model we also assume that X is above some reasonable
minimum scale, i.e. more than a hectare or two. For simplicity, we do not explicitly formalize
this sensible but minor detail in the notation. Please see previous sections for an overview of this
literature.
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As shown in the Appendix, the utility-maximizing level of fertility at t is n∗t =
(1− γ) (yt − stθ(St)) /µ. Fertility thus increases with after-tax income (yt − stθ(St))
and decreases with cost per child µ.
Aggregate production is given by a standard production function Yt = AtX
1−αLαt
where Yt is output, X is the amount of land, At is total factor productivity, Lt is the
size of the labor force (equal to the number of live adults in period t), and α ∈ (0, 1)
is the output elasticity of labor. If we define population density as Pt = Lt/X, we
can express output per adult individual as Yt/Lt = yt = AtP
α−1
t .
3.3 Public goods
Taxes are used for the provision of public goods. Public goods are large-scale utilities
that only regions with an existing state can provide such as defensive walls, large-
scale irrigation, infrastructure, property rights, rule of law, science, money, and
safety along trade routes. Publicly provided goods like these obviously enhance
productivity for farming populations by lowering transaction costs of production
and trade. The effective provision of public goods Gt ≥ 0 requires the collection of
taxes θ(St) which we assume are a positive function of state experience St. More
precisely, we assume that θ(0) = 0, limSt→∞ θ(St) = θ¯ < 1, and that θ
′(St) > 0 at
all St > 0. The longer the state experience, the greater the fiscal capacity to collect
taxes. In a sense, there is thus a learning-by-doing effect from state history.13
The effective provision of public goods not only depends on the physical resources
θ(St) extracted through taxation but also on the effective level of centralized coor-
dination Z(St). This refers to the institutions in place to initiate, coordinate and
enforce collective action in large public good projects such as the construction of a
defensive tower or the digging of irrigation canals. Z(St) might thus be thought of
as reflecting how efficiently physical resources from taxation θ(St) are transformed
into actual public goods. In the early stages of development, centralized power
made possible the creation of public goods previously unseen and most likely en-
hanced productivity greatly. Centralization also provided sufficient law and order
(or suppression of conflict) among immediate neighbors so that people could settle
thickly, and invest their energies in production while benefiting from specialization
and trade. Z(0) = 1 means that when a state first arises, the government manages
to transform θ(St) into Gt in a one-to-one manner.
13Although we do not model it here, one might argue that there is potentially also a reverse
causality in the sense that the ability to tax the population is an important factor behind the
emergence and sustainability of states.
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However, centralized power without constraints might also lead to the enrichment
of a small elite at the expense of the masses and the stifling of individual initiative.
Extremely centralized political and economic power implies very weak incentives for
individual effort and a culture of counter-productive rent seeking and corruption.
Hence, we assume that Z(St) is at first an increasing and then a decreasing, concave
function of state experience such that Z ′(St) > 0 at low levels of St and that Z ′(St) <
0 at higher levels.
We assume that the effective provision of public goods Gt is a multiplicative
function of physical tax resources θ(St), centralized coordination Zt(St), and the
binary indicator st describing whether there is a state or not during the particular
period t:
Gt = st · θ(St) · Z(St)
Here we assume that public goods are provided only when state institutions are
in place, i.e. st = 1. We will henceforth present all dynamics under this assumption.
This is a convenient simplification, but in the Appendix we also present a version
where there is taxation even in the absence of a state.14
A Z(St) < 1 implies that a fraction (1− Z(St)) · θ(St) > 0 of public resources
is wasted or counterproductive due to mismanagement, corruption, or crowding out
of private activity.
3.4 Productivity
We assume that during the Malthusian era, the total productivity or technology vari-
able At in the aggregate production function depends on two key factors; the quality
of the natural environment for agriculture N and the region’s effective provision of
public goods Gt.
The natural environment N includes biogeographical factors such as the access
to suitable plants and animals for domestication (Olsson and Hibbs, 2005) but also
the quality of the soil, the annual patterns of precipitation, the prevalence of frosts,
14There might be instances when old states with a lot of state history and a high St collapse
so that st = 0. Despite the region’s long history of governments, our assumption implies that
public goods are provided neither when a state collapses, nor before it emerges. If a state should
arise again so that st = 1, that new state organization can benefit from the accumulated (time
discounted) experience St from previous governments. An example is the Indus Valley, where the
early Harappan states (emerged cca 2000 BCE) broke down around the 17th century BCE, with no
evidence of political organization, urban developments, or any public good provision for an entire
millennium. Yet, the Harappan civilization has a bearing in the total accumulated state experience
in the territory of India and Pakistan, since its technological and political innovations influenced
subsequent development.
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etc. For simplicity, we imagine that N is a constant and that At increases linearly
with N .15
State-provided public goods like security, roads, irrigation, and market places
greatly enhanced the aggregate level of productivity in agricultural societies. We
propose a very simple specification for productivity:
At = A(N,St) = N +Gt(St) = N + θ(St) · Z(St) (1)
Hence, a key feature of the model is that
∂At
∂St
= AS = θ
′(St) · Z(St) + θ(St) · Z ′(St) R 0.
Given the concavity of Z(St), we can define the productivity maximizing level of
state history as S∗t = arg max [θ(St) · Z(St)]. When St = S∗t , further state experience
is going to induce a net negative impact on productivity through the negative effects
of too much centralized power. Of course, if the link between state history and the
degree of centralized coordination Z(St) is very weak, S
∗
t would be very high and
potentially outside the empirically relevant range. In that case, we would only
observe a positive relationship between A and S. We will return to this issue in the
empirical section.
3.5 Dynamics
If a state exists so that st = 1, it is demonstrated in the Appendix that the equilib-
rium population density will converge towards a level
P¯ st =
(
(1− γ) (N + θ(St) · Z(St))
µ+ (1− γ) θ(St)
) 1
1−α
. (2)
This expression has taxes θ(St) both in the numerator and in the denominator.
The intuition is that taxation, on the one hand, decreases optimal fertility since
taxes mean that less resources are available for raising children. This is the effect
in the denominator. On the other hand, taxes also increase the provision of public
goods and hence productivity and income per person, which has a positive impact
on the number of children (in the numerator). It should also be remembered that
the level of taxes θ(St) increases monotonically with St.
The level of centralized coordination Z(St) only enters in the numerator. This
stems from the impact of Z(St) on aggregate productivity and on income levels per
15In reality, we know that the natural environment will be affected over the long run by human
exploitation, climate change, etc. We abstract from these aspects below.
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adult.16 Due to the specific nature of Z(St), centralized coordination will have a pos-
itive impact on population density during a first phase of state experience. As state
history accumulates, government may tend to become more and more exploitative
and tax resources may be wasted in corruption and embezzlement. Moreover, the
effective level of public goods includes effectiveness at enhancing the population’s
productivity, and effectiveness can go down from overmeddling or regulating (like
China banning overseas commerce in 15th century or Louis XIV over-regulating
France). Eventually, aggregate production will start to fall and population density
will decline in response.
3.6 Industrial era
In this section, we will briefly explore the channels through which state history might
have an impact even on post-Malthusian, modern economies.
In the industrial era, land is no longer a central factor of production and it is
standard to model aggregate output as a function of productivity or technology At,
labor Lt, and physical capital Kt such that Yt = F (At, Lt, Kt). If we assume a
labor-augmenting technology so that Yt = K
α
t (AtLt)
1−α, then output per worker (or
per capita) can be written as yt = Yt/Lt = Atk
α
t where kt = Kt/AtLt is capital per
unit of effective labor.
Another standard assumption is that technological progress during the industrial
era grows in each period at a percentage rate g > 0 which we assume to be exoge-
nously given and not a function of the natural environment or of state-provided
public goods.17 In line with the expression in (1), let us define the level of produc-
tivity at the end of the Malthusian era tM > 0 to be AtM = N + θ(StM ) · Z(StM ).
The level of productivity in some industrial era time period τ > tM is then
Aτ = AtM · (1 + g)τ−tM = (N + θ(StM ) · Z(StM )) · (1 + g)τ−tM
As demonstrated in the Appendix, the equilibrium level of log output per capita
in this economy is:18
ln y¯τ = ln(N + θ(StM ) · Z(StM )) + (τ − tM) ln(1 + g) +
α
1− α ln
(
s
g + n+ δ + ng
)
.
(3)
16Note that At = N + θ(St) · Z(St).
17In a globalized industrial economy, important innovations tend to spread geographically
through technological diffusion from the technological frontier.
18For an analysis along the same lines, see Mankiw et al (1992).
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Thus, in this model we make the simplifying assumption that state history solely
affects current levels of prosperity through its impact on the level of productivity at
the time of the country’s industrial revolution.19
Comparative statics show that
∂ ln y¯τ
∂StM
=
AS
AtM
=
θ′(StM ) · Z(StM ) + θ(StM ) · Z ′(StM )
N + θ(StM ) · Z(StM )
Since the denominator of this expression is always positive, the sign is determined
by whether the numerator is positive or negative. As was discussed above, the fact
that Z(St) is a concave function of St means that, once again, the derivative will be
positive at low levels of StM and negative at high levels of StM .
3.7 Key predictions
On the basis of the model, we have derived three key hypotheses:
First, total factor productivity At during the Malthusian era should have a con-
cave, inverted u-shaped relationship with accumulated state history St. Given the
key role of our conjecture that levels of centralization Z(St) eventually had a nega-
tive impact on the provision of productivity-enhancing public goods (e.g. education
or secure property rights, necessary to ensure a favorable climate for technological
innovation), we start by testing this relationship in the empirical section.
Second, the Malthusian era population density P¯ st in (2) will also have a con-
cave, inverted u-shaped relationship with St. The existence of a state means the
individual’s resources are taxed, which leaves less for children. However, the positive
effect of a state on productivity will dominate initially but then turn negative when
centralization lowers the effective provision of public goods and strangles individual
effort, which leads to a stagnation or even decrease in fertility.
Third, since the starting level of productivity on the eve of the industrial rev-
olution is a concave function of state history, a final prediction from the model is
that there should be a persistent, non-linear effect of state history on contemporary
levels of prosperity.
19This is a very strong assumption, and in a richer model, we might also have assumed that
the actual timing of the industrial revolution tM or the level of g was affected by state history, as
suggested by previous research. Empirical observation seems to suggest that it was countries with
intermediate levels of state history like United Kingdom and France that made the transition first.
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4 Data
In this section, we will outline how the existing index of state history has been
extended to cover the BCE period. We will also briefly present some of the key
tendencies in the new data series.
4.1 Constructing the index
The construction of the index for the BCE period follows the principles developed by
Bockstette et al (2002), applied here to 159 modern-day countries.20 We use evidence
of written records where available. Where not extant, we rely on archaeological
data, following a “diagnostic traits” approach: we consider material manifestations
of the monopolization of power, as an “archaeological confirmation of the process
of state formation” (Jones and Kautz, 1981, pp. 16-17). These can be monumental
structures, such as palaces, temples or large urban settlements etc. In the case of
Iraq, for instance, there is the transition from small to large urban centers with
grand architectural structures such as Uruk in the middle of the 4th millennium
BCE.21
The second task is to mark the transition from chiefdom to fully-fledged state.
Following the paradigm of the evolution of pristine states from chiefdoms (see e.g.
Carneiro 1981, Earle 1987, Flannery 1995, Marcus 1992, Spencer 1990, Spencer and
Redmond 2004), we mark this distinction in our data by assigning the following
values: Band/tribe is marked by a rule score of 0, paramount chiefdom is assigned
0.75 and fully-fledged state receives the value 1. Robert Carneiro emphasizes that
the paramount chiefdom is the evolutionary link between autonomous bands or
tribes and the state.22
While it is difficult to know exactly where the chiefdom ends and where the state
begins in pre-history, we have made efforts to draw a sensible line where the evi-
dence suggests a noteworthy evolution in socio-political organization.23 While this
20The reader is referred to the online Appendix C for a more detailed discussion of the coding
procedures and exceptions.
21Admittedly, the drawback of this “symptomatic” approach is that it blurs the boundary be-
tween state and civilization and it is susceptible to misclassifying an emerging or transient civi-
lization into a state in the Weberian sense.
22In his definition, the paramount chiefdom is “an autonomous political unit comprising a number
of villages or communities under the permanent control of a paramount chief” (Carneiro, 1981, p.
45), while the state is “an autonomous political unit, encompassing many communities within its
territory and having a centralized government with the power to collect taxes, draft men for work
or war, and decree and enforce laws” (Carneiro, 1970, p. 733).
23Such is the case of Mexico, where we assign a score of 0.75 to the period 450 - 100 BCE for the
early urban settlements at Chiapas and Oaxaca. We then raise this score to 1 in 100 BCE when
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approach is not uncontroversial, it is the most feasible given limited documentary
resources. We further detail the assignment of scores in a later section.
For each country, the time of emergence of the first state institutions on its
territory is identified, as defined above. State age is defined as the time elapsed from
this date until 2000 CE. The oldest state was established on the land of today’s Iraq
around 3500 BCE. Hence, the time for all countries is divided into 110 periods of
50-years.
For each country i and half century t, scores are assigned to reflect three dimen-
sions of state presence, based on the following questions:24
1. Is there a government above the tribal level? Score component z1it receives 1
point if yes, 0.75 if the government can at best be described as a paramount
chiefdom and 0 points if no government is present.
2. Is this government foreign or locally based? z2it is 1 if the rule is locally based,
0.5 if externally based, and 0.75 for local government with substantial foreign
oversight.25
3. How much of the territory of the modern country was ruled by this govern-
ment? z3it reflects the proportions of the territory under some rule: 1 (over 50
percent), 0.75 (25-50 percent), 0.5 (10-25 percent), 0.3 (under 10 percent).26
Time is indexed by t and refers to a 50-year period ranging from t = 0 for 3500-
3451 BCE when the first state arose, to t = 109 for 1950-2000 CE). For every such
time interval, we compute a composite State index score by multiplying the three
components by one another and by 50:27
sit = z
1
it · z2it · z3it · 50 (4)
Finally, joining the BCE- with the preexisting CE-era series, we aggregate all
“flow” scores sit into Statehist - the comprehensive index of the cumulative state
large-scale urban growth at Teotihuacan and the development of previously missing institutions
such as a standing army warrant the status of fully-fledged state.
24Each dimension is denoted by zcit, which is the score for component c in country i for period t.
25If there were multiple polities within a present country’s borders, its state score for the period
is coded as a simple average of their respective scores.
26For multiple contemporaneous states within what is now a single country z3it is adjusted down
one category, because centralized coordination is assumed to decrease.
27Within period changes in zcit require averaging the scores over subperiods, using as weights the
number of years in each sub-period θ divided by 50:
sit = 50 ·
[
(z1it1 · z2it1 · z3it1) · wit1 + (z1it2 · z2it2 · z3it2) · wit2 + · · ·
]
.
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history.28 The index is normalized by the score of a hypothetical state with full
discounted scores between 3500 BCE and the period of interest τ :
Siτ =
∑τ
t=0(1 + ρ)
t−τ · sit∑τ
t=0(1 + ρ)
t−τ · 50 (5)
This cumulative Statehist index Siτ ranges from 0 to 1 and can be calculated
at virtually any point in history τ = {0, 1, ...109}. We calculate it mainly for 1500
CE (at τ = 99) and for 2000 CE. We can use various rates ρ ≥ 0 for discounting
historical scores. The previous literature has set the convention at ρ = 0.05, in light
of the reasonable assumption that the more distant past matters less today than
recent history. With the additional data, however, this rate gives insufficient weight
to the long stream of sit-scores before 1 CE.
29 While it of course remains to be seen
below just how useful placing weight on the distant past will be, our convention is
to employ the 1 percent discount factor of the normalized Statehist score.30
To answer the three questions (a-c) above in a manner that is consistent across
periods, we relied mainly on information in the Encyclopedia Britannica Online.
We provide additional detail on our data sources and illustrate the coding process
and further data aggregations in the online Appendix C. Accompanying this paper
is also an online Data Coding Appendix, which provides a comprehensive list of
coding decisions for all country-period observations.
4.2 A brief look at the data
In this section we present some patterns that arise from the complete state history
time series and the data used in forthcoming analyses.
Firstly, we note that the evolution of state institutions in the world follows
approximately an exponential upward trend with periods of rapid growth punctuated
by periods of stagnation (Figure 1). The graph shows the log of the aggregated
percentage score for all contemporary countries in our sample at each 50-year period
on the vertical axis and year on the horizontal axis. The percentage score in period
t is calculated as State index world (t) = 100 ·∑Ni=1 sit/ (N · 50) where N = 159 is
the number of included countries and where sit ∈ [0, 50] is the state history score for
28Some minor adjustments were made to the original CE index, but the correlation with the
initial index, considering year 1 to 1950 CE periods only, is 99 percent.
29The extended Statehist score (for the 3500 BCE to 2000 CE period) has a correlation of up to
99.3 percent with the 5 percent discounted 1 - 1950 CE score.
30The 1 percent discounted Statehist index at 2000 CE has a 0.93 correlation with the 1 - 1950
CE 1 percent discounted Statehist index and 0.86 correlation with the 1 - 1950 CE 5 percent
discounted Statehist index.
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country i during 50-year interval t, as described above.31 A value close to 0 percent
in this world index indicates that there is no sign of state presence in any of the
included countries in period t whereas a score of 100 means that all 159 countries
reach the maximum value sit = 50 in our state measure during that period.
32
Several periods are characterized by rapid state evolution whereas other periods
are marked by a general decline. The first boom in state emergence appears already
in 3500-2300 BCE, which then ends with a long period of stagnation. The other
major stagnations in the figure happened around 1750 BCE, 1200 BCE, and 400 CE.
A second period of rapid growth was 850 BCE-1 CE during the Iron Age. From just
after the collapse of the Roman empire around 450 CE, aggregate state emergence
shows a steady upward trend.
This pattern is also visible in Figure 2, which in addition shows the regional
aggregated percentage score for all contemporary countries in our sample (this figure
displays world and regional averages of the Statehist index, rather than the natural
log of that average as in Figure 1, allowing the reader to get a sense of the trend
in a form some may find more intuitive). We disaggregate the evolution of state
history into the four main agricultural core areas: Western, Eastern Asia, Sub-
Saharan Africa, and the Americas.33 These four areas are created on the basis of
how Neolithic agriculture and civilization spread during early historical times.
When we divide up the world in this way, some striking historical differences be-
tween the regions appear: State evolution started earliest in the Western area, with
Eastern Asia lagging behind until rough convergence (indeed, initially overtaking)
around 500 CE, with the other regions gaining steam later and all converging only
toward the end of the era of European colonialism. State emergence was earliest
in Eastern Asia and in the Western region. Interestingly, both of these early civi-
lizations took off on a more rapid path after 850 BCE. By the time of the Western
Roman collapse after 450 CE, Asian state development overtakes the Western one
for the first time.34
31Note that State index world(t) describes the “flow” level of state development in the world in
period t and not the cumulative “stock” of state experience.
32Since many modern-day countries did not have full states in the spirit of our definition during
the entirety of last time period 1950-2000, the aggregate percentage in the graph is about 88 percent
at the end of the time series. Many states were de-colonized part way through the period, a number
emerged from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, others experienced contending governments or state
failure, etc.
33The division into agricultural core areas follows the practice in Morris (2010) and Olsson
and Paik (2013) (see also Diamond and Bellwood, 2003). Combining the two or three distinct
agricultural cores of the Americas identified by some writers is a convenient simplification.
34See Morris (2010) for a detailed comparative analysis of Western and Eastern history since the
Neolithic.
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The other two regions, the Americas and Sub-Saharan Africa, clearly lag behind,
in particular after the Eurasian turning point 850 BCE. From about 500 CE, the
pace of state emergence starts to increase in Sub-Saharan Africa. When the colonial
era starts in the late 15th century CE, the lagging regions experience a dramatic
increase in the State index. This increase is of course to a great extent driven by
the emergence of colonial states, created by European powers. By the final period
of observation (1951-2000), the Americas has the highest score on state presence
among all regions in the world.35
The Statehist index and other variables related to state experience, as well as
outcomes and control variables used in all forthcoming analyses are summarized in
Table 1 below. Full definitions of each variable are given in the online appendix.
5 State History and Economic Development
We now proceed to analyze the relationship between state history and pre-industrial
as well as current economic development.
5.1 State history and pre-industrial economic development
State history and productivity in 1500
We begin with the empirical question of the relationship between state history
and productivity in the Malthusian era. The first prediction of our model was that
total factor productivity should increase up to some level of accumulated state his-
tory, beyond which it may decrease, owing to the negative effects of centralized power
on the coordination of economic activity and public good provision. Since accumu-
lated state history may have adversely affected productivity by stifling innovation,
we proxy productivity with the average index of technology adoption constructed
by Comin, Easterly and Gong (2010). Using various data sources on the presence
and complexity of various technologies, the country-level index captures advances
in five sectors: agriculture, transportation, communications, writing, and military.
The index is computed for 1000 BCE, 1 CE, 1500 CE and 2000 CE, using slightly
different approaches, which we describe in some detail in Appendix B.
35In Figure D1 of the online appendix, we zoom in on the last 550 years of state history and
show trends for Western Offshoots including the U.S. and Canada (along with Australia and New
Zealand) and for the rest of the Americas (Latin America and the Caribbean). The latter two
regions are shown to come from behind to overtake even Europe in internally controlled state
presence by the mid-1800s.
30
In order to test this prediction, we set up the following model:
Technology1500 i = β0+β1·Statehist1500i+β2·Statehist15002i+β′j ·Zi+β′k·Xi+λc+i
(6)
On the left hand-side of equation (6) we have the average technology adoption
index in 1500 CE. On the right-hand side we include our main independent vari-
able, Statehist (the cumulative index shown in equation (5) accumulated in 1500
CE), both linear and squared, to account for the potentially quadratic relation-
ship. The Statehist index is normalized with respect to 3500 B.C.E - 1500 CE and
computed using a 1 percent discount rate per period. Zi is a vector of historical
controls including: Agyearsi, the time before present since the Neolithic transi-
tion in the country-area in question, a variable taken from Putterman and Trainor
(2006); Origtimei - the approximate time since the first settlement on the territory
of the modern-day country by anatomically modern humans, a variable introduced
by Ahlerup and Olsson (2012) as a determinant of the variation in levels of ethnic
diversity across the world. In a more flexible specification, we include the square of
Origtimei and a linear control State age i. Xi is a vector containing geographic con-
trols. These include: latitude of the centroid of the modern-day country i, whether
the country is landlocked, its distance to coast or ocean-navigable river, average
elevation, the land suitability for agriculture, climatic variables for temperature and
precipitation, and the risk of malaria.36 λc is a vector of continent fixed effects.
The results are displayed in Table 2. Columns (1)-(4) present the results without
controlling for geographic characteristics. In columns (6)-(7) we present the results
using continent fixed effects.
Our main coefficients of interest are β1 and β2, which estimate the relationship
between pre-industrial level of technology adoption and state experience. In column
(1) we display the simple association between technology adoption and Statehist,
which is positive and significant. In column (2) we add the squared Statehist, and
the estimates of the Statehist parameters display the concave pattern predicted by
the model: both coefficients are significant at 1 percent, β1 is positive, while β2 is
negative.
We move directly to column (4) in panel A, where we add to the model the first
historical control - Agyears (shown to be positively significantly correlated with
the dependent variable in column 3, for comparison purposes). Its inclusion only
slightly changes the signs and the magnitude of the coefficients of the Statehist terms.
36These variables are taken from the Portland Physical Geography dataset and from the dataset
compiled from various other sources by Ashraf and Galor (2013). See the online appendix for more
details on variables’ construction and collection.
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Moreover, the effect of the time from transition to agriculture is reduced relative
to column (3).37 When we also add Origtime and geographical controls in column
(5), the magnitude of the estimates changes slightly, but the relationship remains
concave. In columns (6) and (7) we learn that the quadratic relationship holds after
controlling for continent fixed effects as well. The introduction of continent fixed
effects wipes out the estimate of Agyears, while the estimate on Statehist squared
remains significant, albeit diminished.
The last column accounts for the age of states and also for recent developments
in the literature postulating that the patterns of human settlement in prehistory
may have complex effects on later economic development (Ashraf and Galor, 2013).
By introducing the squared Origtime variable, we allow for a nonlinear relationship
in the time since first human settlement. However, the coefficients of the terms
containing Origtime are insignificant, while the State Age control has a negative
and significant, albeit small effect.
State history, population and urbanization in 1500 CE
Having established that state history is related to pre-industrial levels of produc-
tivity in a non-monotonic fashion, we also inquire whether this pattern is reflected
in population density at 1500 CE, the second prediction of our model. We also ask
whether state experience made a difference for the level of economic development in
1500 CE, measured through urbanization rates.
In Table 3 we display the results from the model explaining population density
in 1500 CE (panel A) and urbanization rate in 1500 CE (panel B). All specifications
are analogous to those in Table 2.38
In the first column in both panels we see that extended Statehist is positively
and significantly correlated with past population density and urbanization. Interest-
ingly, in the second column, where we introduce Statehist squared, both coefficients
are highly significant, displaying the same quadratic relationship with the left-hand
side variable as uncovered in Table 2. These unconditional estimates convey that the
positive impact of an increase in state experience on population density diminishes
up to a point where it becomes null. Beyond this point, increased experience with
state institutions impacts negatively on population density. For historical urban-
37As a robustness check, we have redone the estimations using the overall technology adoption
index excluding the agriculture components; the results are very similar. See Table E5 in the
appendix.
38We also fitted multiple regression models where the economic outcomes depend linearly on
Statehist. The results displayed in Tables E6-E9 in the appendix reveal that these models have
slightly lower explanatory power than the models allowing for quadratic Statehist effects.
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ization rates, we observe the same quadratic pattern displayed by the coefficients
of Statehist and Statehist squared, which are significant at conventional levels for
outcomes in 1500 CE. The non-linear pattern is robust to all changes in specifica-
tion and it holds even with continent fixed effects. We note also that the inverted-u
relationship for these outcomes as well as technology adoption is also observed for
all outcomes in year 1 CE, but it becomes insignificant when we gradually introduce
controls in the regressions (see online appendix Table E3 - panels A and B, and Ta-
ble E4, panel A). The estimated state history effects are net of the contribution of
early transition to agriculture, which was still influencing positively the population
density in 1500 CE.
5.2 State history and current economic development
The third prediction of our model was that accumulated state history should af-
fect current economic development non-linearly, due to the persistence of its effects
(positive at low levels, negative at high ones) on productivity in the pre-industrial
era. To investigate whether this is indeed the case, we start by estimating our model
with technology adoption in 2000 CE as a quadratic function of state history. The
results are displayed in Table 4 below. In panel A, we regress technology adoption
on Statehist in 2000 CE.
However, when analyzing the current levels of technological sophistication, using
the raw Statehist data means that we only account for the history within the territo-
ries of modern-day countries. This ignores the state history of other territories from
which people migrated in recent centuries to settle in new territories. Population
flows after 1500, when the era of colonization began, are instrumental in mapping
the impact of historical events to today’s economic performance. This is because
the ancestors of today’s population have evidently brought with them the history,
the know-how and the experience with state institutions from their places of origin
(Putterman and Weil, 2010; Comin et al, 2010; Ashraf and Galor, 2013).
We therefore also use an alternative measure of state history which is obtained
by adjusting the 1500 CE Statehist index with the migration matrix developed by
Putterman and Weil (2010). We then re-estimate our model using this new measure
- the ancestry-adjusted Statehist - which, for each country, represents the average
pre-industrial Statehist of its year 2000 population’s ancestors, with the weights for
each source country being the share of then-living ancestors estimated to have lived
on its present-day territory. These alternative results are displayed in Table 4, panel
B.
33
Remarkably, the same concave relationship emerges when the dependent vari-
able is the average index of technology adoption in 2000 CE. Furthermore, using the
ancestry-adjusted Statehist in 1500 CE to explain the differences in average tech-
nology adoption in 2000 yields significant estimates in all specifications, with larger
magnitudes and higher R-squared statistics than using the Statehist in 2000 CE.
Thus, the relationship between state experience and technology was indeed concave
in the Malthusian era, and it was transmitted, albeit in weakened form, all the way
into modern-day levels of technology adoption (compare Table 4 to Table 2). This
result is so far consistent with the predictions of our model.
The last prediction of our model was that there should also be a persistent
non-linear effect of state history on contemporary economic prosperity, owing to
its non-linear effect on productivity before the industrial revolution. We test this
prediction by comparing per capita GDP levels in 2000, as a function of accumulated
state history.
Figure 3 illustrates the essence of our findings. On the Y-axis we have the
logarithm of GDP per capita in 2000 and on the X-axis we have the extended
Statehist (normalized with respect to 3500 B.C.E - 2000 CE and computed using a
1 percent discount rate per period).
The figure displays a scatter plot of all countries in the sample, while also allowing
for a quadratic fit of the relationship between output and Statehist. A hump-shaped
relationship emerges when using the extended Statehist.39 The immediate implica-
tion is that states with extreme values of Statehist fare worse in terms of per capita
GDP in 2000 than states with intermediate levels of Statehist, as measured by the
extended index. In the online appendix, we show that the relationship between year
2000 income and the state history index based on 1 - 1950 CE data does not display
the downward sloping portion of the inverted U seen in Figure 3.
However, Figure 3 provides only an initial impression. The inverted U pattern
is not especially apparent in the scatter of points, and in any case the relationship
plotted is not conditioned on the influence of other variables. The question arises
whether the apparent relationship between Statehist and income mainly reflects
other historical forces at play or natural conditions which may have shaped both
the history of state institutions and current wealth. In order to investigate this
issue, we estimate the model in (6) with the logarithm of GDP per capita in 2000
CE as the dependent variable. The results are displayed in Table 5 below. In panel
39This quadratic relationship is also suggested by the scatter plots displayed separately for
internally- and externally- originated states (i.e. the rule was imposed from within the state’s
territory and from without, respectively) and when we use the ancestry-adjusted Statehist index.
See Figures D3-D5 in the appendix.
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A, we use the new Statehist index, while in panel B, the Statehist 1 -1950 CE data
are used for purposes of comparison. All specifications are analogous to the ones in
the previous tables.
As before, the main coefficients of interest are those of Statehist and Statehist
squared, which estimate the relationship between current per capita income and state
experience in 2000 CE. The unconditional correlation between per capita income and
Statehist is positive and similar in magnitude across the two panels, but slightly less
precisely estimated when the independent variable is (the new, extended) Statehist.
In column (2) we add the squared Statehist, and the results mirror the pattern
conveyed by Figure 3: In panel A, both coefficients are significant at 1 percent,
and their signs confirm the concave relationship between log per capita GDP and
state history. By contrast, in panel B, the counterpart of this specification using
Statehist 1 -1950 CE displays coefficients with the same signs but much smaller and
insignificant (the coefficient of the quadratic term even turns positive when controls
are included).40
While Agyears is significantly positively correlated with modern-day GDP (col-
umn 3), when we control for it alongside the linear and quadratic Statehist, its
inclusion hardly changes the signs and the magnitudes of the coefficients of the
Statehist terms. Moreover, the effect of the time from transition to agriculture is
insignificant. As with previous estimations, the results are robust to the inclusion
of Origtime, as well as geographical controls and continent fixed effects.
When we control for the age of states and also introduce the squared Origtime,
the coefficient on the latter is insignificant and state age displays a significant but
small coefficient.41 The introduction of state age diminishes the estimate on Statehist
squared, indicating that the right extreme of Figure 3 is explained by the length of
state existence (the extensive margin of state history), in addition to the overall
degree of autonomy or territory considerations (the intensive margin). We note that
in panel B, the main estimates when using quadratic specification of the old Statehist
are neither significant, nor similar in terms of signs with the estimates in panel A.
This speaks to the added value of the extended Statehist data.
Lastly, from Table 5, based on the estimates of our coefficients of interest, we can
infer that the optimal predicted level of Statehist is reached at 0.356, which is very
40Note that we obtain similar estimates if we use the 1-2000 CE Statehist index instead, meaning
that the 1950-2000 CE period is not what is driving the quadratic relationship documented in panel
A.
41We explore alternative specifications in Tables E1 and E2 in the appendix, where we include
linear and squared variables such as the time since transition to agriculture, state age, absolute
latitude, migratory distance from Addis Ababa, and predicted genetic diversity (where the latter
two are taken from Ashraf and Galor, 2013). Our main coefficients of interest are robust.
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close to that of the United Kingdom (0.357), and most countries in Western Europe.
The effects’ magnitudes are not straightforward to assess from the tables. However,
some numerical examples may show more clearly how the impact of an increase in
Statehist depends on the original level of state experience. Take for instance the
case of Indonesia, which has 1350 years of state existence and a Statehist score of
0.254. If we could hypothetically increase the Statehist score by 0.1 (reaching the
level of the UK score), the implied approximate effect on per capita GDP in 2000
would be roughly a 20 percent increase, from USD 773 to USD 944 in 2000.42 The
opposite would happen if we were to increase the value of the Statehist score by 0.1
for China, which starts off with a value of 0.582: the approximate effect would be a
drop in per capita GDP in 2000 by 44.4 percent.
Taken together, our estimation results so far are consistent with the last pre-
diction of the model. Moreover, we also showed that this evidence only comes to
light when we employ the new extended Statehist index. While these results cannot
necessarily be read as causal, we take an additional step in that direction, by also
estimating the model for per capita GDP above using the ancestry-adjusted Stathist
index. The results, using two alternative adjustment methods, are displayed in Table
6. In panel A, we use the Statehist index in 1500 adjusted by the migration matrix
(as in previous studies, but for the first time including full state history before 1
CE). In panel B, we use a composite index obtained by adding the raw 1500 - 2000
Statehist to the ancestry-adjusted Statehist index at 1500, which is then normalized
by the full discounted score for 3500 BCE - 2000 CE. The 1500 - 2000 CE part is
added in order to account for the places’ histories in the past five centuries.43
We find that the inverted-u shape relationship between per capita income and the
ancestry-adjusted Statehist is robust to all specifications and that the coefficients
of interest are significant at 1 percent level in all columns in panel A. Moreover,
the explanatory power of the model when we introduce only the ancestry-adjusted
Statehist terms (column 2) is now 20.9 percent vs 5.2 for unadjusted Statehist. The
results using the measure used in panel B, look reassuringly similar to those in
Table 2, panel A. The fact that the column (2) R-squared is much lower when we
account for the 1500-2000 portion of Statehist tells us that, in line with our model,
42The exact calculation based on estimates in column 2 of panel A is [(7.010−2·9.842·0.254)/10]·
100% = 20.1%.
43Conceptually, the first part of the component index represents the history non-indigenous
populations brought with them to their new homes in 1500 (or after), the second part the political
experience they (and indigenous descendants, if any) experienced there since that time. Such a
composite gives only a rough accounting for actual experience insofar as many migrants arrived
long after 1500, and the timing of migration differs considerably both by receiving and by source
country.
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the most relevant variation for economic performance today comes from the pre-
industrial era state experience. We note also that the fact that the main estimates
are unaffected by State age, indicates that the intensive margin of the index, given
by the autonomy, coherence and territorial extent of the centralized rule, is the main
driver of the results. All of these elements are crucial for amassing and maintaining
centralized power.
The interpretation of these results is similar, but more nuanced than when we
use the raw data: territories which accumulated limited or extensive, solid and
unchallenged state experience by 1500 CE, either locally or through an inflow of
knowledge from migrant populations, have a lower per capita GDP in 2000 CE than
those with an intermediate level of state experience. This result is also consistent
with our theoretical framework where we argued that the link between state history
and current levels of development should mainly be driven by what happened during
the Malthusian era (i.e. prior to 1500 CE).
5.3 Discussion
To sum up, we have presented a model of the role of state experience in economic de-
velopment, through its non-linear effect on productivity in the Malthusian era, which
carries over into modern day productivity and output. The accompanying empir-
ical analysis revealed consistent reduced-form regressions, where a robust concave
relationship is confirmed between extended Statehist and technology and economic
development in 1500 and 2000 CE.
Our central assumption was that the non-linearities stem from the use of taxes
and provision of public goods, which are higher the stronger and more experienced
a state becomes, but which can be undermined when a high level of centralized
power is attained, that gives rise to provision of less efficiency-enhancing public
goods and crowding out of productive enterprise. Although an extensive analysis of
the causal mechanisms is beyond the scope of this paper, we believe we have offered
support from the literature that this is a very plausible channel. However, we do not
exclude complementary channels which could partly drive the concave relationship
we uncovered on which we offer some reflections.
First, our finding appears to be consistent with the fact that while there is
indeed a great deal of persistence of early societal advantages, it is also the case
that the technological and institutional know-how of societies can slowly diffuse to
neighbouring societies through migration or trade. These societies with younger
states can then pick the best practices of the older societies and potentially avoid
some of the pitfalls that might have become a drag for the old civilizations.
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State capacity might be one example of such institutional transfer across state
borders. The ability to levy taxes and to consolidate an administrative infrastructure
has recently been shown to produce regional spill-overs to neighbouring areas’ eco-
nomic performance (Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno and Johnson, 2014). The argument
is that state capacity may be more easily built around pre-existing bureaucracies
(which, in this context, younger states would naturally have had access to).
Other factors that have been proposed for explaining the reversal in the Western
core include environmental degradation in the Fertile Crescent and in parts of the
Mediterranean region. Once agriculture spread out of the Fertile Crescent, the more
robust loess soils of northern Europe, combined with a reliance on rain rather than
irrigation for cultivation, proved to be an advantage in the long run (Jones, 1981). It
has also been suggested that the rise and fall of dominant empires of the Western core
followed cycles of expansion, over-extension, and eventually decline, with a gradual
shift of power towards the northwest (Kennedy, 1989). Acemoglu et al (2005) show
that the emergence of Atlantic trade after 1500 CE had a major impact on the rise
of for instance Spain and the United Kingdom.44
A similar process can potentially explain comparative development in East Asia.
Japan’s less powerful central court and greater perceived vulnerability to potential
Western colonizers led it to undertake decisive modernization measures almost a
century before China. This development had spillover effects on Korea and Taiwan,
all young states in comparison with China.
In summary, the new pattern uncovered by the extended Statehist shows that,
beyond a certain point, a longer enduring state history is associated with economic
disadvantages. While we leave it for future work to attempt to identify the exact
causal mechanisms behind this pattern, we believe caution is recommended against
the interpretation of these disadvantages as fully automatic and insurmountable
consequences of long state histories. Our view is not that a long uninterrupted state
history is always bad for economic development and as such undesirable. We believe
this is a story of moderation in the exercise of centralized power and adaptability
of the state institutions to the ever-changing economic realities. While those in the
middle range of state history have thus far exhibited such moderation and adaptabil-
ity more effectively, on average, there remains a considerable space of indeterminacy
within which political actors may still exert influence over their countries’ fates.
44Acemoglu et al (2001) argue that there was also a reversal among former colonies such that
relatively less advanced pre-colonial societies had an inflow of European migrants who installed
strong institutions that still persist today. Hariri (2012) argues that non-European countries with
older states that resisted European colonization had worse economic outcomes in the modern era
due to the persistently autocratic nature of their states.
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6 Conclusions
We coded and assembled a comprehensive data series on state history from state
emergence (which often occurred before the Common Era) to 2000 CE for a sample
of 159 countries, building on the previously constructed State antiquity index of
Bockstette et al (2002). Grounding our definition of state in the anthropological
and political literatures, we coded three components that make up the state history
index: 1) Existence of a state, 2) whether the state is home-based or imposed from
without; and 3) territorial coverage of the state relative to the land areas defined by
modern country borders. We obtained three overarching measures of state presence
and evolution: 1) a cumulative Statehist index (as in Bockstette et al.), 2) State age
(time since state emergence) and 3) a contemporaneous State index capturing the
level of state presence at different points in time. Moreover, the availability of state
history information at various levels of spatial and temporal aggregation render our
data particularly versatile for a large variety of comparative analyses.
We derived a model of economic growth in the Malthusian era, where the new
key element is the presence of a state that taxes its population and provides public
goods. The model predicts that up to a certain point, accumulated state experience
is beneficial for productivity, income and population density. However, beyond a
certain level, it can have adverse effects, yielding a concave relationship between
state experience and economic performance, which persists to the modern era.
In our regression analysis, we confirmed the predictions about the relationships
between state history and early historical proxies for income (population density
and urbanization), and technology in 1500 CE. Previous estimates using data for
the period 1 to 1950 CE only had suggested a linear relationship between state
experience and contemporaneous levels of economic development. Contrary to this,
we showed that cumulative state history from earliest emergence to 2000 CE has an
inverted-u shaped relationship with current income. We confirmed that inclusion of
the BCE period is crucial to this result. Countries with extreme Statehist scores
are worse off in terms of both current and historical economic development than
countries with intermediate values of Statehist. The optimal level of state history
as defined here is estimated to be that of modern-day United Kingdom.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Emergence of states in the world 3500 BCE-2000 CE
Note: The graph shows the logged value of the aggregate State index for 159 countries identified
during 110 50-year intervals between 3500 BCE and 2000 CE. The value 100 is equivalent to all 159
countries in our sample being full states, as defined in the text. On the horizontal axis, negative
values imply years BCE whereas positive values show the CE-period. A linear fitted regression
line has been included. The State index is calculated as described in text.
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Figure 2: Emergence of states in four agricultural core areas and in the world as a
whole 3500 BCE- 2000 CE
Note: The figure shows the development of the aggregated State index in the Western agricul-
tural zone (including 62 current countries in Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, as well as
Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Rus-
sia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), Eastern Asia (20 countries), Americas (including 27
countries in North and South America and in the Caribbean), and Sub-Saharan Africa (47 coun-
tries). Oceania (including 3 countries) is omitted. It also shows the aggregate index for the 159
countries in the world as a whole (solid black line). On the horizontal axis, negative values imply
years BCE whereas positive values show the CE period. Particular years with trend breaks are
marked.
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Figure 3: Non-linear relationship between Log GDP per capita in 2000 and Statehist
index
Note: The figure shows a fitted quadratic regression line corresponding to the estimates in Table
5, Panel A, column 2, with 154 country observations distinguished by 3-letter country isocodes.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A State history indicators N Mean SD Min Max
Statehist 159 0.234 0.172 0.017 0.743
Statehist 1 – 1950 CE 159 0.386 0.261 0.012 0.978
Ancestry – Adjusted Statehist in 2000 CE 154 0.252 0.189 0.017 0.811
Ancestry – Adjusted Statehist of 1500 CE 154 0.218 0.167 0.000 0.747
State Age (millenia) 159 1.639 1.430 0.100 5.500
Internally – originated 159 0.490 0.501 0 1
Panel B Outcome Variables
Average Technology Adoption in 1500 CE 112 0.487 0.317 0.000 1.000
(Log) Population Density in 1500 CE 154 0.905 1.461 -3.817 3.842
Urbanization Rate in 1500 CE 83 7.278 5.134 0.000 28.000
Average Technology Adoption in 2000 CE 130 0.451 0.198 0.174 1.012
(Log) GDP pc in 2000 154 7.488 1.606 4.463 10.531
Panel C Covariates
Agyears (millenia) 151 4.717 2.442 0.362 10.500
Origtime (millenia) 158 58.917 49.958 0.200 160.000
Absolute centroid latitude 159 26.368 17.704 0.422 67.469
Landlocked 134 0.224 0.418 0.000 1.000
Distance to coast and rivers 149 374.333 457.408 7.952 2385.58
Mean Elevation 149 637.715 551.281 9.167 3185.920
Land Suitability 145 0.378 0.248 0.000 0.960
Percentage Arable Land 156 15.852 14.001 0.040 62.100
Temperature 158 18.226 8.350 -7.929 28.639
Precipitation 158 92.959 61.700 2.911 259.952
Malaria (percentage population at risk) 151 0.316 0.426 0.000 1.000
Note: The table summarizes all variables used in the analysis, as follows: 1) Panel A describes
the State history variables created by us. Note that Ancestry – Adjusted statehist of 1500 is the
average accumulated state history to 1500 CE of the year 1500 ancestors (by territory of residence
at that time) of the year 2000 population of each country; 2) Panel B outlines some historical
and economic variables which are used as dependent variables in the regression analysis. The data
for historical population density is based on population data from McEvedy and Jones(1978) and
land data from World Bank World Development Indicators. The data for urbanization rate in 1
CE is taken from Comin, Easterly and Gong (2010) and is based on Peregrine (2003). The data
for urbanization rate in 1500 CE is that reported by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005).
The Average Technology Adoption indices in 1 CE, 1500 CE and 2000 CE are constructed by
Comin, Easterly and Gong (2010). Per capita GDP is expressed in current US dollars, as provided
by the World Bank; 3) Panel C details the covariates included in the regressions. Agyears was
assembled by Putterman with Trainor (2006) and it records the number of millennia elapsed in
2000 C.E. since the Neolithic transition took place. Origtime was coded by Ahlerup and Olsson
(2012) and it represents the time since initial uninterrupted settlement by modern humans (before
2000 CE). The geographic and climatic controls are retrieved from various sources. The variables’
construction is detailed in Appendix B.
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Table 2: State history and average technology adoption in 1500 CE
Technology Adoption in 1500 CE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Statehist in 1500 1.227*** 2.841*** 1.695*** 1.727*** 1.068*** 1.782***
CE (0.157) (0.350) (0.444) (0.338) (0.229) (0.416)
Statehist in 1500 -3.359*** -2.587***-1.855***-0.743**-0.943***
CE squared (0.738) (0.887) (0.624) (0.346) (0.319)
Agyears in 1500 0.104*** 0.073*** 0.038*** 0.004 0.012
CE (0.008) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011)
Origtime in 1500 0.001 -0.001** 0.000
CE (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Origtime in 1500 -0.000
CE squared (0.000)
State Age in 1500 -0.092*
CE (0.049)
Observations 112 112 110 110 107 107 107
R-squared 0.389 0.521 0.532 0.616 0.809 0.902 0.911
Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE No No No No No Yes Yes
Note: The dependent variable is the technology adoption index in 1500 CE and the main indepen-
dent variables are the extended statehist index between 3500 BCE and 1500 CE, linear and squared.
The list of controls includes: absolute latitude, an indicator of whether the present-day country is
landlocked, distance to coast and rivers, mean elevation, land suitability, percentage arable land,
temperature, precipitation, percentage population at risk of contracting malaria. Robust standard
errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3: State history, Log Population Density and Urbanization in 1500 CE
Panel A Log Population Density in 1500 CE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Statehist in 1500 3.883*** 9.559*** 6.184*** 7.473*** 6.129*** 11.077***
CE (0.670) (1.666) (2.119) (1.802) (1.709) (3.426)
Statehist in 1500 -12.324*** -9.893*** -7.339** -4.894** -7.326**
CE squared (3.098) (3.498) (3.169) (2.253) (2.905)
Agyears in 1500 0.315*** 0.211*** 0.157** 0.131* 0.217***
CE (0.042) (0.067) (0.065) (0.067) (0.068)
Origtime in 1500 0.005** -0.003 -0.020
CE (0.003) (0.004) (0.014)
Origtime in 1500 0.000
CE squared (0.000)
State Age in 1500 -0.509**
CE (0.214)
Observations 154 154 147 147 128 128 128
R-squared 0.184 0.254 0.269 0.314 0.709 0.767 0.786
Panel B Urbanization in 1500 CE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Statehist in 1500 16.678*** 29.429*** 35.364*** 48.134*** 41.542*** 69.670***
CE (2.384) (7.323) (8.662) (12.193) (12.707) (22.835)
Statehist in 1500 -25.531** -29.862**-43.924***-35.621**-49.359***
CE squared (12.514) (12.662) (15.010) (14.076) (17.606)
Agyears in 1500 0.761*** -0.382 -0.206 -0.323 0.152
CE (0.177) (0.244) (0.325) (0.417) (0.481)
Origtime in 1500 -0.076** -0.082* -0.216
CE (0.037) (0.042) (0.146)
Origtime in 1500 0.002
CE squared (0.002)
State Age in 1500 -2.831
CE (1.750)
Observations 83 83 83 83 76 76 76
R-squared 0.278 0.311 0.111 0.324 0.459 0.498 0.532
Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE No No No No No Yes Yes
Note: In panel A, the dep. var. is log population density in 1500 CE and the main independent
variables are the extended statehist index between 3500 BCE and 1500 CE, linear and squared. In
panel B, the dep. var. is the urbanization rate in 1500 CE and the main independent variables are
the extended statehist index between 3500 BCE and 1500 CE, linear and squared. The data for
historical population density is based on population data from McEvedy and Jones(1978) and land
data from World Bank World Development Indicators. The data for 1500 CE urbanization rate
is reported by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005), defined as the percentage of a country’s
total population residing in urban areas (each with a city population size of at least 5,000). The
controls include: absolute latitude, an indicator of whether the present-day country is landlocked,
distance to coast and rivers, mean elevation, land suitability, percentage arable land, temperature,
precipitation, percentage population at risk of contracting malaria. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Table 4: State history and average technology adoption 2000 CE
Panel A Technology Adoption in 2000 CE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Statehist 0.086 0.842*** 0.664** 0.302 0.461* 0.604**
(0.095) (0.318) (0.332) (0.239) (0.244) (0.272)
Statehist squared -1.285*** -1.192** -0.405 -0.554* -0.531*
(0.452) (0.459) (0.347) (0.322) (0.319)
Agyears 0.011 0.011 -0.007 -0.004 0.002
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012)
Origtime 0.000 0.001** 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Origtime squared 0.000
(0.000)
State Age -0.030
(0.021)
Observations 130 130 129 129 125 125 125
R-squared 0.006 0.044 0.016 0.050 0.643 0.683 0.688
Panel B Technology Adoption in 2000 CE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ancestry – Adjusted 0.233** 1.332*** 1.329*** 0.794*** 0.672*** 0.787***
Statehist in 1500 CE (0.092) (0.275) (0.309) (0.215) (0.219) (0.223)
Ancestry – Adjusted -2.088*** -2.085***-1.125***-0.938***-0.887***
Statehist in 1500 CE sqr. (0.513) (0.514) (0.287) (0.317) (0.303)
Agyears 0.011 -0.000 -0.010 -0.005 0.001
(0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012)
Origtime 0.001* 0.001** 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Origtime squared 0.000
(0.000)
State Age -0.029
(0.018)
Observations 130 130 129 129 125 125 125
R-squared 0.037 0.151 0.016 0.150 0.675 0.698 0.704
Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE No No No No No Yes Yes
Note: In both panels the dependent variable is the technology adoption index in 2000 CE. In
panel A the main independent variables are the extended statehist index between 3500 BCE and
2000 CE, linear and squared. In panel B, the main independent variables are the extended state-
hist index between 3500 BCE and 1500 CE, ancestry-adjusted, linear and squared. The list of
controls includes: absolute latitude, an indicator of whether the present-day country is landlocked,
distance to coast and rivers, mean elevation, land suitability, percentage arable land, temperature,
precipitation, percentage population at risk of contracting malaria. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Statehist vs. Statehist 1-1950 CE and (Log) GDP pc 2000. Nonlinear
relationship
Panel A Log GDP pc 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Statehist 1.326* 7.010*** 7.337*** 3.869** 4.530** 6.790***
(0.723) (2.291) (2.658) (1.921) (2.057) (2.496)
Statehist squared -9.842*** -9.832*** -4.718 -4.970* -4.657*
(3.529) (3.549) (2.854) (2.793) (2.776)
Agyears 0.105** 0.004 -0.071 -0.087 0.010
(0.048) (0.079) (0.063) (0.079) (0.081)
Origtime 0.002 0.008** 0.010
(0.003) (0.004) (0.013)
Origtime -0.000
squared (0.000)
State Age -0.460**
(0.183)
Observations 154 154 147 147 125 125 125
R-squared 0.020 0.052 0.026 0.064 0.702 0.719 0.734
Panel B Log GDP pc 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Statehist 1.277** 1.940 2.200 0.066 0.251 1.267
1-1950 CE (0.531) (2.049) (2.278) (1.441) (1.597) (1.667)
Statehist 1-1950 -0.783 -0.748 0.942 0.962 0.453
CE squared (2.518) (2.625) (1.608) (1.811) (1.776)
Agyears 0.105** -0.011 -0.069 -0.080 0.012
(0.048) (0.068) (0.055) (0.072) (0.081)
Origtime 0.001 0.007* 0.011
(0.003) (0.004) (0.013)
Origtime -0.000
squared (0.000)
State Age -0.267**
(0.127)
Observations 154 154 147 147 125 125 125
R-squared 0.043 0.044 0.026 0.058 0.704 0.722 0.730
Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE No No No No No Yes Yes
Note: The dependent variable is Log per capita GDP in 2000. In panel A the main independent
variables are extended Statehist index linear and squared. In panel B the main independent
variables are the Statehist index 1-1950 CE, linear and squared. The list of controls includes:
absolute latitude, an indicator of whether the modern-day country is landlocked, distance to coast
and rivers, mean elevation, land suitability, percentage arable land, temperature, precipitation,
percentage population at risk of contracting malaria. Robust standard errors in parentheses.***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Ancestry – Adjusted Statehist and (Log) GDP pc 2000. Nonlinear rela-
tionship
Panel A Log GDP pc 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ancestry – Adjusted 2.778*** 12.213*** 13.110*** 6.068*** 5.347*** 6.041***
Statehist of 1500 (0.794) (2.263) (2.100) (1.574) (1.647) (1.761)
Ancestry – Adjusted -18.218*** -18.636***-8.984***-7.519***-6.794***
Statehist of 1500 sqr. (4.326) (4.076) (2.176) (2.324) (2.317)
Agyears 0.105** -0.025 -0.056 -0.075 -0.027
(0.048) (0.059) (0.056) (0.078) (0.082)
Origtime 0.003 0.006* 0.008
(0.003) (0.004) (0.013)
Origtime sqr. -0.000
(0.000)
State Age -0.233
(0.146)
Observations 149 149 147 144 125 125 125
R-squared 0.083 0.209 0.026 0.243 0.722 0.727 0.733
Panel B Log GDP pc 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ancestry – Adjusted 1.389** 7.074*** 6.661*** 3.514** 4.123** 6.268***
Statehist in 2000 (0.670) (2.113) (2.426) (1.727) (1.849) (2.286)
Ancestry – Adjusted -9.085*** -8.378*** -4.034* -4.250* -4.033*
Statehist in 2000 sqr. (3.021) (3.000) (2.364) (2.308) (2.289)
Agyears 0.105** 0.021 -0.069 -0.085 0.010
(0.048) (0.080) (0.063) (0.079) (0.081)
Origtime 0.002 0.008** 0.010
(0.003) (0.004) (0.013)
Origtime sqr. -0.000
(0.000)
State Age -0.463**
(0.186)
Observations 149 149 147 144 125 125 125
R-squared 0.027 0.066 0.026 0.071 0.702 0.719 0.734
Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE No No No No No Yes Yes
Note: The dependent variable is Log per capita GDP in 2000. In panel A the main independent
variables are the ancestry-adjusted extended Statehist index between 3500 BCE and 1500 CE,
linear and squared. In panel B the main independent variables are the composite ancestry-adjusted
Statehist index (where the discounted ancestry-adjusted scores between 3500 BCE and 1500 CE
are added to the raw discounted scores between 1500 and 2000 CE, and the final score is normalized
by the sum of discounted full scores between 3500 BCE and 2000 CE), linear and squared. The
list of controls includes: absolute latitude, an indicator of whether the present-day country is
landlocked, distance to coast and rivers, mean elevation, land suitability, percentage arable land,
temperature, precipitation, percentage population at risk of contracting malaria. Robust standard
errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix
Appendix A - The Model
In this Appendix, we outline the full version of the extended Malthusian growth
model of Ashraf and Galor (2011). The basic setting is a geographically well defined
region where a population has made the transition to an agricultural, sedentary
society. The specific aim of the model is to propose a mechanism for how states
interact with economic development during the agricultural era. The key novel fea-
tures of the model are that we introduce the endogenous rise of a state which taxes
individuals but also provides public goods. Both fiscal capacity as well as the cen-
tralization of power increases with accumulated state experience. The centralization
of power initially has a positive impact on the effective provision of public goods
and economic growth but might eventually transform into having a negative impact
when the constraints and checks against governments become too weak.
A1 Individuals
Let us imagine an overlapping generations framework with a representative (hermaphroditic)
individual who lives for two periods, childhood and adulthood. All key choices are
made in adulthood. The individual has a utility function given by
ut = c
γ
t · n1−γt (1)
where ct is the individual’s level of consumption at time t with an associated prefer-
ence parameter γ and nt is the (continuous) number of children of each adult person.
One unit of time might be thought of as a generation.
The adult individual farmer earns an income yt which can be used for either
child-rearing, consumption, or paying a tax. The budget constraint is therefore
ct + µnt ≤ yt − stθ(St) (2)
where µ > 0 is the cost of rearing one child and stθ(St) ≥ 0 is a lump-sum tax
where st is a binary indicator st ∈ {0, 1} describing whether there is a state or not
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during the particular period t and where the tax level θ(St) is a function of the
historical accumulated experience of a state St ≥ 0. We will define taxation and the
involvement of a state in the economy further below.
By maximizing (1) with respect to the budget constraint in (2), it is straightfor-
ward to show that the utility-maximizing quantity of children is
n∗t =
(1− γ) (yt − stθ(St))
µ
. (3)
Since the adult population in the next generation is given by Lt+1 = n
∗
tLt, we
can express the law of motion for labor as:
Lt+1 = n
∗
tLt =
(1− γ) (yt − stθ(St))Lt
µ
(4)
A2 Production and population density
The aggregate production function during the Malthusian era is given by
Yt = AtX
1−αLαt .
In this function, Yt is output, X is the amount of land and At is total factor
productivity, Lt is the size of the labor force (equal to the number of live adults in
period t), and α ∈ (0, 1) is the output elasticity of labor. There are no property
rights to land so holders of land receive no compensation.
Workers are paid their average product, which will also be equal to the gross
income per adult person:
yt =
Yt
Lt
= At
(
X
Lt
)1−α
= AtP
α−1
t (5)
In this expression, Pt = Lt/X is population density. Income per capita thus
increases with productivity and decreases with population density at time t. Com-
bining this expression with (4) and dividing by X means that we can express the
evolution of population density as
Pt+1 =
(1− γ) (AtPα−1t − stθ(St))
µ
· Pt
Pt+1 is thus a concave function of Pt and a linear, positive function of At.
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A3 Public goods, productivity, and state history
The equations specifying the level of public goods Gt = stθ(St) · Z(St), total factor
productivity A(N,St), and levels of state history Sτ are displayed and explained in
sections 3.2-3.4 in the main paper.
A4 Dynamics
Combining the components above with the equations in the paper describing public
goods, productivity and state history, population density in the Malthusian era can
be written as
Pt+1 =
(1− γ) (Pα−1t (N + stθ(St) (Z(St)− 1))
µ
· Pt (6)
In the pre-state economy when st = 0, the size of the population will tend to
converge towards a steady state when Pt+1 = Pt = P¯ and n¯ = 1. Combining (4)
and (5), we can deduce that the equilibrium level of population density is
P¯ =
L¯
X
=
(
(1− γ)N
µ
) 1
1−α
. (7)
Population density thus increases with productivity (i.e. the natural quality
of the environment) N and decreases with the cost of raising children µ. If this
equilibrium level P¯ is lower than the critical state viability level P˜ , there will be
no state. However, we assume that the normal scenario for a region that made the
transition to agriculture is that P˜ < P¯ . Hence, the region will naturally converge
towards a level of population where a state is eventually formed. The regions with
the highest level of N , i.e. the highest land quality for agriculture, will reach the
critical level first and hence have the oldest states.
If a state exists so that st = 1, the equilibrium population density will converge
towards a level
P¯ st =
(
(1− γ) (N + θ(St) · Z(St))
µ+ (1− γ) θ(St)
) 1
1−α
. (8)
This expression has taxes θ(St) both in the numerator and in the denominator.
A key feature is further that state history St will at first have a net positive effect
on equilibrium population due to the beneficial impact of early centralization Z(St)
but will eventually have a net negative impact when a lower effective public goods
provision leads to lower income levels, leaving less resources for raising children.
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Note also that unlike (7), the equilibrium level of population density during
states will not be a steady, constant equilibrium since the stock of state history
keeps changing with time.
Inserting (8) level into (5), we find that the equilibrium disposable income per
person in the Malthusian economy with states is:
y¯t − θ(St) = µ
(1− γ) + θ(St)− θ(St) =
µ
(1− γ)
The expression shows that that income per capita y¯t is unaffected by total pro-
ductivity At but increases with state presence and with state history through fiscal
capacity θ(St). It also shows that net income per capita is not a function of state
history St since the increase in income per capita due to a lower fertility is exactly
offset by the decrease in disposable income due to taxation.
Equilibrium levels of consumption remains stable throughout and can be shown
to be1
c¯ =
γµ
(1− γ) .
A5 Industrial era
The Malthusian era comes to an end at the time of the industrial revolution tM .
The nature of the economy is then fundamentally changed from being dependent on
land to being driven by capital accumulation. Aggregate output is now a function
of productivity or technology At, labor Lt, and physical capital Kt such that Yt =
F (At, Lt, Kt) = K
α
t (AtLt)
1−α. Output per worker (or per capita) is yt = Yt/Lt =
Atk
α
t where kt = Kt/AtLt is capital per unit of effective worker.
As in Mankiw et al (1992) and many other studies, we assume that dynamics of
the capital stock are given by
Kt+1 −Kt = sYt − δKt.
The two other factors of production At and Lt have exogenous growth rates
g, n > 0:
At+1 = At (1 + g) = AtM (1 + g)
t+1−tM ; Lt+1 = Lt (1 + n) .
Unlike during the Malthusian era, n is now independent of yt.
1Also indirect utility is constant with and without a state and is v = γ
(
µ
(1−γ)
)γ
.
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Another standard assumption is that technological progress during the indus-
trial era grows in each period at a percentage rate g > 0 which we assume to be
exogenously given and not a function of state-provided public goods.2 In line with
the expression for At in the main paper, let us define the level of productivity at
the end of the Malthusian era tM > 0 to be AtM = N + θ(StM ) · Z(StM ). The level
of productivity in some industrial era time period τ > tM is then
Aτ = AtM · (1 + g)τ−tM = (N + zθ(StM ) · Z(StM )) · (1 + g)τ−tM
The dynamics of the capital stock per unit of effective worker can be rewritten
as
kt+1 =
Kt+1
At+1Lt+1
=
sYt + (1− δ)Kt
At+1Lt+1
=
sYt + (1− δ)Kt
At (1 + g)Lt (1 + n)
=
=
skαt + (1− δ) kt
(1 + g) (1 + n)
In a steady state, it will be the case that kt+1 = kt = k
∗. Solving for the
equilibrium level k∗ yields
k∗ =
(
s
g + n+ δ + ng
) 1
1−α
The equilibrium level of output per capita at some time τ is thus:
ln y¯τ = lnAτ + α ln k
∗ = (9)
= ln(N + θ(StM ) · Z(StM )) + (tM − τ) ln(1 + g) +
α
1− α ln
(
s
g + n+ δ + ng
)
.
2In a globalized industrial economy, important innovations tend to spread geographically
through technological diffusion from the technological frontier.
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Appendix B - Variables Description and Data Sources
B1 State history variables
Statehist. The extended statehist is the normalized aggregate index of state his-
tory. This index is defined as the sum of all 50-year period state history scores,
adjusted by a discount factor, divided by the maximum value of a discounted index,
corresponding to a state with a score of 50 in every half century between 3500 B.C.E.
and 2000 C.E. The index can be calculated using various discount rates to put more
weight on recent history than on the more distant past. Throughout the paper we
use the 1% discount rate.
Statehist 1-1950 C.E. This is the statehist computed according to the initial
version of the index in Bockstette et al. (2002), considering only the period 1 – 1950
C.E. This is also a normalized index (with respect to a virtual state that would have
full scores for every half century between 1 and 1950 C.E.). In this paper we use a
discount factor of 1% for this index.
Ancestry – Adjusted Statehist of 1500 C.E. This is the average accumulated
state history to 1500 C.E. of the year 1500 ancestors (by territory of residence at
that time) of the year 2000 population of each country. It is obtained by adjusting
the extended statehist index at 1500 C.E. by the migration matrix of Putterman and
Weil (2010), as follows: for each country i in the sample, we use the matrix to identify
the share of the current population that has ancestry that can be traced to the
territory of country j; for each country j we multiply its statehist score accumulated
at 1500 C.E. (discounted by 1% and normalized with respect to a state with full
scores from 3500 B.C.E. until 1500 C.E.) by a weight which is the share of the
current population in country i identified to have roots in country j; the sum of all
weighted statehist scores thus obtained across all j is the ancestry-adjusted statehist
index at 1500 C.E. Using this adjustment, we account for the state experience prior
to 1500 C.E. of other territories, brought by post-1500 migrants into a land area
defined by modern country borders, in addition to the state history of the country’s
own territory.
Ancestry – Adjusted Statehist in 2000 C.E. This is the extended statehist
index at 2000 C.E., adjusted for post-1500 migrations, as follows: we compute the
statehist index between 1500 and 2000 C.E. (discounted by 1% and normalized with
respect to the same period); we add this score to the ancestry –‘ adjusted statehist
of 1500 C.E. defined as above.
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State Age. This variable, measured in millennia, represents the total amount of
time elapsed from the first date (exact or approximate) when state experience is
assigned a positive scores (the first date when the component S1 pertaining to the
existence of a rule above tribal level is positive) until 2000 C.E. State age does not
discount the periods of state collapse (when scores revert to 0) incurred after the
state emergence date.
B2 Historical controls
Agyears. This variable assembled by Putterman with Trainor (2006) records for
each present-day country in a sample of 170 countries the number of millennia
elapsed in 2000 C.E. since the Neolithic transition of populations that lived on the
territory of that country. The year of transition is assigned by cross-referencing
expert opinions about the time when the population is a particular region covered
more than half of their calorie intake from agriculture.
Origtime. This variable coded by Ahlerup and Olsson (2012) represents the time
since initial uninterrupted settlement of anatomically modern humans (before 2000
C.E.) on the territories that now belong to modern-day countries. The variable
was coded for 191 countries and the coding was based on Oppenheimer (2003)
and Bradshaw Foundation (2007), as well as Encyclopedia Britannica (2007) for
the island cases. Since the original settlements follow the paths of the migration
routes out of Africa, the variable is correlated with the migration distance, and can
therefore also be employed as a proxy for the latter.3
The Matrix of Migration since 1500 C.E. This matrix was developed by Putter-
man and Weil (2010) to describe the composition of the populations of modern-day
countries in terms of ancestry at 1500 C.E., before the migration flows of the colonial
era. The matrix contains 165 rows (each row corresponding to a present-day coun-
try) and 165 columns (representing the same countries), where every cell records the
percentage of current population in country on row i that traces its ancestry to the
population in the source country on column j, such that the sum of all cells on each
row is 1. In their paper, Putterman and Weil (2010) obtained ancestry-adjusted
measures of Statehist (1-1950 C.E.) and Agyears, by multiplying each row to each
one of the vectors containing the values of their variables of interest at 1500 C.E.
for each country in their sample (which amounted to a sum over the values of the
3In our sample the correlation coefficient between the time since original human settlement and
the migration distance of Ashraf and Galor (2013) is -0.51, which indicates that the shorter the
migration distance to a particular territory, the earlier the first human settlement.
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variables of interest of each source country by the corresponding share of the popu-
lation with ancestry in other countries). We follow the same procedure in order to
obtain the extended ancestry-adjusted statehist.
B3 Outcomes variables
GDP per capita in 2000. Data in current US dollars, as reported by the World
Bank.
Population density in 1 C.E. and 1500 C.E.. This variable is measured in
number of individuals per square kilometer. The variable is retrieved from Ashraf
and Galor (2013), who employ the population size data from McEvedy and Jones
(1978), and the land area from World Development Indicators. Since the territorial
unit employed in McEvedy and Jones (1978) is based on 1975 country borders,
in some cases, the same value of the population density is assigned to contiguous
present-day countries (that may have been part of the same constituency in 1975,
such as Yugoslavia).
Urbanization in 1 C.E. This measure of urbanization was computed by Peregrine
(2003) in the Atlas of Cultural Evolution (ACE). The variable takes three values: 1
if the largest settlement on the territory defined by the borders of a given modern-
day country was under 100 persons, 2 if the largest settlement was between 100
and 399 persons and 3 for settlements larger than 400 persons. We retrieved this
variable from Comin, Easterly and Gong (2010), where it also used previously.
Urbanization in 1500 C.E. The urbanization rate for 1500 A.D. comes from
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) and it is calculated as the percentage of a
country’s urban area population (for cities with at least 5,000 inhabitants).
Technology Adoption in 1 C.E. These variables are three indices created by
Comin, Easterly and Gong (2010), henceforth CEG. The index in 1 C.E. is based
on data from Peregrine’s (2003) “ACE” in which various cultural traits of 289 pre-
historic cultures are evaluated: writing, agriculture, transportation, urbanization.
CEG used this and additional data to code country - level data on technology
adoption in five sectors: agriculture, transportation, communications, writing, and
military. The authors structured the information in “ACE” into indicators that de-
noted the presence or absence of a technology within a certain sector and territory,
which they then averaged over to create the sector specific technology adoption in-
dex between 0 and 1 (e.g. where “ACE” codes “technological specialization” by 1
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for none, 2 for pottery and 3 for metalworks, CEG marked pottery and metalwork
as the two potential technologies within the “industry sector” at the time, which
they coded using a binary convention 1 – if technology is present and 0 if not; the
average over all these dummies within every sector is the value of the technology
adoption index for that sector; this average for the industry sector in this case would
be 0 if neither technology was present, 0.5 if only one was present and 1 if both were
present). Then, the overall adoption level, the variable that we use in this paper,
for each country, was calculated as the average of the adoption levels across sectors.
Technology Adoption in 1500 C.E. For the average technology adoption measure
in 1500 C.E., CEG (2010) used many different sources to summarize information on
20 technologies across 4 sectors excluding agriculture (for instance, for “Industry”,
the two possible technologies are “presence of iron” and “presence of steel”). For the
latter they used a proxy based not on technology presence, but rather on which type
of agriculture was the primary source on a particular territory – e.g. pastoralism,
hand or plough cultivation, or none). As with overall technology adoption in 1 C.E.,
the overall measure in 1500 C.E. is obtained by averaging over the scores for each
sector.
Technology in 2000 C.E. The technology measure in 2000 C.E. is constructed in
CEG(2010), based on Comin, Hobijn and Rovito (2008) and it captures the gap in
the intensity of technology adoption for every country with respect to the US (in
terms of years of usage of each technology relative to the number of years since the
invention of that technology) for ten technologies: electricity, internet, PC’s, cell
phones, telephones, cargo and passenger aviation, trucks, cars and tractors, in per
capita terms. The average across the technologies’ scores is subtracted from 1 (the
level of US, by construction) to obtain the country-level technology adoption gap
measure. This measure is different from the measures for 1 and 1500 C.E., since it
also measures adoption along the intensive margin.
B4 Geographical variables
Absolute latitude. This is the absolute value of the country’s centroid latitude.
The variable was retrieved from the Portland Physical Geography dataset.
Distance to coast and river. This variable represents the mean distance to the
nearest coastline or sea-navigable river, measured in kilometers. The variable was
retrieved from the Portland Physical Geography dataset.
61
Mean elevation. The mean elevation above sea level is measured in meters. The
variable was retrieved from the Portland Physical Geography dataset. The original
source is NOAA’s National Geophysical Data Center.
Land suitability. This is a measure of land suitability for agriculture, computed
at country level by Michalopoulos (2012), based on grid-cell data reported by Ra-
mankutty et al. (2002). For details on the construction of the original index, the
reader is referred to Ramankutty et al (2002). The index includes information on
ecological indicators of climate and soil suitability for agriculture (such as drowing
degree days, evapotranspiration, soil carbon density and soil pH).
Percentage arable land. This measures the percentage of a modern-day country’s
area that is arable. The source is World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
Temperature. This is a mean across the average monthly temperature over time
(1961-1990) in 1-degree resolution grids within a country. This variable was retrieved
from Ashraf and Galor (2013), whose source is the G-ECON project (Nordhaus
2006).
Precipitation. This is a mean across the average monthly precipitation over time
(1961-1990) in 1-degree resolution grids within a country. This variable was retrieved
from Ashraf and Galor (2013), whose source is the G-ECON project (Nordhaus
2006).
Malaria (percentage population at risk). This variable represents the level of
risk of contracting malaria (measured by the percentage population in 1994 in areas
of high risk of contracting malaria, times the share of cases in the country involving
fatal species of P. Falciparum). The original data was constructed by Gallup and
Sachs (2001).
Landlocked. This is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is landlocked.
Appendix C - Additional Statehist Coding Infor-
mation and Illustrations
To code all components of the index in a manner that is consistent across periods,
we relied mainly on information in the Encyclopedia Britannica Online. We sur-
veyed the main articles on the history of the modern-day country (e.g. “History of
Azerbaijan”), but also articles connected to events in its history (e.g. “Azerbaijan-
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historical region”, “Ancient Iran: The Sasanian period”). There were a number of
instances where information in Britannica was sparse, in which cases we surveyed
alternative sources, such as books or journal articles treating individual cases. For
instance, in the case of Afghanistan, in addition to the Encyclopedia Britannica
entries, we consulted two books: “Ancient Cities of the Indus Valley Civilization,”
by Jonathan Kenoyer and “Bactria: An Ancient Oasis Civilization from the Sands
of Afghanistan” by Giancarlo Ligabue and Sandro Salvatori. The complete descrip-
tion of coding decisions and sources for all country-period observations can be found
in the online Data Coding Appendix accompanying the paper.
Table C1 illustrates an example of coding based on information from Encyclope-
dia Britannica, covering the period 450 BCE - 1 CE for the territory of modern-day
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Table C1: Coding example - the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 400 BCE – 1 CE
Year BCE Government is Government What percentage of Weight* sit
above tribe level? domestic? the territory is ruled?
(z1it) (z
2
it) (z
3
it) (witθ)
400-201 0.75 1 0.3 1 11.25
200-151 0.75 1 0.3 0.9
12.63
(cutoff at 155) 1 0.5 1 0.1
150-1 1 0.5 1 0.72 25
Note: witθ = number of years between period ends and cutoff, or between two cutoffs, divided by
50.
CODING INFORMATION
400-200: (0.75, 1, .3). From the 4th century BCE, along with the coming of Celtic
tribes in the area, the Illyrian tribes became gradually more politically cohesive.
Sources recall the existence of early indigenous petty kingdoms in Illyria on the
territory of present-day Albania only. We therefore mark the occasional Illyrian
tribe alliances by z1it=.75.
200-151: (0.75, 1, .3) until 155 and (1, .5, 1) from 155 onwards. Delminium
(on modern-day Bosnian territory) was taken by the Romans in 155 BCE, hence
z2it = .5. Most of the area of Bosnia was integrated in the Roman province Dalmatia,
hence z3it). The score is [0.9(0.75, 1, .3) + 0.1(1, .5, 1)]*50.
150-1: (1, .5, 1). Bosnia was under Roman occupation.
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The extended Statehist includes some coding exceptions not present in the 1-1950
CE Statehist:
1) The z1it component (existence of a supra-tribal rule) may also take the value
0.5 to indicate radical uncertainty with respect to the existence of a supra-tribal
rule on the territory of country i in period t. An example is the case of Somalia,
which receives a score z1it of 0.5 between 1500 BCE and 1 CE, when its territory is
believed to have been part of the Kingdom of Punt.
2) The z1it component (existence of a supra-tribal rule) may also take the value
0.875 (an average of 0.75 and 1) to indicate the joint presence of a paramount
chiefdom and a full-fledged state on the territory of country i. An example is the case
of Armenia between 1275 and 840 BCE, when the Urartu (indigenous paramount
chiefdom) and the Assyrian rule (full state) coexist on its territory.
3) The z2it component (is the government imposed from within or from without)
may take the value 0.875 (an average of 1 and 0.75) to indicate that the state is
largely self-governed, with some foreign oversight. For instance, Austria qualifies for
this score between 1945 and 1955, when although largely independent, it was closely
observed by the Allied powers, which were still occupying some territories.
4) The z2it component (is the government imposed from within or from without)
may take the value 0.9375 (an average of 1 and 0.875) to indicate that most of
the territory is governed from within, but some part of the territory is influenced
or supported (at best nominally) by an external government. For instance, Cyprus
receives this score from 1960 onwards, as the northern part of the island was declared
the independent Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, recognized only by Turkey.
Figure C1 shows the comparison between the original old Statehist index for the
CE-period and the new one presented in this paper. A notable feature is that the
previous index failed to reflect the state history of several ancient civilizations like
Egypt and Iran, countries that now receive a substantially higher score. Ethiopia,
which had a full state by 1 CE but was a relative newcomer compared to those just
mentioned, has the highest state history value going by the old measure, but now
loses in relative terms to the older civilizations.
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Figure C1: Extended Statehist (3500 BCE-2000 CE) vs Statehist 1-1950 CE
Note: The red, triangular observations with 3-letter isocodes show country observations where
states emerged before 1 CE and whose index score changes considerably with the extended coding.
Both variables use a 1 percent discount rate.
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Appendix D - Supplementary Figures
Figure D1: Emergence of states in six world regions during the colonial era, 1450-
2000 CE
Note: The figure shows the development of the aggregated State index in Europe, Eastern Asia,
West and Central Asia (including Turkey and India and the located countries in between), Latin
America and the Caribbean (all countries in the Americas except Canada and USA), Africa (in-
cluding North Africa), and the Western offshoots (USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand).
Oceania is omitted. On the horizontal axis, negative values imply years BCE whereas positive
values show the CE-period. Particular years with trend breaks are marked.
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Figure D2: Non-linear relationship between Log GDP per capita in 2000 and State-
hist 1-1950 CE
Note: The figure shows a fitted quadratic regression line corresponding to the estimates in Table
2, Panel B, column 2, with 154 country observations distinguished by 3-letter country isocodes.
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Figure D3: GDP pc in 2000 C.E. and state history in internally-originated states
Note: The figure shows the relationship between Log GDP pc 2000 and Statehist, including a
quadratic fit, for the subsample of countries where states were internally-originated.
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Figure D4: GDP pc in 2000 C.E. and state history in externally-originated states
Note: The figure shows the relationship between Log GDP pc 2000 and Statehist, including a
quadratic fit, for the subsample of countries where states were externally-originated.
69
Figure D5: GDP pc in 2000 C.E. and ancestry- adjusted state history
Note: The figure shows the relationship between Log GDP pc 2000 and ancestry-adjusted State-
hist, including a quadratic fit, for all the countries in the sample.
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Appendix E - Supplementary Tables
Table E1: Robustness checks-Log (GDP) per capita in 2000 and Statehist.
Log (GDP) per capita in 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Statehist 9.565*** 16.357*** 5.985** 7.306** 7.306**
(2.547) (4.402) (2.382) (2.867) (2.867)
Statehist squared -6.609** -15.975*** -3.803 -4.791 -4.791
(2.746) (5.219) (2.926) (3.083) (3.083)
State Age -0.663*** -1.892*** -0.434** -0.557*** -0.557***
(0.195) (0.546) (0.186) (0.212) (0.212)
Agyears -0.480*** -0.040 0.009 -0.001 -0.001
(0.171) (0.078) (0.083) (0.091) (0.091)
Agyears squared 0.047***
(0.016)
State Age 0.242***
squared (0.087)
Absolute centroid -0.022
latitude (0.031)
Absolute centroid 0.001
latitude squared (0.000)
Distance from -0.064
Addis Ababa (0.110)
Distance from -0.001
Addis Ababa squared (0.003)
Predicted genetic 22.403
diversity (73.470)
Predicted genetic -9.011
Diversity squared (55.974)
Constant 11.299*** 11.312*** 10.765*** 12.264*** 0.320
(1.459) (1.492) (1.545) (1.804) (24.057)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Continent FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 125 125 125 125 125
R-squared 0.743 0.741 0.725 0.730 0.730
Note: The variables “Distance from Addis Ababa” and “Predicted Genetic Diversity” are those
constructed by Ashraf and Galor (2013). Robust standard errors in parentheses.***p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table E2: Robustness checks-Log (GDP) per capita in 2000 and ancestry-adjusted
statehist.
Log (GDP) per capita in 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ancestry – Adjusted 7.326*** 7.875*** 6.657*** 6.919*** 6.919***
Statehist (1.724) (1.911) (1.890) (1.918) (1.918)
Ancestry – Adjusted -8.103*** -9.780*** -7.532*** -7.476*** -7.476***
Statehist squared (2.286) (2.975) (2.365) (2.473) (2.473)
State Age -0.334** -0.052 -0.017 -0.013 -0.013
(0.154) (0.079) (0.083) (0.088) (0.088)
Agyears -0.300** -0.583** -0.246* -0.322** -0.322**
(0.138) (0.247) (0.147) (0.154) (0.154)
Agyears squared 0.029**
(0.014)
State Age 0.071
squared (0.049)
Absolute Centroid -0.032
Latitude (0.032)
Absolute Centroid 0.001
Latitude squared (0.001)
Distance from 0.007
Addis Ababa (0.089)
Distance from -0.003
Addis Ababa squared (0.003)
Predicted Genetic 70.494
diversity (60.738)
Predicted Genetic -46.137
Diversity squared (46.088)
Constant 10.416*** 10.380*** 9.861*** 11.160*** -15.763
(1.527) (1.578) (1.573) (1.789) (20.284)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Continent FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 125 125 125 125 125
R-squared 0.737 0.732 0.733 0.734 0.734
Note: The variables “Distance from Addis Ababa” and “Predicted Genetic Diversity” are those
constructed by Ashraf and Galor (2013). Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table E3: State history, Log Population Density and Urbanization in 1 CE.
Panel A Log Population Density in 1 CE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Statehist in 1 CE 4.350*** 8.417*** -1.237 1.270 2.754 4.553
(0.810) (1.837) (2.175) (2.645) (1.874) (3.222)
Statehist in 1 CE -8.254*** 0.880 -1.063 -3.034 -4.265
squared (2.838) (3.251) (4.258) (2.512) (3.322)
Agyears in 1 CE 0.455*** 0.490*** 0.456*** 0.457*** 0.457***
(0.040) (0.063) (0.079) (0.081) (0.084)
Origtime in 1 CE 0.001 -0.016*** -0.010
(0.004) (0.006) (0.010)
Origtime in 1 CE -0.000
squared (0.000)
State Age in 1 CE -0.213
(0.266)
Constant -0.425*** -0.518*** -1.469*** -1.510*** -6.309*** -6.073*** -6.215***
(0.140) (0.144) (0.159) (0.168) (1.267) (1.296) (1.270)
Observations 135 135 130 130 115 115 115
R-squared 0.154 0.182 0.455 0.458 0.717 0.800 0.803
Panel B Urbanization in 1 CE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Statehist in 1 CE 1.128*** 2.778*** 0.599 0.235 1.312 1.500
(0.237) (0.624) (0.723) (1.066) (0.958) (1.761)
Statehist in 1 CE -3.260*** -1.013 -0.576 -1.312 -1.452
squared (1.045) (1.117) (1.474) (1.164) (1.404)
Agyears in 1 CE 0.101*** 0.093*** 0.077** -0.040 -0.039
(0.020) (0.027) (0.034) (0.039) (0.039)
Origtime in 1 CE 0.004* -0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Origtime in 1 CE 0.000
squared (0.000)
State Age in 1 CE -0.020
(0.191)
Constant 2.566*** 2.533*** 2.348*** 2.354*** 1.592** 1.304 1.300
(0.064) (0.069) (0.100) (0.105) (0.759) (0.990) (0.989)
Observations 128 128 128 128 125 125 125
R-squared 0.063 0.087 0.139 0.141 0.371 0.526 0.526
Controls no No no no yes yes yes
Continent FE no No no no no yes yes
Note: In panel A, the dependent variable is log population density in 1 CE and the main indepen-
dent variables are the Statehist index between 3500 BCE and 1 CE, linear and squared. In panel
B, the dependent variable is the urbanization rate in 1 CE and the main independent variables
are the Statehist index between 3500 BCE and 1 CE, linear and squared. The data for historical
population density is based on population data from McEvedy and Jones(1978) and land data from
World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The data for urbanization rate in 1 CE is taken from
Comin, Easterly and Gong (2010) and is based on Peregrine (2003) and takes three values: 1 if
the largest settlement is smaller than 100 persons; 2 if it is between 100 and 399 persons; and 3
if it is larger than 400 persons. The list of controls includes: absolute latitude, an indicator of
whether the present-day country is landlocked, distance to coast and rivers, mean elevation, land
suitability, percentage arable land, temperature, precipitation, percentage population at risk of
contracting malaria. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table E4: State history and average technology adoption in 1 CE. Ancestry – Ad-
justed State history and technology adoption in 2000 CE
Panel A Technology Adoption in 1 CE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Statehist in 1 CE 0.762*** 1.695*** 0.415 0.016 0.534 0.788
(0.122) (0.279) (0.390) (0.519) (0.351) (0.601)
Statehist in 1 CE -1.842*** -0.524 -0.150 -0.691* -0.862*
squared (0.479) (0.572) (0.746) (0.412) (0.508)
Agyears in 1 CE 0.064*** 0.055*** 0.064*** 0.023 0.031*
(0.007) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Origtime in 1 CE 0.001 -0.002***-0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Origtime in 1 CE 0.000**
squared (0.000)
State Age in 1 CE -0.026
(0.060)
Constant 0.688*** 0.669*** 0.554*** 0.562*** -0.062 -0.123 -0.130
(0.027) (0.028) (0.037) (0.039) (0.337) (0.332) (0.322)
Observations 128 128 128 128 124 124 124
R-squared 0.149 0.189 0.281 0.285 0.541 0.763 0.772
Panel B Technology Adoption in 2000 CE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ancestry – Adjusted 0.233** 1.332*** 1.329*** 0.794*** 0.672*** 0.787***
Statehist in 1500 CE (0.092) (0.275) (0.309) (0.215) (0.219) (0.223)
Ancestry – Adjusted -2.088*** -2.085***-1.125***-0.938***-0.887***
Statehist in 1500 CE sqr. (0.513) (0.514) (0.287) (0.317) (0.303)
Agyears 0.011 -0.000 -0.010 -0.005 0.001
(0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012)
Origtime 0.001* 0.001** 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Origtime squared 0.000
(0.000)
State Age -0.029
(0.018)
Constant 0.399*** 0.314*** 0.405*** 0.315*** 0.708*** 0.769*** 0.711***
(0.023) (0.025) (0.038) (0.033) (0.164) (0.207) (0.208)
Observations 130 130 129 129 125 125 125
R-squared 0.037 0.151 0.016 0.150 0.675 0.698 0.704
Controls no no no no yes yes yes
Continent FE no no no no no yes yes
Note: In panel A, the dependent variable is the technology adoption index in 1 CE and the main
independent variables are the Statehist index between 3500 BCE and 1 CE, linear and squared.
In panel B , the dependent variable is the technology adoption index in 2000 CE and the main
independent variables are the ancestry-adjusted Statehist index, between 3500 BCE and 1500 CE,
linear and squared. The list of controls includes: absolute latitude, an indicator of whether the
present-day country is landlocked, distance to coast and rivers, mean elevation, land suitability,
percentage arable land, temperature, precipitation, percentage population at risk of contracting
malaria. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table E5: Robustness checks-Technology adoption (excluding agriculture) in 1 CE
and 1500 CE and statehist.
Panel A Technology adoption in 1 C.E. excluding agriculture
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Statehist in 1 CE 2.012*** 0.526 0.113 0.600 1.025
(0.328) (0.464) (0.564) (0.391) (0.691)
Statehist in 1 CE -2.179*** -0.650 -0.271 -0.799* -1.095*
squared (0.567) (0.682) (0.821) (0.462) (0.587)
Agyears in 1 CE 0.075*** 0.064*** 0.071*** 0.028 0.036*
(0.008) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019)
Origtime in 1 CE 0.001 -0.002*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Origtime in 1 CE 0.000*
squared (0.000)
State Age in 1 CE -0.044
(0.069)
Constant 0.604*** 0.469*** 0.480*** -0.152 -0.105 -0.115
(0.032) (0.041) (0.043) (0.391) (0.403) (0.397)
Observations 128 128 128 124 124 124
R-squared 0.201 0.293 0.298 0.577 0.759 0.768
Panel B Technology adoption in 1500 C.E. excluding agriculture
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Statehist in 1500 2.969*** 1.747*** 1.783*** 1.019*** 1.549***
CE (0.386) (0.484) (0.339) (0.197) (0.447)
Statehist in 1500 -3.524*** -2.684*** -2.015*** -0.728** -0.857***
CE squared (0.797) (0.948) (0.643) (0.322) (0.295)
Agyears in 1500 0.107*** 0.076*** 0.041*** -0.000 0.004
CE (0.009) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011)
Origtime in 1500 0.001** -0.001* 0.001
CE (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Origtime in 1500 -0.000*
CE squared (0.000)
State Age in 1500 -0.071
CE (0.055)
Constant 0.169*** -0.013 -0.007 -0.042 0.031 -0.053
(0.027) (0.039) (0.039) (0.266) (0.149) (0.161)
Observations 111 109 109 107 107 107
R-squared 0.498 0.510 0.589 0.813 0.915 0.922
Controls no no no yes yes yes
Continent FE no no no no yes yes
Note: The list of controls includes: absolute latitude, an indicator whether the modern-day coun-
try is landlocked, distance to coast and rivers, mean elevation, land suitability, percentage arable
land, temperature, precipitation, percentage population at risk of contracting malaria. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table E6: State history and Log Population Density in 1 CE and 1500 CE-linear
relationship.
Panel A Log Population Density in 1 CE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Statehist in 1 CE 4.350*** -0.734 0.583 0.793 0.614
(0.810) (0.861) (1.097) (0.811) (1.025)
Agyears in 1 CE 0.455*** 0.484*** 0.466*** 0.481*** 0.463***
(0.040) (0.057) (0.068) (0.078) (0.083)
Origtime in 1 CE 0.001 -0.016*** -0.008
(0.004) (0.005) (0.010)
Origtime in 1 CE -0.000
squared (0.000)
State Age in 1 CE 0.031
(0.184)
Constant -0.425*** -1.469*** -1.507*** -6.369*** -6.193*** -6.262***
(0.140) (0.159) (0.167) (1.281) (1.297) (1.282)
Controls no no no yes yes yes
Continent FE no no no no yes yes
Observations 135 130 130 115 115 115
R-squared 0.154 0.455 0.458 0.717 0.798 0.799
Panel B Log Population Density in 1500 CE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Statehist in 1500 3.883*** 0.902 3.653*** 3.605*** 6.072***
CE (0.670) (0.957) (0.943) (0.915) (1.803)
Agyears in 1500 0.315*** 0.269*** 0.180*** 0.115* 0.169**
CE (0.042) (0.064) (0.064) (0.069) (0.069)
Origtime in 1500 0.006** -0.003 -0.017
CE (0.003) (0.004) (0.012)
Origtime in 1500 0.000
CE squared (0.000)
State Age in 1500 -0.334*
CE (0.180)
Constant 0.359** -0.411* -0.345 -2.761* -3.271** -3.382***
(0.144) (0.212) (0.223) (1.487) (1.343) (1.258)
Controls no no no yes yes yes
Continent FE no no no no yes yes
Observations 154 147 147 128 128 128
R-squared 0.184 0.269 0.273 0.687 0.759 0.770
Note: The data for historical population density is based on population data from McEvedy
and Jones(1978) and land data from World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The list of
controls includes: absolute latitude, an indicator whether the modern-day country is landlocked,
distance to coast and rivers, mean elevation, land suitability, percentage arable land, temperature,
precipitation, percentage population at risk of contracting malaria. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table E7: State history and urbanization in 1 CE and 1500 CE-linear relationship
Panel A Urbanization in 1 CE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Statehist in 1 CE 1.128*** 0.003 -0.135 0.475 0.170
(0.237) (0.232) (0.360) (0.313) (0.728)
Agyears in 1 CE 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.082*** -0.030 -0.037
(0.020) (0.025) (0.028) (0.039) (0.039)
Origtime in 1 CE 0.004* -0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Origtime in 1 CE -0.000
squared (0.000)
State Age in 1 CE 0.063
(0.154)
Constant 2.566*** 2.348*** 2.348*** 1.560** 1.260 1.285
(0.064) (0.100) (0.104) (0.755) (0.995) (0.984)
Controls no no no yes yes yes
Continent FE no no no no yes yes
Observations 128 128 128 125 125 125
R-squared 0.063 0.139 0.139 0.371 0.523 0.524
Panel B Urbanization in 1500 CE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Statehist in 1500 16.678*** 18.666*** 22.878*** 21.837*** 30.860*
CE (2.384) (3.452) (6.078) (7.446) (16.414)
Agyears in 1500 0.761*** -0.201 -0.135 -0.598 -0.411
CE (0.177) (0.239) (0.356) (0.474) (0.472)
Origtime in 1500 -0.052 -0.070* -0.141
CE (0.036) (0.041) (0.131)
Origtime in 1500 0.001
CE squared (0.001)
State Age in 1500 -1.256
CE (1.693)
Constant 4.487*** 3.633*** 5.119*** -7.853 -7.314 -8.246
(0.569) (1.019) (1.015) (8.277) (8.019) (8.291)
Controls no no no yes yes yes
Continent FE no no no no yes yes
Observations 83 83 83 76 76 76
R-squared 0.278 0.111 0.282 0.386 0.458 0.467
Note: The data for urbanization rate in 1 CE is taken from Comin, Easterly and Gong (2010)
and is based on Peregrine (2003) and takes three values: 1 if the largest settlement is smaller than
100 persons; 2 if it is between 100 and 399 persons; and 3 if it is larger than 400 persons. The data
for urbanization rate at 1500 CE is that reported by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005),
defined as the percentage of a country’s total population residing in urban areas (each with a city
population size of at least 5,000). The list of controls includes: absolute latitude, an indicator
whether the modern-day country is landlocked, distance to coast and rivers, mean elevation, land
suitability, percentage arable land, temperature, precipitation, percentage population at risk of
contracting malaria. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table E8: State history and average technology adoption in 1 CE and 1500 CE-linear
relationship
Panel A Technology Adoption in 1 CE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Statehist in 1 CE 0.762*** 0.106 -0.080 0.093 -0.001
(0.122) (0.122) (0.196) (0.134) (0.246)
Agyears in 1 CE 0.064*** 0.059*** 0.065*** 0.028** 0.032*
(0.007) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016)
Origtime in 1 CE 0.001 -0.002*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Origtime in 1 CE 0.000*
squared (0.000)
State Age in 1 CE 0.023
(0.048)
Constant 0.688*** 0.554*** 0.559*** -0.071 -0.147 -0.139
(0.027) (0.037) (0.039) (0.332) (0.329) (0.320)
Controls no no no yes yes yes
Continent FE no no no no yes yes
Observations 128 128 128 124 124 124
R-squared 0.149 0.281 0.283 0.541 0.759 0.769
Panel B Technology Adoption in 1500 CE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Statehist in 1500 1.227*** 0.288 0.754*** 0.684*** 1.140***
CE (0.157) (0.193) (0.172) (0.135) (0.353)
Agyears in 1500 0.104*** 0.088*** 0.042*** -0.000 0.004
CE (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
Origtime in 1500 0.001 -0.001** 0.001
CE (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Origtime in 1500 -0.000
CE squared (0.000)
State Age in 1500 -0.070
CE (0.047)
Constant 0.315*** 0.065* 0.090** -0.143 0.026 -0.062
(0.030) (0.036) (0.037) (0.258) (0.170) (0.180)
Controls no no no yes yes yes
Continent FE no no no no yes yes
Observations 112 110 110 107 107 107
R-squared 0.389 0.532 0.541 0.776 0.897 0.904
Note: The list of controls includes: absolute latitude, an indicator whether the modern-day coun-
try is landlocked, distance to coast and rivers, mean elevation, land suitability, percentage arable
land, temperature, precipitation, percentage population at risk of contracting malaria. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table E9: State history, ancestry-adjusted state history and technology adoption in
2000 CE-linear relationshi
Panel A Technology Adoption in 2000 CE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Statehist 0.086 -0.074 0.063 0.128 0.289*
(0.095) (0.132) (0.106) (0.106) (0.174)
Agyears 0.011 0.015 -0.008 -0.008 -0.000
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012)
Origtime 0.000 0.001** 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Origtime squared -0.000
(0.000)
State Age -0.032
(0.021)
Constant 0.430*** 0.405*** 0.406*** 0.761*** 0.818*** 0.791***
(0.029) (0.038) (0.038) (0.162) (0.206) (0.206)
Controls no no no yes yes yes
Continent FE no no no no yes yes
Observations 130 129 129 125 125 125
R-squared 0.006 0.016 0.018 0.639 0.679 0.684
Panel B Technology Adoption in 2000 CE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ancestry – Adjusted 0.233** 0.231 0.215* 0.194* 0.354**
Statehist in 1500 CE (0.092) (0.156) (0.121) (0.115) (0.161)
Agyears 0.011 -0.000 -0.013 -0.011 -0.003
(0.007) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
Origtime 0.000 0.001** 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Origtime squared 0.000
(0.000)
State Age -0.034*
(0.018)
Constant 0.399*** 0.405*** 0.401*** 0.754*** 0.790*** 0.721***
(0.023) (0.038) (0.035) (0.162) (0.203) (0.204)
Controls no no no yes yes yes
Continent FE no no no no yes yes
Observations 130 129 129 125 125 125
R-squared 0.037 0.016 0.036 0.649 0.683 0.690
Note: The list of controls includes: absolute latitude, an indicator whether the modern-day coun-
try is landlocked, distance to coast and rivers, mean elevation, land suitability, percentage arable
land, temperature, precipitation, percentage population at risk of contracting malaria. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Abstract
This paper aims to understand how corruption responds to an income loss.
We exploit an unexpected 25% wage cut incurred in 2010 by all Romanian
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ment. To measure corruption we compare changes in exam outcomes from
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fected by the policy. We find that the wage loss induced better exam outcomes
in public than in private schools and we attribute this difference to increased
corruption by public educators.
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1 Introduction
The last decades have witnessed fast growing political and academic efforts to break
down the phenomenon of corruption into causes and effects. To date, many puzzles
still remain regarding the key causes and determinants of corruption (see Olken and
Pande, 2012 for a recent review of developments in this area). Among these, the
degree to which corruption responds to a wage change is an underexplored topic of
particular interest to policy makers. This paper attempts to shed light on the effects
of wages on corruption in the public sector, exploring a quasi-natural experiment
generated by an unexpected 25% wage cut incurred by the public sector employees
in Romania in 2010. Understanding the consequences of a wage loss, especially for
corruption, is particularly relevant in the context of the recent waves of austerity
measures that have swept over most of the EU countries.1 To our knowledge, this is
the first paper that identifies a causal relationship between a wage cut in the public
sector and corruption activities.
The idea that financial compensation is a crucial factor in the decision of whether
to engage in fraudulent action was first formalized in 1974 with Becker and Stigler's
seminal work. The key prediction from their model was that increasing the re-
muneration of public servants above the market-clearing wage can reduce bribery,
and thus reduce the prevalence of corruption. Subsequently, this hypothesis has
been empirically tested, initially using macro-level data. For example, exploring
a cross-section of developing countries, Van Rijkenghem and Weder (2001) show
a negative, but rather small, association between civil service compensation and
corruption measured by the ICRG index, while Rauch and Evans (2000) find no
significant relationship between bureaucrats' wages and corruption, but show that
salaries correlate negatively with the bureaucratic delay. To date, few studies have
used microlevel data to identify the deterrent effect that wages have on corruption.
Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) exploit a crackdown on corruption in the pro-
curement departments of Buenos Aires hospitals. They find that at higher levels of
the staff's wages the crackdown is more effective in reducing the prices of hospital
inputs when there is an intermediate level of monitoring. However, they also show
that higher wages have no statistically significant effect when there is no monitor-
ing or when monitoring is at a very high level. These results are consistent with
the predictions of the Becker-Stigler model. Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2010) also
find empirical support for the capacity of projected gains to reduce fraud. In this
setting, however, the prospective rents are obtained from future opportunities to
1Similar measures regarding cuts in public sector wages have been proposed in other EU coun-
tries, e.g., Greece in 2011 and Spain in 2012.
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collect bribes that rely strictly on keeping the job, which leads to an inter-temporal
substitution of fraud today for rent-extraction in the future.2
While these studies are centered on the effect of an increase in remuneration on
dishonesty, it is not obvious that a decrease in wages would have a symmetric impact
on corruption.3 Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova Peter (2007), to our knowledge, is
the only study that has analyzed corruption in direct relation to low wages. Using
micro data from Ukraine, these authors show that the wage differential between the
private and (the much lower-paid) public sector does not translate into a difference
in consumption, and they conclude that bribery must account for the observed wage
gap. In doing so, they document the role of corruption in explaining the prevalence
of low-paid public jobs, rather than the reverse. Thus, the impact of a decrease
in wages on the prevalence of corruption, the object of our study, remains an open
empirical question.
In the spirit of the shirking model proposed by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984),
lower wages could trigger a switchover to rents from corrupt activities, as the civil
servant attempts to compensate for his lost income. At the same time, a different
mechanism, working in the opposite direction, holds the prospect of unemployment
as a deterrent for shirking or, as applied to our case, corruption (Shapiro and Stiglitz,
1984). Thus, particularly in a depressed economic time, as in 2010, an income loss
may potentially prompt more risk-averse public employees to refrain from corruption
because they fear losing their job and their only source of income when the market
cannot accommodate them. The latter mechanism is also supported by an argument
la Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2010) that the need to keep the public job with future
bribe opportunities (relatively more lucrative than the diminished wage), may drive
a temporary drop in corruption. Overall, these mechanisms convey an ambiguous
2Armantier and Boly (2011) carry out a controlled field experiment on the receptiveness of exam
graders to bribe-offering. The effect of higher wages on corruption tested in their experiment is
ambiguous. This paper belongs to a growing experimental literature on corruption using controlled
field experiments (see Olken, 2007; Bertrand et al., 2006), as well as lab experiments (see Frank
and Schulze, 2000; Abbink, 2002; Schulze and Frank, 2003; Barr et al., 2009; Barr and Serra, 2009).
The latter category also yields mixed evidence on the impact of a wage increase on corruption.
3According to the prospect theory, agents perceive differently equivalent losses and gains. This
is sustained by empirical evidence. For example, Armantier and Boly (2013) show in a field
experiment that teachers performed better in a marking task when incentivized with a penalty,
rather than with a bonus. If this applies to corruption, it is not clear whether reduced wages would
increase corruption. Also, Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2010) argue that a significant wage decrease
could increase the reliance on future bribe, and hence on keeping the public sector job with bribe
opportunities, thus possibly discouraging an increase in fraud in the present. From the stand point
of the wage-corruption relationship, our study is akin to the theoretical underpinnings of Becker
and Stigler (1974). However, whereas the bribe in their model is exogenous, our analysis inquiries
into how wages can alter corruption intensity. In this respect, our findings relate more closely to
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) who take bribes to be endogenous and analyze how they respond to
the market structure of corruption.
87
effect of lower wages on corruption, and identifying their impact is essentially an
empirical exercise.
In this paper we show that a large reduction in the wages of civil servants in
this case public school principals, together with teachers, and/ or the administration
personnel can increase the incidence of corruption. Specifically, our study attempts
to measure the effect of an exogenous 25% reduction in wages on corruption in the
education sector in Romania. As part of an austerity plan, the Romanian public
sector was hit by an unexpected wage cut announced on May 7th 2010, scheduled
to take effect starting July 1st 2010. In June 2010, just between the announcement
of the cut and its actual implementation, the annual national high school-leaving
exam the Baccalaureate took place in the usual manner, testing approximately
200,000 students. The prevalence of corruption at the Baccalaureate exams was
notorious and was attributed to the high-stakes character of the exam (it accounts
for up to 100% of the university/college admission score) and the poor remuneration
of teachers in general. As it happened, the 2010 exam signaled an unprecedentedly
high number of allegations of fraud and bribery by school principals connected with
the Baccalaureate. The 2010 spike in court investigations by the Romanian National
Anticorruption Directorate (DNA), revealed how batches of identical answers had
been distributed to students (by public educators), earning the 2010 exam a special
title: “The Xeroxed exam”.4 Additional survey data on education corruption in
Romania confirms that there was an increase in the incidence of bribery in public
education in 2010 compared to 2006.5
Since we do not observe bribery and fraud directly, our strategy for understanding
the impact of the wage cut on corruption is to compare the change in the Baccalau-
reate exam outcomes mainly the school level average grades and passing rates of
the standardized Romanian language exam from 2007 to 2010 between public and
private schools, as the latter category was not affected by the policy.6 The argu-
4This title given by the media refers to the fact that many students were found to have identical
test answers (including in essay type exams), which is unlikely to happen without special interven-
tions, given the complexity of the subjects. We will return to the mechanisms of corruption later
in the paper.
5We use Life in Transition Surveys I and II and rely on the question “In your opinion, how
often do people like you have to make unofficial payments or gifts in these situations?”and we
focus on public education. The answers range from 1 (never) to 5 (always). A t-test shows that
the average score in 2010 is significantly larger than in 2006 (1.76 as opposed to 1.62) and the
regression counterpart of this difference remains significant after we control for the usage of public
education services.
6Because corruption is notoriously difficult to measure, many researchers resort to some indirect
assessments, such as evaluating corruption through changes in the outcome of interest when moving
into a treatment where corruption is more likely. A similar strategy has been, for example, employed
in Olken (2007) or Bertrand et al. (2006).
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ments in favor of interpreting the resulting change in exam scores as being due to
changes in corruption are the following: 1) the timing between the announcement
of the wage cut and the exam is far too short for other responses (for example, a
change in the students' or in-class teachers' effort); and 2) using county specific vari-
ation in corruption we find that our effects are indeed driven by the most corrupted
counties, whereas we find no impact of the wage cut in counties with little or no
corruption. If we believe that exogenous shocks to private schools or responses in
form of effort are likely to have a similar impact in the most and least corrupted
counties, we can conclude that these confounders are unlikely to bias our baseline
estimates. However, in Section 5.2 we discuss extensively alternative explanations
and possible confounders to our interpretation of the main results.
Our results show a positive and significant change in the exam outcomes between
public and private schools, which we attribute to an increase in incentives to engage
in corrupt activities in 2010 relative to previous years. In particular, our results
for the standardized Romanian written exam, a test which remained similar across
years and is taken by all students, regardless of their track, indicate a wage cut-
driven effect equivalent to a 0.26 S.D. increase in exam scores and an increase in
school-level Romanian exam pass rates by 3.3 percentage points. The estimated
effects are equivalent to a nearly 4% increase in both exam outcomes. We employ
different falsification tests and sensitivity analysis to lend further credibility to our
results.
While this study adds to the developing pool of knowledge about corruption
in the education sector (see, for example, Ferraz et al., 2012; Duflo et al., 2014;
Reinikka and Svensson, 2004, 2005; Muralidharan and Sundaraman, 2011; Glewwe
et al., 2010), it also complements the findings in a related literature investigating
incentives for teachers cheating and the dangers of high-stakes evaluation systems
(Jacob and Levitt, 2003; Nichols and Berliner, 2007).
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents an overview of the Ro-
manian context, explaining the wage cut policy, the educational system and the
implications for corruption. Section 3 provides the details of our data, while Section
4 outlines our empirical strategy and our main empirical findings. Section 5 pro-
vides some tests as to whether changes in exam scores following the wage cut can be
interpreted as changes in corruption caused by the wage cut, while our conclusions
are presented in Section 6.
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2 Background
2.1 The 2010 unexpected public sector wage cut
The threat of recession posed by the unfolding international financial crisis in the
fall of 2008 was largely overlooked by Romanian politicians, who confidently con-
veyed a disjunction between Romania and the world economy. The autumn 2008
Euro-barometer showed that more than 70% of Romanian respondents anticipated
no change or even an improvement in the general economic situation of Romania.7
Despite the IMF's prompting for moderation, upon preparing his 2009 electoral cam-
paign and especially after winning the elections, the incumbent president promoted
greatly optimistic prospects: “(...) we expect significant growth in the first part of
2010”.8
May 7th, 2010 involving a 25% cut in wages for all public sector employees, the
elimination of some of their financial and in-kind incentives (which were accounting
for an additional up to 15% of the monthly remuneration), and a 15% reduction in
pensions and unemployment benefits was unexpected, generating social instability
and political divergence. The austerity measure was introduced in an attempt to
reach the 6.8% budget deficit target agreed upon with the IMF (for more details
about the unexpected announcement and the political situation in Romania in 2010,
see also Bejenariu and Mitrut, 2012). Soon after, the Finance Minister publicly
admitted that the governments' previous optimism had been deceptive.9 Thus,
following the May 7th announcement, on June 30th, the President promulgated the
austerity law, which came in effect July 1st, with an initial duration of 6 months,
until December 31st, 2010. To date, the public sector wages have not been restored
to their initial level.
2.2 The structure of education and the high school exam in
Romania
The standard design of the educational system in Romania is based on a division
of three cycles, each containing four years: primary school (grades 1 to 4), middle
school or gymnasium (grades 5 to 8), followed by a national exam which insures
the admission into high schools on a: i) theoretical (or general) track, ii) techno-
7http://ec.europa.eu/public opinion/cf/ “What are your expectations for the year to come with
respect to the economic situation of your country (Romania).”
8http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/basescu-romania-nu-va-fi-afectata-de-criza-837030.html (in
Romanian).
9http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-politic-7350294-sebastian-vladescu-era-foarte-usormintim-
continuare-mai-imprumutam-vreo-sase-luni.htm (in Romanian)
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logical track, and iii) vocational track (see NASFA Romanian Educational System,
2011). Upon completion of high school, students take the school-leaving exam -
the Baccalaureate exam (akin to the French Baccalaure´at) - which is a nationwide
standardized test mandatory for obtaining the certificate of graduation from sec-
ondary school. Importantly, passing the Baccalaureate exam is a strict requirement
for pursuing further professional training or for enrolling in tertiary education,10 as
the student's average grade on this exam accounts for up to 100% of the university
admission score, and is the main criterion for being granted exemption from tuition
fees (in public universities). Thus, passing this national examination (with high
grades) is very important.
The Baccalaureate consists of several standardized tests taken in oral (testing
knowledge of Romanian and a foreign language) and written form (containing mul-
tiple choice, elaborate answers and essays in different subjects, depending on track).
These are graded on a scale from 1 to 10, and to pass the exam, a student should
obtain a minimum score of 5 on each test and a minimum overall average score of
6, while scores of 7 and above are usually regarded as competitive for admission
in higher education, The tests are held in examination centers, to which more high
schools from the same locality are randomly assigned. The organization of the exam
in every center is the responsibility of the exam committee, which consists of a
chairman (typically a university professor), one or two deputy-chairmen (typically
public high school principals), a person specialized in IT management (for techni-
cal support), and a number of public school teachers whose duty is to monitor the
exam.11
The format of the Baccalaureate has been standard for the last ten years with
two oral exams and four written tests, which take place over the course of two weeks
toward the end of June every year. A few changes to the exam format in 2010 make
the overall pass rate less comparable to earlier years.12 The most important changes
were the exclusion of oral tests from the overall score and the elimination of the
fourth written test, all with abnormal score distributions highly concentrated at the
top marks.13 The tests are standardized for all students ascribed to each education
10At the very least, the degree obtained by passing this exam offers a basic qualification with
the potential to earn the student a better placement in the labor market.
11These teachers are unrelated to the subject under evaluation or to the students, and are
randomly assigned in pairs of two in each classroom by the exam committee.
12No other changes in the educational system took place in the period 2007-2010.
13The oral exams were pushed ahead of the written ones, to February, and they were rendered
irrelevant to the overall exam grade. Also, a new examination of digital competencies was added
to the oral section of the exam, and one track-specific written test was eliminated. The assessment
became qualitative, categorizing the students into: experienced, advanced or average users. Also,
in 2007, 2008 and 2009, in preparation for the exam, the students had access to 100-300 published
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profile and track. The one test that is unique to all students regardless of profile
and track is the written Romanian language exam. This, together with the fact that
the conditions for this test have remained very similar across years makes it an ideal
basis for comparison of student outcomes on the exam.14
As stated before, in 2010, the wage cut news arrived on May 7th, three weeks
before the end of the school year, during which the graduation ceremonies take
place. Since the exam is set in June, this close timing between the unexpected news
and the exam reduces the possibility that the wage cut would have changed the test
outcomes via increased effort by students, parents or teachers. Still, in Section 5,
we will perform some sensitivity analyses to rule out this channel.
2.3 The corruption environment
The endemic post-communist corruption in the public sector has become proverbial
among Romanians: a 2003 World Bank Report about corruption in Romania reveals
that more than 67% of the respondents alleged that all or almost all public officials
in Romania are corrupt, while more than 50% of the respondents believed that
bribery is part of the everyday life in Romania.15 This is particularly true in the
education and health systems, where up to 66% of the respondents confirmed that
they were paying the so-called atentie (unofficial payments or bribes).16 More than
a quarter of the students interviewed in the 2003 World Bank Diagnostic Survey of
Corruption in Romania admitted to have provided some unofficial payments during
the previous year.
written exam models with full answers for each discipline, some of which would have become the
actual tests. In 2010 the test would resemble, but not perfectly match the models. All in all, we
expect these changes, if anything, to decrease the test scores.
14We also claim that for the Romanian written exam it is more difficult to cheat in class (as
one possible confounder to corruption), since students need to develop ideas and write essay-like
questions as part of the examination.
15A 2010 study on corruption in Romania shows about 80% of the respondents to agree
that the Government and Central Institutions are corrupted to a large and very large ex-
tent, a finding that is in linewith the idea that corruption has increased during the last years.
www. agenda21.org.ro/download/%20Studiu%20perceptia%20cetatenilor%20asupra%20 corup-
tiei%20din%20institutiile%20publice.pdf (in Romanian).
16Paying the so-called atentie is very common. A World Bank Report on corruption in Romania
confirms that up to 66% of the respondents have paid an atentie during a hospital stay, while 27%
of the respondents have given atentii to vocational school (teachers), 25% to the primary school
(teachers), 21% in the high-school system and 17% in the University Anderson et al., 2001. For
education these are lower bounds: first, people do not like to admit they are bribing teachers, as
may signal insufficient ability; second, these numbers are from survey questions to all households,
regardless of the age of the household members and whether or not they have kids in school. A
recent survey among university students reveals that about 72% of the students and 68% of the
university teachers were involved in corrupted activities in relation to school (our calculations using
the 2007 PEIS data, Gallup Romania).
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Thus, one notable feature of the Romanian public schools that favors the propa-
gation of corruption is the existence of a habitualized system of informal payments.
These range from more innocuous forms such as the imposition of funds collected
for covering school and classroom material expenses (fondul scolii/clasei) all the
way to gifts demanded by teachers in exchange for favors such as not failing the
students or inflating their grades.17 Overall, the frequency of such exchanges over
the entire course of school years sustains a dense clientelistic network. Among the
most commonly invoked causes for dysfunctions in the public education system are:
i) the poor remuneration of teachers in the public sector18 and ii) the high-stakes
of the high-school exit exam, particularly starting with the year 2002 when increas-
ing numbers of universities included the Baccalaureate exam score as part of the
admission process.
There is an overall consensus among the Romanian public that the Baccalaure-
ate passing rates (anchored around 80%) and the underlying grades are artificially
inflated through corruption. This “performance” is in complete opposition to in-
ternational tests (PISA), where Romanian students earn among the lowest scores.19
This inconsistency is shown in Fig. 1 where we show the 2009 upper secondary
graduation rates and the PISA test scores for 16 European countries. Interestingly,
Romania lies in the first part of the distribution of the upper secondary graduation
rates (Fig. 1A), while, at the same time, is the European country with the lowest
PISA scores (in Fig. 1B we show the reading test, but similar ranking is obtained
for the mathematics and the science tests). Moreover, the introduction of video
surveillance in 2011 coincided with a drop in average pass rates to a staggering 44%,
further confirming that the exam had for years been corrupt.
The 2010 exam earned a special reputation and the suggestive title “The Xeroxed
Baccalaureate” after a large number of cases of corruption at the exam (150 defen-
dants compared to essentially none previously) caused a media storm.20 Without
precedent, many teachers and school principals were investigated by the Romanian
National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA), in connection with the 2010 Baccalau-
17Center for Education (CEDU, 2006), Administration and practices lacking integrity
in schools. http://www.cedu.ro/files/research/Administrare%20si%20practici% 20lip-
site%20de%20integritate%20in%20scoala%20%20raport%20de%20cercetare.pdf (in Romanian).
18In Romania, similar to other transition countries, wages of the educational staff in the public
sector are highly centralized and there is little variation across teachers. While there are no official
statistics, it is the case that public teachers earn, on average, up to two times less than their private
counterparts.
19See, for example, the 2009 PISA Executive Report: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/
60/46619703.pdf and the 2009 OECD Report Education at a Glance http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/41/25/43636332.pdf.
20http://www.pna.ro/faces/index.xhtml.
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reate exam for having taken large amounts of money from students to help them
pass or to raise their grades.21 In particular, the school personnel was accused
of arranging with committee members for selected papers of these students to be
graded higher, partly changed or entirely replaced (Xeroxed) with correct answers.
Some of these cases went to court and were finalized in 2011 and 2012 with prison
sentences.22 This evidence suggests that the exam in 2010 was characterized by an
unusually high level of corrupt activity, which we explain through the additional
incentives for fraud borne by the unexpected wage cut.
2.3.1 Possible mechanisms of corruption
As explained above, in Romania gift-giving and informal payments are very common,
particularly in public institutions (see CEDU Report, 2006; Corruption in Public
Institutions, 2010).2324 At the Baccalaureate, the unofficial payments resulting in
grade inflation can be, broadly, summarized as follows:
a) Collective bribes the so-called “protocols” are informal but commonly ac-
cepted funds (money) collected on various occasions, among which is graduation.25
The graduating students, shortly before the end of the school year, collect these con-
tributions to “organize” the Baccalaureate exam, which are in fact used to “grease
the wheels ” such that the invigilators and other committee members turn a blind
eye to cheating in the exam rooms (copy aids, talk among students, etc.). However,
in-class cheating and thus, implicitly the protocol, is feasible for both public and
private students, who are randomly and anonymously mixed in exam rooms, under
the same surveillance. We will rule out differential in-class cheating in Section 5.
b) Individual bribes some students (individually or in small groups) may give
extra bribes for extra favors. These favors come in many forms: distributing of cor-
rect solutions during the exam for the contributing students, bribing the evaluators
21http://www.ziare.com/stiri/arestare/directori-de-liceu-arestati-pentru-fraude-labacalaureat-
1029179;
http://www.adevarul.ro/scoala educatie/liceu/150-000 de leifraudarecord
la Bacalaureat 0 292771226.
22www.desteptarea.ro/zeci-de-condamnari-in-dosarul-spaga-la-bac.html (in Romanian).
23Center for Education (CEDU, 2006), “Administration and practices lacking integrity in
schools ”, see footnote 17. The National Agency for Public Workers (2010), “Percep-
tions about corruption in public institutions”, http://www.anfp.gov.ro/DocumenteEditor/ Up-
load/proiecte%20in%20derulare/Studiu%20perceptie%20coruptie%20sept%202010.pdf.
24Hallak and Poisson (2007) provide a comprehensive taxonomy of corruption in education. The
forms of fraud tackled in this paper are not restricted to the Romanian educational system. In
Russia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan (Silova and Bray, 2006) the sale of grades is common, while in
India the high school exam annual pass rates dropped from 61% to 17% in 1992, when police were
stationed at the examinations centers (Kingdon and Muzammil, 2009). For more such illustrations
see Lewis and Pettersson (2009: 45).
25See also Center for Education CEDU, 2006 (footnote 17).
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to score selected papers higher, cooperating with the exam committee to single out
the marked papers and improve them or completely replace (Xerox) them with cor-
rect ones before sending them to the evaluation centers.26 In particular, using the
already developed informal network at the high-school level, students use the teach-
ers/school principals' channel to send their bribes to the exam committee members
and/ or the evaluators for higher grades. Although the composition of the exam
committees is made public only 48 h before the exam, the chairman and the IT staff
are known months in advance. Note that the school principals typically have a very
dense web of connections, having been randomly allocated to be part of the exam
committees formed around the Baccalaureate in different years.
The individual bribes are somewhat more relaxed for the public students given
the well-established informal networks in public schools.27 However, the existence
of corruption in private high schools cannot be ruled out but, as private school
principals are not in exam committees, the chain of events necessary for a bribe
from a student to result in higher exam scores is less likely to be fulfilled for private
school students. Thus, we ground our identification strategy in the conjunction of
this form of corruption with this differentiation between public and private schools'
access to a corrupted network.28
3 Data and descriptive statistics
3.1 The data set
In our empirical exercise we use three main sources of data. Firstly, we use ad-
ministrative data from 2007 to 2010, essentially covering the universe of students
26It was actually this form of bribe that led to the court cases in 2010 mentioned above. The
2010 Report of Activity of the National Anticorruption Court enumerates the investigated crimes
at the 2010 Baccalaureate: bribe giving and taking; influence peddling; stealing, destruction and
falsification of official documents, all involving large amounts of money. Individual bribes amounted
to 350 Euro for passing one written test and 500 Euro for passing the overall exam. The total
prejudice was at least 150,000 Euro. We do not have information about the number of high school
students involved in individual bribing, but in the PEISGallup 2006 data, 55% of the university
students admitted to have been paid “gifts ” to get higher exam grades (admittedly, these are low
stake-exams).
27Note that there is a cost associated with engaging in corrupt activities for educators the risk
of getting caught and losing future earnings. Although no official sources detail on the monitoring
and detection process, the 2010 Report of Activity of the National Anticorruption Court reveals
that most cases of corruption at the exam have been detected as a consequence of reporting of the
crime by some party involved in the corrupt deal (usually students). This gives a good indication
that the larger the portfolio of clients a public educator serves, not only the larger is the private
benefit, but also the higher is his risk of getting caught.
28In our sensitivity analysis we attempt to isolate the collective bribe channel from the individual
bribes by controlling for exam center.
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enrolled in the Baccalaureate exam, with individual information about their gender,
school, their personal specialization track (theoretical/general, technological or vo-
cational), whether the student passed the exam and the scores on each exam. From
these scores we will construct our outcomes of interest. We also know whether the
student was present at the exam or expelled from the exam room due to in-class
cheating.29 Secondly, we complement the data above with a measure on the stu-
dents' poverty status, using individual information on the students eligible for the
Money for High School (MHS) program of financial assistance for high school stu-
dents with a monthly income per family member below 180 RON (about 53 USD).
The 2007-2010 data provided by the Ministry of Education covers information on
all the eligible students' school in every year of application.30
Finally, our third source of data is the 2010 Study Performance in High School
(SPHS) data, collected by Statistics Romania. The SPHS records information on a
broad set of high school characteristics for all high schools in the country: the high
school name and a unique identification code; the address of the school (locality and
county); the type of school (whether private or public); and detailed information
about the number of students by gender and ethnicity, the number of teachers and
school principals by gender, type of employment contract, and their age structure.
We can thus match these data with the administrative students' records at the final
exam by the school's unique identification code to construct our working sample.
The key information for our empirical strategy is whether the student comes from
a private or a public school. We only consider counties that have both private and
public schools (19 out of a total of 42 counties). Thus, for the main analysis we
rely on an unbalanced panel of between 824 and 850 schools for each academic year
(127,500 students on average per academic year); among these approximately 6%
are private schools (up to 5000 students per academic year).31
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Summary statistics for our main variables of interest, separately for 2007 through
2010 are found in Table 1. For our working sample, about 26.5% are theoretical or
29With our data, we only observe students that have been registered for the Baccalaureate.
30In particular, an applicant was eligible if he had a gross monthly income per family member
not larger than 180 RON in the previous three months before applying. For the years 2007-2010
all students that were eligible and applied have received the scholarship. For more information
about this program see Borcan et al. (2014).
31Our main results when using the entire sample are overall similar to those in the main analysis
but less precisely estimated. Additionally, we will show some results at the examination center for
all centers with at least one private school and where the share of private students is about 25%.
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general schools, around 8% are vocational schools, and the rest of around 66% are
technological or mixed schools.
We show descriptive statistics for exam scores and pass rates for the Romanian
written exam at the school level, where we have weighted each school by the number
of students taking the tests in the exam. Table 1 shows an increase in the average
grade at the written Romanian test in 2010 relative to previous years, particularly
2009 and 2007. This test is directly comparable across years as its format has remain
similar relative to previous years and all students, regardless of their profile, track
or ethnicity, need to pass this standardized exam. This makes it an ideal basis for
comparison of student outcomes across years. Thus the school-level average grades
for the written Romanian exam and the share of students (at the school level) passing
the written Romanian exam are our main outcomes of interest.
Finally, it is important to note that private and public schools differ in the
levels of our key outcomes. Private schools consistently exhibit average passing
rates and average Romanian grades below those of public schools. This indicates
an overall lower performance of private schools, related to the selection of lower
achieving students into private high schools in the 9th grade, a common occurrence
in Romania.32 This is why later in the paper we: 1) estimate the impact on exam
scores between public and private school students in 2010, relative to previous years,
controlling for pre-treatment differences in exam scores for previous years, county
fixed effects and county-specific time trends, and school fixed effects, and 2) conduct
estimation on a matched sample of public and private schools, with similar levels
and trends in exam scores, and on type of track (and on other characteristics), prior
to the wage cut in 2010.
4 Estimation strategy and baseline results
4.1 Identification strategy
We attempt to understand whether an income loss led to changes in corruption
behavior, measured through a change in exam outcomes. Specifically, the policy we
evaluate is the May 7th, 2010 unexpected wage cut for all public sector employees,
affecting more than 90% of the Romanian education staff. The intuition is as follows.
Before the 2010 exam, we assume exam outcomes to be inflated, for both public
32This is true on average, as a small number of private high schools select and train top students.
For a description of the selection of Romanian students into the 9th grade see Pop-Eleches and
Urquiola (2011).
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and private schools.33 Additionally, it is probably reasonable to assume that the
incentives and level of corruption intensity for private schools should stay constant.34
As we have argued before, a substantial wage loss for the public school staff has,
ex-ante, unclear implications for corruption: on the one hand, teachers may attempt
to compensate for their forgone income by increasing the prevalence of bribing and
corruption; at the same time, an income loss may prompt teachers to refrain from
corruption because the need to keep their job along with future bribe opportunities
becomes more salient.
Our main empirical strategy to assess the impact of a change in corruption
incentives caused by an unexpected wage cut is a simple difference-in-difference
(DD) specification. In particular, we will compare school-level exam outcomes for
the public and private schools in 2010 relative to earlier years. Because private and
public students are alphabetically mixed in exams rooms and subject to the same
examinations, the private school students constitute a natural control group. If the
wage cut has caused an increase in corrupt behavior of the educators in the public
schools (through bribes, as discussed in Section 2), we expect to see an increase in
exam scores in public school, relative to private schools.
Our baseline specification is the following equation:
ysct = α + β · Publics · yr2010t + δ′ ·Xsct + ϕt + θs + θc · t+ sct (1)
where s indexes a school in county c at year t. ysct is one of our two main
outcomes of interest: 1) the school-level average grade for the written Romanian
language exam and 2) the school-level share of students passing the written Roma-
nian language exam; Publics is an indicator that equals 1 if school s is public and 0 if
it is private; yr2010t is an indicator that equals 1 if it is for the 2010 final exam and
0 if it is for any other year; Xsct includes the share of poor students and the share of
male students in school s in year t; ϕt represent 3 year indicators; θs includes schools
indicators and θs ·t are county-specific yearly trends. Our main coefficient of interest
33A natural test of the validity of this assumption is actually the Baccalaureate exam in 2011.
Following different anti-cheating initiatives and threats (for example, installing video cameras in
schools during the exam, threatening the staff with dismissal), over half of the students taking the
exam failed (see Borcan, Lindahl and Mitrut, 2014).
34While we assume that corruption in private schools did not change after the 2010 wage cut
announcement, one may argue that this policy impacted indirectly the private teachers' labor
market, making them potentially less inclined to take bribes for fear of getting fired. Thus, this
could have generated lower exam scores in private schools, due to less corruptible private school
teachers. We hereby work under the assumption that corruption (if any) in private schools stays
constant between 2010 and previous years, or that the alternative labor market situations equally
affected for private and public school teachers. We will also run several sensitivity analyses in
Section 5.
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is β, the DD-estimand, which measures the change in outcomes in 2010, after the
abrupt wage cut, relative to previous years, for public relative to private schools. We
weight all regressions with the number of (per school) students taking the exam.35
In the regressions we cluster the standard errors at the municipality level, since an
important part of schools' financing is decided by the municipal administrations
(resulting in 254 clusters).
By including school fixed effects, we are able to control for unobservable time-
invariant school characteristics. In alternative specifications, we replace θs with θc,
which includes 19 county indicators.36 In this case we expand the list of controls
to include a separate Publics indicator and an additional vector Xsc containing two
indicators for the track of the school: theoretical and technological (the base is
vocational).37
We account for possible changes in the composition of students at the school level
by including controls for the students' gender and poverty status, which, if correlated
with the events in 2010, may otherwise alter estimates of the β coefficient.
A necessary condition for an estimate of to capture the effect of a sizable wage cut
on corrupted exam scores is that the interaction term Publics·yr2010t is uncorrelated
with the error term in Eq. (1). Our key assumption in order to get consistent
estimates of β in Eq. (1) is therefore that, in the absence of the wage cut, we
would not observe any difference in the change in the exam scores between public
and private schools in 2010 relative to earlier years (the parallel trend assumption).
To investigate the plausibility of this assumption we will estimate a less restrictive
35The estimates are very similar if we estimate un-weighted regressions.
36The difficulty in estimating correct standard errors in DD models where a policy changes only
for a small number of groups is discussed in Conley and Taber (2011). Their argument is that
unless the number of treated groups is large, standard methods for inference are inappropriate.
In this study we have treated and control units (public and private schools) represented in all the
19 counties. Hence, if we see geographical clusters (for instance counties) as units of treatment,
their critique is not relevant for this study. Of course, one can also think of their critique as being
relevant for non-geographical dimensions (such as all public schools being one unit of treatment
and all private schools being one unit of control). However, although we discuss this issue more in
detail in Section 5.2, we think that it is unlikely that there are important specific shocks (unrelated
to the wage cut) that affect public schools but not private schools. This assertion gets additional
support from the facts that a) we get similar sized standard errors whether or not we cluster
the standard errors at the school, the locality or at the county level, something which can be
reconciled with the Conley & Taber argument being valid here only in the unlikely case of shocks
hitting public and private schools differently between but not within counties, and b) we do not
find that exam scores evolve differently in public and private schools prior to the wage cut, hence
supporting the claim that observed differences in outcomes between public and private schools are
not due to group-specific shocks.
37We do not include other school related characteristics since we only have this information
for the year 2010. We will perform some tests using this information and show these results in
Appendix B.
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version of Eq. (1) and add two interaction terms, the public and yearly indicators
for 2008 and 2009, to the baseline model.
We also try to address concerns related to other changes that may have affected
private and public schools differently in 2010 relative to previous years and that
could confound the estimated effect β. Firstly, because private schools are, on
average, different than public schools along other dimensions, we conduct additional
estimations where, for a subsample of schools, we are able to control for student
performance measured prior to high-school admittance and we also use matched
samples of private and public schools to check our main results. Secondly, because a
differential change in exam scores between public and private school students might
occur for reasons unrelated to corruption we, in Section 5.2, discuss and investigate
a number of additional potential threats to the interpretation of our results.
4.2 Results from baseline estimations
In this section, we present the basic findings from estimating Eq. (1). Table 2 dis-
plays the DD estimation results from our chosen baseline specification featuring the
average grade (Panel A) and the pass rate on the written Romanian exam(Panel B)
as our main outcomes of interest. Columns (1) and (2) present the DD estimates
unconditional on pre-treatment dynamics, while columns (3)-(4) display the esti-
mated coefficients from the fully-interacted model. Columns (1)-(3) include school
indicators, whereas column (4) presents the estimates from the model with county
fixed effects.38 All columns include year-indicators and county indicators interacted
with a time trend.
We note already in column (1) that for both outcomes, the DD estimate of
the wage cut is positive and statistically significant. When we add controls for
school student composition, the DD-estimate increases slightly. Focusing on the DD-
estimates reported in column (2), we find that the average grade score has increased
with 0.27 points and the average pass rate has increased with 3.3 percentage points
(a 3.7% increase) for students in public schools relative to private schools, in 2010
compared to previous years. Interpreting the estimate for the average grade score
in terms of effect sizes, the size of the estimated effect is equivalent to a 0.26 S.D.
increase in scores on the Romanian exam (amounting to a 3.9% increase).39
38In all columns we use the same unbalanced panel. Estimates for the sample of schools with
data in all years (balanced panel) are available upon request. They are similar in magnitude to
the results from the specifications with school fixed effects, but slightly less precisely estimated.
39The calculation of the effect size is based on the school-level distribution in exam outcomes
reported in Table 1. If we instead use the student-level distribution for the Romanian written
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Identifying a causal effect of the wage cut on corruption through the DD esti-
mate hinges crucially on the parallel trend assumption. If exam scores would have
increased more in public schools than in private schools, even in the absence of the
wage cut, our DD estimates would be too high. Column (3) in Table 2 presents
estimates from regressions which allow for a flexible form of pre-treatment dynam-
ics by including the publicyear interactions for 2008 and 2009 (the omitted year is
2007). For neither outcome are the estimates for the 2009 and 2008 year-specific
public indicators significantly different from zero.40 This suggests that public and
private schools do not differ significantly in their evolution of exam scores during
the pre-treatment years, validating the parallel trend assumption.41 These results
therefore lend support to our hypothesis that the change in grades in public schools
relative to private schools in 2010 relative to previous years not driven by different
trends in the performance of the two types of schools, but rather plausibly related
to the wage cut through the increased incidence of corruption.42
Lastly, we note that the estimates in column (4) where we have replaced the
school indicators with county indicators generate larger estimates and similar stan-
dard errors relative to the first three columns.
5 Sensitivity analysis and alternative explanations
Because our identification strategy is based on observational data, it deviates from
the ideal setting of a randomized experiment. To consolidate the credibility of our
exam (where the standard deviation is 1.674 in 2010s) we get the estimated effect to be equivalent
to a 0.16 S.D. increase in scores on the Romanian exam.
40When we add more structure to the pre-treatment dynamics and replace Publics · yr2009t
and Publics · yr2008t by the interaction of Publics with a linear time trend, the estimate for
Publics · yr2010t decreases somewhat (to 0.251) and is statistically insignificant, but still shows a
large 2010 jump from what would be expected from the estimated trend which indicates an increase
by 0.008 (for public relative to private schools) for each year.
41Note that the estimates for the Publics · yr2008t interaction are large relative to 2007 and
2009 for both outcomes. However: (i) the 2010 DD estimate is significant and is the largest in
magnitude, whereas the estimates for the pre-treatment interaction terms are always insignificant;
(ii) the estimates for the Publics ·yr2010t interaction term, are similar in models with and without
pre-treatment dynamics.
42The results shown in Table 2 are based on students in all high-school tracks. The theoretical
tracks are generally the first choice for skilled students in the admission to secondary education.
In order to investigate the potentially differential impact across school tracks, we also performed
estimations separately, for theoretical and non-theoretical schools and we find a similar-sized con-
tribution to the wage cut effect, even though the effects for theoretical schools are imprecisely
estimated. Finally, as already explained, we only focus on the written Romanian exam because
this is a standard exam for all children, regardless of the track and sub-track. Other exams, more
specific for each track and sub-track (e.g., some theoretical track students would take Mathemat-
ics difficulty 1 while others Mathematics difficulty 2; some would choose between Physics and
Chemistry), are more difficult to analyze.
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findings, we perform some additional analyses where we attempt to gauge the sen-
sitivity of our results to using private schools as the control group, and to eliminate
some confounding factors and to build a compelling case against alternative behav-
ioral responses to the wage-cut news.
5.1 Are the treatment and control groups similar enough?
One could object that private schools are not an ideal control group to public schools
and there is always a possibility that the controls included in the specifications
underlying the results above are insufficient to adjust for such differences. Most
importantly, the average exam scores and pass rates differ significantly between
public and private schools. Additionally, although probably of less importance, the
control group (6% of the sample) is notably smaller than the treated group. To
check if these issues are likely to bias our baseline estimates we perform different
sensitivity checks.
5.1.1 Estimations controlling for student performance prior to high-
school admission
Our first exercise attempts to rule out the possibility that the DD estimate is driven
by differential student intake in the public and private schools in the 2010 cohort,
and to tease out the effect of student composition from the general public-private
score gap. To do this, we make use of additional data available from the Ministry
of Education covering the high-school students' gymnasium (5th-8th grade) average
graduation grade (i.e., the average of all scores from grades 5 to 8), which we refer
to as student “ability ” below.43 Unfortunately, this information is only available
for the students that completed gymnasium in 2004-2006 and were admitted to high
schools, with standard admission procedures, in 2008-2010.44 Hence we rely on a
smaller (and potentially slightly different) sample than for the baseline estimates.
43This proxy should capture students' true ability reasonably well. Firstly, because this measure
captures all grades in all subjects during the four years of middle school (gymnasium). Secondly,
there are less incentives to inflate this grade through corruption as all students in Romania are
admitted into high-school, so this is not a high-stake grade as compared to e.g., the Baccalaureate
(for more details about the centralized transition between middle and high school, eighth to ninth
grade, in Romania see Pop-Eleches and Urquiola, 2011). Furthermore, as shown before, following
the 2011 anti-cheating initiatives and threats (installing video cameras in schools during the exam,
threatening the staff with dismissal), the passing rate for the Baccalaureate failed with more than
45% in 2011 relative to before (see Borcan et al., 2014), whereas the drop was much smaller (about
17%) for the 8th grade standardized evaluation.
44Moreover, we do not have this information for around 60 schools, because the gymnasium
performance is only made public by high schools that organize a standard admission process,
whereas some vocational and private schools have independent admission procedures.
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In Table 3 we show results for the average grade (Panel A) and the pass rate
on the written Romanian exam (Panel B) from estimating Eq. (1) for the years
2008-2010. We start in column (1) by replicating the baseline estimates from Table
2 (the second specification), in column (2) we include controls for the average initial
ability of the students in each high-school and for the share of students per school
for whom we have information on ability, while in column (3) we add interactions
with the 2010 year indicator.
First we note that, despite some potential change in the composition of schools for
the years 2008-2010, our results in column (1) are comparable with those in our main
Table 2. Next, we learn that controlling for student ability has little effect on the size
of the DD estimate using the pass rate as the outcome, but that the DD estimate
using the average grade as an outcome which now becomes smaller and insignificant.
However, the specification underlying the estimates in column (2) is quite restrictive
as it assumes that student ability has the same impact on Baccalaureate outcomes
in all years. This is especially problematic since there are reasons to expect that
the importance of ability for later outcomes differs depending on how corrupt these
outcomes are. Therefore, in column (3) we also interact student ability with the
2010 indicator. The result is then that the DD estimate is statistically significant
and similar in size as in column (1). This reassures us that the wage cut effect
is independent of the initial ability and of the interaction of the ability level with
the exam structural changes in 2010 (i.e., a potentially more favorable response of
higher-ability students to the increase in exam difficulty).45 This means that we
are able to pin down what typically distinguishes public and private schools and to
ensure that the DD estimate is not driven by any difference in student composition.
Finally, we note that the coefficient of the interaction between average school ability
and the 2010 indicator is negative and significant, while ability itself has a large
positive coefficient. This means that in 2010, ability has a lower impact on exam
outcomes, while being in a public school in the same year, conditional on ability, has
a larger impact on exam outcomes than in previous years. Results in Panel B for
the pass rate outcome have a similar pattern as those shown above for the average
written Romanian. Overall, these findings seem to support our hypothesis that the
DD estimate captures an increase in corruption in public relative to private schools.
45Additionally, from county fixed effect estimations not reported here we see that controlling for
average ability seems to reduce the public-private gap before 2010.
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5.1.2 Evidence from matched public and private schools
With our next exercise we address the potential concerns that the public schools
included in the treatment group might not have comparable private schools. Be-
cause we do not have enough pre-treatment school level information we attempt to
match public to private schools using exam scores in 2007-2009 (to capture both the
levels and the trend), student composition in terms of share of poor students and
the gender split, track, and county.46 As we match on pre-treatment outcomes, our
strategy here is to simply compare the matched public and private school outcomes
for the year 2010. Results are reported in Table 4. In column (1) we show the
resulting matching estimates without any controls, while in columns (2) and (3) we
add the student composition controls and the theoretical track indicator. The esti-
mates in the first two columns are somewhat bigger than our baseline DD estimates
reported in Table 2. When we add controls for the exam scores prior to 2010 (in
column 3) and also county fixed effects (in column 4), we learn that the matching
estimates decrease quite a lot. However, since the precision also increases, we still
obtain statistically significant positive estimates for both outcomes when including
the full set of controls. The magnitude of the estimates is also quite similar to our
baseline DD–estimates, thus matching techniques are reassuring in what concerns
our baseline parametric estimates.
5.1.3 Examination centers with both private and public schools
Finally, we also limit the sample to schools in examination centers where there was
at least one private school and estimate regressions similar to our baseline.47 These
results are reported in Appendix (Table A1) and are in line with our main results in
Table 2. We also include examination center indicators to control for unobservables
at the center level (location, size related to the number of schools and, implicitly,
to the collective bribe). This could potentially rule out collective bribe for schools,
some of which are assigned to the same exam center. That estimates do not change
with the inclusion of examination fixed effects, suggests that individual bribes are
the main mechanism for why we find the wage cut to increase the corrupted exam
scores.
46We use the nearest neighborhood and 1-to-1 matching (without replacement) to match a public
to each private school. Our matching is done using the psmatch2 command in STATA (Leuven
and Sianesi, 2003).
47For this exercise, we have identified on a case–by–case basis the school composition of centers
to which at least one private school was assigned each year. The percentage of private school
students in this sample is about 25%.
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5.2 Alternative explanations
Because, like most of the previous work, we do not have a direct measure of bribes,
in this section we discuss some potential confounding explanations that could bias
our main estimates. In particular, students, parents, teachers, proctors and/or exam
committee members may respond to the wage cut announcement in ways that are
actually unrelated to corruption, but that can nevertheless impact scores on the
exam taken in June. Another concern is related to other possible exogenous macro-
level shocks incurred in 2010 (or before) that may differentially affect public and
private school students or teachers, and that, in turn, would impact differently the
exam scores. In addition, the Baccalaureate exam changed in 2010. Although we
cannot provide fully conclusive evidence, in what follows we attempt to discuss all
these alternative explanations that may bias/confound our main results.
5.2.1 Exploring the regional variation in corruption
One ideal setting to test these concerns would be to estimate Eq. (1), for the
same time period, in a setting where there is no corruption in education, but where
circumstances are otherwise identical. While the nature of the policy we analyze
precludes us from finding and using such a setting, we can still use the variation
in corruption at the county level in Romania. In Fig. 2 we show the county-level
variation in corruption as proxied by the frequency of payment of bribes and gifts
in the public education system. In particular, we use the Life in Transition Survey
(2010) and aggregate the scores assigned to responses to the question “In your
opinion, how often do people like you have to make unofficial payments or gifts in
these situations?”, considering only the situations regarding the receipt of public
education.48 Using these aggregate scores, we divide counties into more and less
corrupt if they situate above/below the median corruption. Next, we estimate our
model separately for most and the least corrupted counties in an attempt to check
whether the wage cut impact is differential across counties. If other exogenous shocks
(e.g., macro-level shocks) or other responses (e.g., change of effort or cheating not
related to corruption) had a similar impact across all counties, significant estimates
exclusively in the more corrupted counties would support the corruption channel.
48The “Life in Transition Survey, After the Crisis” (LiTS II, 2010), was the second public
attitudes survey conducted jointly by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
and the World Bank. It surveyed 39,000 households in 34 countries, including Romania. The
goal was to assess “public attitudes, well-being and the impacts of economic and political change
” (www.ebrd.com), particularly those brought by the financial crisis. The survey is nationally
representative, conducted face-to-face on samples of randomly chosen 1000 households from each
country.
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In Table 5, Panel A for the average grade at the written Romanian exam and
Panel B for the share of students passing the written Romanian exam, we find
that our positive interaction effects are driven by effects in the most corrupted
counties, while the estimates in the least corrupted counties are much smaller and
never statistically significant.49 The challenge with this exercise is that corruption
may be correlated with factors that may have also affected the performance of the
students differently. Indeed, investigating other county level characteristics reveals
not only that richer counties (higher GDP, less poverty, less unemployment) tend
to be more corrupt, but also that less trust in justice and people is associated with
more corruption. These other factors could lie behind the difference in performance
across counties, so this split by corruption level cannot fully dismiss alternative
explanations. We discuss these confounding stories in more detail below.
5.2.2 Some alternative explanations
We have discussed the overall economic context in 2010 (see Section 2) and partic-
ularly the fact that the international financial crisis was taken lightly in Romania.
Indeed, the autumn 2008 and 2009 Eurobarometer showed that more than half of
the Romanian respondents anticipated no change and some even expected an im-
provement in the general economic situation of the country.50 As such, we believe
that it is reasonable to assume that the austerity measures were not anticipated,
neither in their unprecedented scope and magnitude, nor their timing. However, be-
low we discuss how the overall macroeconomic situation or other mechanisms, like
the changes in the exam structure, can affect proctors, evaluators, educators and/or
students efforts' and which, in turn, can confound our main results.
i) Proctors' effort is a potential confounding story, particularly if the proctors
decreased their effort following the wage cut or the overall economic situation, re-
sulting in more students cheating during the 2010 exam compared to previous years.
This may have a stronger effect, on average, on the public students, if they are more
predisposed to cheating. To shed light on this issue, we employ our main strategy
on a measure of the share of students caught cheating (in class) and expelled from
the exam, from the total number of students taking the exam (at the school level).
49These results are robust when using alternative measures of county-level corruption. In par-
ticular, we constructed a proxy based on the share of people having an informal network, at the
county level, based on a question from the 2007 Romanian Barometer of Public Opinion: “Is there
anyone (i.e., informal network) that could “help” you solve (i.e., informally): issues in court/trials,
medical problems, city hall, police, or issues related to the local authorities.”. The results, available
in online Appendix B (Table B2) are similar to those in Table 5.
50http://ec.europa.eu/public opinion/cf/: “What are your expectations for the year to come
with respect to the economic situation of your country (Romania)”.
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The interaction term between the public and the year indicators is never significant
in Table 6, which seems to support that, indeed, what we measure is not a change
in in-class cheating.
ii) Evaluators' effort may have also changed (as a result of the wage shock and/or
the macro conditions), in that they may have potentially decreased effort when eval-
uating the exams. If this was the case, we expect this to be particularly relevant for
the students who were on the verge of passing.51 The minimum requirements for
passing each test and the overall exam are 5 and 6, respectively. Therefore, if there
were proportionally more public than private students with scores 5-6, a less strin-
gent assessment in 2010 could favor the public students, conducing to the observed
average difference in outcomes. Then, in 2010, we would expect, on average, more
public than private students passing the written Romanian exam with scores 5-6.
To check this channel we consider in Table 7 a new outcome the share of students,
at the school level, that passed the written Romanian exam with scores above 5 and
below 7. Indeed, the interaction term between the public and the year indicators is
only significant in the first two columns, and if anything, it is negative (Panel A),
dismissing the story about marginal improvement of public students' scores due to
a change in evaluators' assessment effort. Interestingly, in Panel B of the same table
we show that the only positive significant increase for the public students relative
to their private peers, in 2010 relative to the previous years, is found at the upper
tail of the score distribution, for scores of 7 and above (within this range of scores,
students would be competitive enough for admission into higher education, so there
are higher stakes from achieving these scores). In Fig. 3 we show, separately by year,
the average school shares of students attaining scores in each one of six categories:
below 5, 5-5.99, 6-6.99, 7-7.99, 8-8.99 and 9-10, for public and private schools, re-
spectively. Public and private schools differ at competitive scores (7 and above) in
2010 relative to before (particularly 2009 and 2007): while for private schools there
is a slight decrease in the average student share in this range, for public schools
the average shares in segments 7-7.99 and 8-8.99 show an increase. For the scores
5-6.99, the average shares in private schools are quite stable across years, while they
decrease somewhat for public schools in 2010, relative to before. Overall based on
the trends shown in Fig. 3, both a decrease in the scores for the private schools and
an increase in the scores for the public schools appear to have contributed to the
differences observed in 2010. The figure therefore corroborates the results in Table
51The implicit assumption here is that students who fail to pass a test (with score 5) or the
overall Baccalaureate (with score 6) are more likely to appeal and/or re-take the exam in August,
implying more effort.
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7. This is also partly supported by anecdotal evidence that the Xeroxed exams
helped students to achieve competitive scores of 7 and above.52
iii) Educators' effort in teaching activities could be affected by the substantial
wage cut and/or by the overall economic context. We dismiss the former channel
because the courses were already finished at the time of the wage cut announce-
ment. Moreover, if anything, a lower teacher wage would likely lead to lower stu-
dent achievement, which would mean that we would underestimate our main effect
estimates. However, the overall economic context may have changed the educators'
effort. Particularly worrisome for our interpretation is whether the educators have
increased effort during in-class teaching in the months before the wage cut, differ-
entially in public and private schools.53 Moreover, because our main effect seems to
come from the upper part of the grade distribution, this would mean that only com-
petitive students were affected by the possible change in educators' effort. Overall,
this remains a channel that we cannot completely dismiss.
iv) Students' effort may have also been affected by the changes in 2010 not di-
rectly related to the wage cut policy. For instance, the marginal benefits of going
to college may have changed as a result of the 2010 macroeconomic context which,
in turn, may have changed the incentives of students to study for the Baccalaure-
ate. If the returns of going to college increased relatively more for the public than
for the private students, the former may have put additional effort in passing the
exam.54 Below we outline some conceivable “symptoms ” of the change in students'
incentives, which may confound our interpretation of the results:
52In the wake of corruption trials, student testimonies confirm that bribes were paid to en-
sure a score of 7 and above. Source: http://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/dimitriebolintineanu-
1 51d31f61c7b855ff56f42753/index.html (in Romanian).
53Alternatively, teachers may have reacted to the unstable economic situation by increasing the
supply of private tutoring which would result in better outcomes for students. We have looked
into the 2008-2010 Romanian Household Budget Survey and, albeit a very small sample, we find
no change in the share of students taking private tutoring in 2010 vs. 2009 and 2008.
54Another reason for the students' effort to evolve differently between the public and private
school students is if their parents are affected differently by the wage cut (if e.g., the public school
students are more likely to have parents employed in the public sector). Even if this is the case,
it is not obvious in what direction this would affect our estimates: parents affected by the wage
cut might be more willing to pay bribes in order to avoid future university fees for their children
or, lower incomes mean that there are less available resources to be spent on bribes. Because we
are lacking data on the occupations of the parents, we are not able to investigate this issue. In
addition to the issue about student effort, if, for example, students fear that the evaluators will be
more demanding in 2010 as a behavioral reaction to the wage cut because both public and private
students are graded by public teachers, their level of awareness should be the same. Thus, their
incentives to invest in marginally more preparation, either individual or through potential private
tutoring, should not differ. We have looked into the 2008-2010 Romanian Household Budget Survey
and, albeit a very small sample, we find no change in the share of students taking private tuition
in 2010 vs. 2009 and 2008.
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a) Changes in student selection (either with respect to the share of exam takers
or the students' background) related to changes in students' incentives: One con-
cern is the differential evolution in the share of public and private students taking
the Baccalaureate. Lack of data about the number of graduates prevents us from
constructing an accurate measure of the dropout rates over time. Using a rather
restrictive proxy, we see that the share of 12th graders enrolled in the final exam
sustained a larger increase in private than in public schools.55 Even if this were
accurate, this would be unlikely to have happened on grounds of the wage cut (an-
nounced on May 7th 2010), since the exam registration period was December 2009.
However, the dropout rates may be affected by the overall economic conditions. This
would be a problem for our estimates if marginal students were of lower ability: we
might suspect that exam scores could decrease more in private than in public schools
in 2010 relative to before, partly because of changed composition of students. For
lack of accurate dropout rates before 2010, we cannot control for the share of exam
takers in the regressions, which would account for a variety of unobserved factors
to do with motivation. Still, we can at least include in our regressions a proxy for
family income as an additional control, as a way to partially control for students'
selection. For instance parent's income may determine a change in the motivation
on whether to invest in education and exert effort, particularly during an economic
downturn. If, for instance, fewer low-income students take the exam, discouraged
by the economic turmoil, then this would affect only the public schools, potentially
generating the results we see. And similar arguments in the opposite direction could
be made. Our strategy to deal with this issue is to control in all our regressions for
the share of poor students among the students who take the exam in each school,
a variable which we have yearly data for. Thus, we ensure that our results are not
explained by the income composition.
55Our preferred proxy suggests that the share of exam takers has increased from 2007 to 2010:
the shares are 0.85, 0.90, 0.89 and 0.91 in public schools and 0.68, 0.60, 0.68 and 0.81 in private
schools, for the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, respectively. These numbers are calculated in
the following way: We know how many students took the Baccalaureate exam, but do not know
how many students are enrolled in high school and decide not to take the exam. Also, we know
how many students in each school graduated from high school (graduation is based on course work
during the four years of high school and is decided about one month before the Bac exam) in 2010,
but not for earlier years (since we only have HS graduation data for 2010). The best we can do
is to assume that high school graduation is constant over time, and use the number of graduates
per school in 2010 as the denominator. This makes it possible to approximate the fraction taking
the Baccalaureate (out of the total number of graduates) in each year for each school. Note that
we are getting that the share of exam takers is above 100% for about 10% of the schools (we have
then restricted these schools to have a share equal to one). Also note that, by construction, this
preferred proxy is of lower quality in the years before 2010.
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b) Changes in students' effort resulting from macroeconomic conditions. As
described above, survey evidence indicates that in December 2009 Romanians antic-
ipated no change or even expected an improvement in the general economic situation
of the country. Despite this, we cannot exclude that the worsening of the macroeco-
nomic climate may have affected the students' marginal benefits of going to college.
If students in public and private schools differ along characteristics like ability and
income, the marginal cost of effort may differ across schools. Students with a lower
marginal cost of effort are likely to respond more to changes in the returns to ed-
ucation. The variation in the marginal cost of effort that comes from variation in
income can, at least partially, be dealt with by controlling for the school share of
poor students, our proxy for income. Another part of this variation can be explained
by students' ability. Using the students' ability proxy, in Table 3 we control for dif-
ferences in ability and their interaction with the year 2010 indicator (containing all
general changes) which should capture partially the interaction between ability and
the 2010 marginal costs of effort. The effect of being a public student in 2010 is very
similar in regressions with and without ability controls (columns 1 and 3). However,
this test cannot fully dismiss the interaction between the macroeconomic changes
and other unobserved characteristics in public and private school students.
c) Changes in students' effort (and teachers' reactions) resulting from the 2010
changes in the Baccalaureate exam. As some subject tests were no longer included
in the Baccalaureate exam in 2010, the Romanian written test became relatively
more important. As a result, students may have put additional effort in studying
for the Romanian written test. While we do control for students' ability and a family
income proxy, this may still be a valid argument that may potentially confound our
results.56 However, without more detailed individual level data it remains difficult
to show conclusive evidence to dismiss this channel.
v) Finally, we acknowledge that the deterioration of the country's economic sit-
uation may have generated an increase in corruption directly, not necessarily via
the wage cut. This possibility cannot be dismissed, despite survey evidence indi-
cating that most Romanians were optimistic about the overall economic situation
of Romania prior to the austerity measures in May 2010. In particular, if public
teachers perceived and resented the general economic deterioration more acutely
than the private teachers, they may have been more tempted to resort to illicit in-
56In an attempt to dismiss the wage cut anticipation effects on students' parents' or teachers'
efforts due to changes in the exam structure, we consider the no-stake oral Romanian exam held
only in February 2010. For this year we compare public and private students' scores and we find
that the significant positive gap between them disappears when we control for previous performance
(scores 5th-8th grade). Despite this, the possibility remains that students simply reacted differently
to the overall changes in exam format in 2010.
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comes regardless of the pay cut. In this case, the estimates here still reflect a story
of economic adversity and corruption, but causality runs from the general economic
depression rather than reduced bureaucrats' compensation per se.
6 Conclusion
This study responds to the imperative call for diagnosing the causes of corruption,
particularly those stemming from the financial incentives of civil servants. We ex-
ploit an unexpected wage cut of 25% incurred by the entire public sector in 2010, to
investigate the causal relationship between wage loss and the intensity of corruption.
We base our analysis in the educational system, which was largely affected by the
reduction in wages. Using data from the national Romanian Baccalaureate exam,
we employ difference-in-differences strategies and estimate the effect of the wage
cut on exam outcomes in the public schools, in comparison with private schools
which did not experience any wage shock. Our estimates show that the wage cut
caused a disproportionate change in average grades and passing rates in public high
schools relative to private ones between 2010 and previous years. We attribute the
estimated increased difference in exam outcomes between public and private schools
to an intensification of corrupt activity by public school staff that is related to the
wage loss. Our conclusion is also supported by the fact that we find no significant
effects of the public school indicator for the pre-treatment years, and a series of tests
which rule out some confounding stories. However, we need to be cautious when
interpreting the main results because, as emphasized in the previous section, there
are several channels that may confound the interpretation of our main mechanism.
Our results provide a snapshot of the undesired impact the policies of budget con-
traction had on the illicit behavior of affected agents, which is of particular relevance
in the context of the recent adoption of austerity measures by post-crisis financially
distressed EU members. Such drastic types of reductions in public spending are
particularly dangerous in vulnerable environments that are already predisposed to
corruption.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Upper secondary graduation and PISA tests, country ranking
Figure 1A
Figure 1B
Notes: Our calculations using the UNESCO Institute for Statistics data from 2009 (available
at http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education) and the 2009 PISA reading test scores (available at
http://www.oecd.org/pisa/pisaproducts/pisa2009keyfindings.htm). Please note that: 1) we have
used all European countries for which we have both information on upper secondary graduation
rates and PISA 2009 tests; 2) Romania scores last and similar figure (1B) would have been obtained
if using the mathematics or science tests scores.
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Figure 2
Notes: Source: our calculations using the 2010 Life in Transition Surveys. We use the question:
“In your opinion, how often do people like you have to make unofficial payments or gifts in these
situations?” focusing only on the receipt of public education. The answers are scored 1-5 where
1 corresponds to “never” and 5 to “always” . For each county we display the average over all
respondents scores within the respective county.
116
Figure 3: The Romanian written exam average shares of students, by scores, by
private and public schools, and by year.
Notes: Each bar segment is the average across all private schools (and public schools, respectively)
of the share of students (in each school) who attain written Romanian scores in one of the 6
categories: below 5, 5-5.99, 6-6.99, 7-7.99, 8-8.99 and 9-10. All shares are weighted with the
number of (per school) students taking the exam.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 2010-2007
2010 (N=850)2009 (N=841)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
All schoolsPublic schools 0.937 0.241 0.942 0.232
Share poor students 0.184 0.18 0.184 0.187
Share male students 0.498 0.164 0.494 0.17
Theoretic track 0.264 0.441 0.265 0.441
Vocational track 0.08 0.271 0.079 0.27
Technologic and mixed tracks 0.655 0.475 0.655 0.475
Average Grade Romanian written exam 7.000 1.060 6.755 1.175
Average Pass Rate Romanian written exam0.939 0.086 0.912 0.111
Private Average Grade Romanian written exam 5.618 0.813 5.746 0.783
Average Pass Rate Romanian written exam0.804 0.116 0.839 0.113
Public Average Grade Romanian written exam 7.090 1.036 6.845 1.185
Average Pass Rate Romanian written exam0.945 0.074 0.917 0.102
2008 (N=824) 2007(N=837)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
All schoolsPublic schools 0.947 0.222 0.947 0.223
Share poor students 0.144 0.162 0.106 0.133
Share male students 0.483 0.167 0.477 0.163
Theoretic track 0.266 0.442 0.26 0.439
Vocational track 0.081 0.273 0.078 0.269
Technologic and mixed tracks 0.651 0.476 0.661 0.473
Average Grade Romanian written exam 7.007 1.091 6.686 1.109
Average Pass Rate Romanian written exam0.930 0.088 0.918 0.104
Private Average Grade Romanian written exam 5.834 1.078 5.846 0.849
Average Pass Rate Romanian written exam0.816 0.143 0.855 0.134
Public Average Grade Romanian written exam 7.032 1.077 6.712 1.106
Average Pass Rate Romanian written exam0.933 0.085 0.92 0.102
Notes: Average Grade Romanian written exam - the average grade in the Romanian written exam
at school level; Average Pass Rate Romanian written exam the share of students per school who
passed the Romanian written exam.
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Table 2: Main effects, 2007-2010 academic years
Panel A: Average grade score on the standardised written Romanian exam
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public*Yr10 0.232** 0.266** 0.314** 0.455***
(0.110) (0.105) (0.138) (0.116)
Public*Yr09 0.023 0.123
(0.137) (0.106)
Public*Yr08 0.128 0.175
(0.195) (0.174)
Share Poor 0.143 0.142 -0.731***
(0.224) (0.225) (0.188)
Share Males -1.079*** -1.074*** -2.517***
(0.189) (0.189) (0.211)
Theoretic 0.889***
(0.050)
Technologic -0.443***
(0.059)
Public 0.753***
(0.196)
Observations 3,324 3,324 3,324 3,324
R-squared 0.921 0.923 0.923 0.603
Panel B: Share of students passing the standardised written Romanian exam
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public*Yr10 0.030* 0.033** 0.031* 0.054***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.017)
Public*Yr09 -0.019 -0.006
(0.024) (0.019)
Public*Yr08 0.022 0.031
(0.034) (0.028)
Share Poor 0.041 0.043 -0.002
(0.026) (0.026) (0.018)
Share Males -0.095*** -0.094*** -0.178***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.022)
Theoretic 0.040***
(0.005)
Technologic -0.035***
(0.007)
Public 0.059**
(0.027)
Observations 3,324 3,324 3,324 3,324
R-squared 0.790 0.792 0.792 0.409
Year FE YES YES YES YES
School FE YES YES YES NO
County FE NO NO NO YES
County trends YES YES YES YES
Notes: All regressions are weighted with the number of (per school) students taking the exam.
The standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered at the locality level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1 119
Table 3: Main effects, controlling for student ability, 2008-2010 academic years
Panel A: Average grade score on the standardised written Romanian exam
(1) (2) (3)
Public x yr10 0.258** 0.204 0.274**
(0.124) (0.124) (0.135)
Average 5-8 grade score 0.392*** 0.462***
(0.091) (0.109)
Share non-missing 5-8 score 0.419** 0.456***
(0.168) (0.172)
Share poor -0.147 -0.321 -0.278
(0.303) (0.298) (0.322)
Share males -0.901*** -0.688*** -0.598**
(0.271) (0.261) (0.267)
Average 5-8 grade score x yr10 -0.097**
(0.039)
Share poor x yr10 -0.277
(0.242)
Share males x yr10 -0.178
(0.127)
Observations 2,297 2,297 2,297
R-squared 0.939 0.941 0.942
Panel B: Share of students passing the written Romanian exam
(1) (2) (3)
Public x yr10 0.040** 0.036** 0.051***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Average 5-8 grade score 0.025** 0.046***
(0.012) (0.014)
Share non-missing 5-8 score 0.030 0.039
(0.023) (0.024)
Share poor 0.017 0.002 -0.009
(0.034) (0.039) (0.042)
Share males -0.060* -0.047 -0.028
(0.033) (0.033) (0.031)
Average 5-8 grade score x yr10 -0.027***
(0.006)
Share poor x yr10 -0.028
(0.028)
Share males x yr10 -0.022
(0.020)
Observations 2,297 2,297 2,297
R-squared 0.826 0.827 0.833
Year FE YES YES YES
School FE YES YES YES
County trends YES YES YES
Notes: All regressions are weighted with the number of (per school) students taking the exam. All
regressions use the sample of schools from 2008-2010. The standard errors, shown in parentheses,
are clustered at the locality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Matching private and public schools
Panel A: Average grade score on the standardised written Romanian exam
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public 0.676** 0.368* 0.256 0.305**
(0.287) (0.192) (0.160) (0.122)
Controls NO YES YES YES
Pre-reform outcome NO NO YES YES
County FE NO NO NO YES
Observations 78 78 78 78
R-squared 0.100 0.477 0.805 0.901
Panel B: Share of students passing the standardised written Romanian exam
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public 0.060** 0.043 0.043** 0.033*
(0.029) (0.026) (0.020) (0.018)
Controls NO YES YES YES
Pre-reform outcome NO NO YES YES
County FE NO NO NO YES
Observations 78 78 78 78
R-squared 0.065 0.225 0.627 0.768
Notes: All regressions are weighted with the number of (per school) students taking the exam.
Controls include: theoretic track, share poor students, share males. The standard errors, shown in
parentheses, are clustered at the locality level. Pre-reform outcome is the lag outcome from 2007,
2008 and 2009. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Main effects by county level of corruption, 2007-2010 academic years.
Corruption proxy = unofficial payments in (public) education
Panel A: Average grade score on the standardised written Romanian exam
I. Most corrupted counties (1) (2) (3) (4)
Public*Yr10 0.320*** 0.359*** 0.428*** 0.555***
(0.069) (0.075) (0.141) (0.129)
Public*Yr09 0.015 0.072
(0.176) (0.130)
Public*Yr08 0.206 0.284
(0.244) (0.217)
Share Poor -0.441 -0.438 -0.127
(0.358) (0.360) (0.268)
Share Males -0.968*** -0.961*** -2.560***
(0.271) (0.272) (0.247)
Theoretic 0.926***
(0.069)
Technologic -0.349***
(0.077)
Public 0.626**
(0.253)
Observations 1,645 1,645 1,645 1,645
R-squared 0.920 0.922 0.922 0.594
II. Least corrupted counties (1) (2) (3) (4)
Public*Yr10 -0.020 0.004 -0.028 0.169
(0.317) (0.289) (0.279) (0.195)
Public*Yr09 -0.004 0.139
(0.169) (0.202)
Public*Yr08 -0.106 -0.122
(0.190) (0.189)
Share Poor 0.416 0.417* -1.278***
(0.252) (0.251) (0.268)
Share Males -1.136*** -1.141*** -2.448***
(0.288) (0.286) (0.395)
Theoretic 0.837***
(0.081)
Technologic -0.528***
(0.084)
Public 0.965***
(0.236)
Observations 1,303 1,303 1,303 1,303
R-squared 0.930 0.933 0.933 0.611
Year FE YES YES YES YES
School FE YES YES YES NO
County FE NO NO NO YES
County trends YES YES YES YES
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Panel B: Share of students that passed the written Romanian exam
I. Most corrupted counties (1) (2) (3) (4)
Public*Yr10 0.043*** 0.046*** 0.052*** 0.074***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
Public*Yr09 -0.018 -0.008
(0.030) (0.023)
Public*Yr08 0.042 0.052
(0.043) (0.036)
Share Poor -0.014 -0.010 0.050**
(0.038) (0.038) (0.023)
Share Males -0.083* -0.081* -0.190***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.026)
Theoretic 0.051***
(0.006)
Technologic -0.026***
(0.010)
Public 0.040
(0.032)
Observations 1,645 1,645 1,645 1,645
R-squared 0.782 0.783 0.785 0.417
II. Least corrupted counties (1) (2) (3) (4)
Public*Yr10 -0.011 -0.010 -0.041 0.004
(0.037) (0.035) (0.043) (0.043)
Public*Yr09 -0.039 -0.002
(0.037) (0.043)
Public*Yr08 -0.047 -0.016
(0.036) (0.032)
Share Poor 0.062* 0.065* -0.046*
(0.036) (0.037) (0.027)
Share Males -0.102** -0.103** -0.168***
(0.042) (0.041) (0.044)
Theoretic 0.027***
(0.006)
Technologic -0.044***
(0.011)
Public 0.105*
(0.055)
Observations 1,303 1,303 1,303 1,303
R-squared 0.815 0.817 0.818 0.414
Year FE YES YES YES YES
School FE YES YES YES NO
County FE NO NO NO YES
County trends YES YES YES YES
Notes: In particular, we use the question: “In your opinion, how often do people like you have to
make unofficial payments or gifts in these situations?”, and we focus only on public education. All
regressions are weighted with the number of (per school) students taking the exam. The standard
errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered at the locality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Share of expelled students (caught cheating) from the exam, 2007-2010
academic years
Share of expelled students from the exam
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public*Yr10 -0.005 -0.005 -0.009 -0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Public*Yr09 -0.005** -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002)
Public*Yr08 -0.004 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003)
Share Poor -0.002 -0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Share Males 0.000 0.000 0.002***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Theoretic -0.000**
(0.000)
Technologic 0.000
(0.000)
Public 0.001
(0.001)
Observations 3,324 3,324 3,324 3,324
R-squared 0.330 0.331 0.333 0.066
Year FE YES YES YES YES
School FE YES YES YES NO
County FE NO NO NO YES
County trends YES YES YES YES
Notes: All regressions are weighted with the number of (per school) students taking the exam.
Columns (1)–(4) unbalanced panel; column (5) balanced panel. The standard errors, shown in
parentheses, are clustered at the locality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Main effects by scores, 2007-2010 academic years
Panel A: Share students that passed the Romanian written exam with scores 5-6
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public*Yr10 -0.038** -0.041** -0.039 -0.026
(0.019) (0.019) (0.024) (0.023)
Public*Yr09 -0.013 -0.011
(0.022) (0.019)
Public*Yr08 0.026 0.043*
(0.028) (0.026)
Share Poor 0.002 0.004 0.159***
(0.045) (0.046) (0.032)
Share Males 0.108*** 0.109*** 0.418***
(0.040) (0.041) (0.030)
Theoretic -0.183***
(0.010)
Technologic 0.072***
(0.013)
Public -0.089***
(0.030)
Observations 3,324 3,324 3,324 3,324
R-squared 0.883 0.884 0.884 0.556
Panel B: Share students that passed the Romanian written exam with scores 7-10
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public*Yr10 0.068*** 0.074*** 0.070** 0.080***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.031) (0.025)
Public*Yr09 -0.006 0.005
(0.030) (0.023)
Public*Yr08 -0.004 -0.012
(0.042) (0.038)
Share Poor 0.039 0.040 -0.161***
(0.055) (0.056) (0.043)
Share Males -0.203*** -0.203*** -0.595***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Theoretic 0.223***
(0.013)
Technologic -0.106***
(0.015)
Public 0.148***
(0.042)
Observations 3,324 3,324 3,324 3,324
R-squared 0.913 0.914 0.914 0.598
Year FE YES YES YES YES
School FE YES YES YES NO
County FE NO NO NO YES
County trends YES YES YES YES
Notes: All regressions are weighted with the number of (per school) students taking the exam.
The standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered at the locality level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
125
126
A Appendix – Supplementary Tables
Table A1: Main effects using the sample of exam centers: mixed public with private
schools
Panel A: Average grade score on the standardised written Romanian exam
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public*Yr10 0.272* 0.322** 0.420** 0.583*** 0.523*** 0.591***
(0.144) (0.140) (0.164) (0.158) (0.167) (0.211)
Public*Yr09 0.107 0.220 0.270* 0.172
(0.154) (0.133) (0.144) (0.172)
Public*Yr08 0.174 0.227 0.213 0.163
(0.168) (0.151) (0.160) (0.203)
Share Poor 0.188 0.134 -0.958** -1.027*** -1.298***
(0.546) (0.548) (0.413) (0.380) (0.487)
Share Males -1.347*** -1.335*** -2.198*** -1.855*** -2.557***
(0.426) (0.425) (0.308) (0.293) (0.376)
Theoretic 0.777*** 0.558*** 0.289*
(0.116) (0.116) (0.155)
Technologic -0.269** -0.339*** -0.413***
(0.113) (0.094) (0.112)
Public 0.850*** 0.903*** 0.896***
(0.163) (0.130) (0.166)
Observations 738 738 738 738 738 417
R-squared 0.945 0.947 0.947 0.706 0.829 0.842
Panel B: Share of students passing the standardised written Romanian exam
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public*Yr10 0.031 0.035* 0.038 0.060** 0.056** 0.085**
(0.021) (0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.036)
Public*Yr09 -0.011 0.004 -0.000 0.013
(0.023) (0.021) (0.019) (0.026)
Public*Yr08 0.027 0.038 0.032 0.032
(0.031) (0.025) (0.025) (0.034)
Share Poor 0.059 0.069 -0.002 -0.037 -0.080
(0.059) (0.059) (0.041) (0.041) (0.057)
Share Males -0.142** -0.133** -0.137*** -0.132*** -0.185***
(0.066) (0.065) (0.028) (0.027) (0.040)
Theoretic 0.033*** 0.016 -0.012
(0.010) (0.012) (0.017)
Technologic -0.018* -0.046*** -0.048***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015)
Public 0.067*** 0.070*** 0.058*
(0.024) (0.024) (0.033)
Observations 738 738 738 738 738 417
R-squared 0.849 0.852 0.854 0.516 0.661 0.667
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
School FE YES YES YES NO NO NO
County FE NO NO NO YES NO NO
Center FE NO NO NO NO YES YES
County trends YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: All regressions are weighted with the number of (per school) students taking the exam.
The standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered at the locality level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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B Appendix – Supplementary Analysis
B1. Heterogeneous effects
Finally, in this section, we explore whether corruption responds to the wage cut
in distinct ways across high schools with different characteristics. In particular, in
Table B1, we look at DD estimates in schools with different proportions of female
students (Panel A of Table B1), different ethnic compositions (Panel B), varying
shares of teachers paid by the hour (Panel C) and, different age of the school principal
(Panel D).
The most interesting findings are the following:
a) The DD estimates are significant only for high schools with a minority popu-
lation of female students, suggesting that male dominated schools are more prone to
appeal to corruption especially when the financial incentives are accentuated. While
this does not exclude milder forms of fraud, such as increased male to female student
cheating in the exam rooms, this finding is also consistent with an outward shift in
demand for illegal grades meeting the increased supply by didactic staff, where male
students are dominant.
b) The impact of the wage cut is significant in ethnically mixed high schools
(defined as having the share of Romanians less than 1), which is true both for the
average pass and for the average grade in the Romanian written exam.
c) The findings are mixed for schools with a different share of teachers working
part time. Effects are larger in magnitude for those with higher prevalence (i.e.,
the share of teachers paid by the hour is larger than the mean=11%), suggesting
they might be more responsive to monetary incentives. This might indicate that
less organised schools or teachers who have loose ties to the teacher labor market
(by being hired on a temporary contract), are more easily influenced by principals
to be involved in corrupt behavior. However, it should be noted that very few
schools have a high proportion of part-time teachers. If we exclude the few schools
with more than 50% of teachers paid by the hour, we get positive and statistically
DD-estimates that are in line with our baseline estimates.
d) Schools with a younger school principal (i.e., smaller than the mean age=48)
are more responsive to monetary incentives. This might be in line with the increase
in corruption in schools over time in Romania, so that older principals were used to
working in a system of less corruption.
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B2. Results using an alternative measure of corruption
Figure B1
Notes: Our calculations using the 2007 Public Opinion Barometer, Soros. We use the question:
“There is anyone (i.e., informal network) that could “help” you solve (i.e., informally): issues in
court/trials, medical problems, city hall, police, or issues related to the local authorities”
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Table B2: Main effects by county level of corruption, 2007-2010 academic years.
Corruption proxy = share that use informal network
Panel A: Average grade score on the standardised written Romanian exam
I. Most corrupted counties (1) (2) (3) (4)
Public*Yr10 0.350*** 0.376*** 0.445*** 0.532***
(0.093) (0.096) (0.168) (0.139)
Public*Yr09 0.025 0.082
(0.199) (0.149)
Public*Yr08 0.189 0.220
(0.269) (0.234)
Share Poor -0.176 -0.175 -0.750**
(0.371) (0.370) (0.328)
Share Males -1.038*** -1.028*** -2.437***
(0.244) (0.244) (0.319)
Theoretic 0.936***
(0.063)
Technologic -0.395***
(0.077)
Public 0.650***
(0.219)
Observations 1,941 1,941 1,941 1,941
R-squared 0.923 0.924 0.924 0.592
II. Least corrupted counties (1) (2) (3) (4)
Public*Yr10 0.035 0.093 0.100 0.357*
(0.263) (0.243) (0.213) (0.212)
Public*Yr09 0.011 0.155
(0.130) (0.100)
Public*Yr08 0.010 0.106
(0.196) (0.204)
Share Poor 0.263 0.262 -0.770***
(0.263) (0.268) (0.227)
Share Males -1.194*** -1.194*** -2.607***
(0.276) (0.276) (0.201)
Theoretic 0.834***
(0.087)
Technologic -0.511***
(0.096)
Public 0.942***
(0.354)
Observations 1,383 1,383 1,383 1,383
R-squared 0.919 0.921 0.921 0.614
Year FE YES YES YES YES
School FE YES YES YES NO
County FE NO NO NO YES
County trends YES YES YES YES
131
Panel B: Share of students that passed the written Romanian exam
I. Most corrupted counties (1) (2) (3) (4)
Public*Yr10 0.037** 0.038** 0.036 0.060***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.022) (0.020)
Public*Yr09 -0.023 -0.006
(0.035) (0.027)
Public*Yr08 0.025 0.035
(0.051) (0.041)
Share Poor 0.039 0.042 0.028
(0.038) (0.038) (0.030)
Share Males -0.082** -0.079** -0.181***
(0.036) (0.035) (0.037)
Theoretic 0.044***
(0.006)
Technologic -0.035***
(0.010)
Public 0.057*
(0.033)
Observations 1,941 1,941 1,941 1,941
R-squared 0.790 0.791 0.792 0.394
II. Least corrupted counties (1) (2) (3) (4)
Public*Yr10 0.020 0.025 0.025 0.042
(0.035) (0.033) (0.036) (0.033)
Public*Yr09 -0.012 -0.008
(0.029) (0.025)
Public*Yr08 0.019 0.023
(0.026) (0.028)
Share Poor 0.032 0.033 -0.022
(0.036) (0.037) (0.020)
Share Males -0.117** -0.116** -0.173***
(0.045) (0.046) (0.019)
Theoretic 0.034***
(0.007)
Technologic -0.034***
(0.010)
Public 0.063
(0.046)
Observations 1,383 1,383 1,383 1,383
R-squared 0.791 0.795 0.795 0.434
Year FE YES YES YES YES
School FE YES YES YES NO
County FE NO NO NO YES
County trends YES YES YES YES
Notes: In particular, we use the question: “There is anyone (i.e., informal network) that could
“help ” you solve (i.e., informally): issues in court/trials, medical problems, city hall, police, or
issues related to the local authorities”. All regressions are weighted with the number of (per school)
students taking the exam. The standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered at the locality
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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1 Introduction
Equality of educational opportunity for individuals of similar ability is a key ingre-
dient in a society that wants to promote growth and increase social mobility. A
meritocratic education system increases the efficiency of how talented individuals
are allocated by rewarding ability and not family income. However, in many coun-
tries, hurdles such as tuition fees and school and neighborhood segregation may
reinforce inequality of opportunities across generations and increase inequality by
limiting skill acquisition and access to higher education for poor individuals of high
ability. An additional barrier to higher education, mostly prevalent in developing
countries, is corruption in education, including bribes taken by teachers to facilitate
admission to education or to inflate grades and scores on high-stakes exams. More-
over, corruption in education may act as an added tax, putting the poor students
at a disadvantage and reducing, once more, equal access to human capital (see the
2013 Global Corruption Report, GCR).
This paper analyzes the implications of the fight against corruption in a setting
of endemic fraud, cheating, and grade selling in the public education system in Ro-
mania.1 Particularly, we investigate the efficiency and distributional consequences of
a national anti-corruption campaign targeting the Romanian high school exit exam
the Baccalaureate.2 The campaign was initiated in 2011 in response to the 2010
Baccalaureate, which marked a peak in corruption for exam grades and generated
a media storm after Romanian National Anticorruption Directorate revealed how
batches of identical answers had been distributed to students by public teachers (see
Borcan, Lindahl and Mitrut, 2014).3 The campaign consisted of two distinct com-
ponents: 1) increasing the threat of punishment for teachers and students caught
taking/giving bribes and 2) closed-circuit TV (CCTV) monitoring of the exam cen-
ters in an effort to eradicate mass cheating and bribes during the examination.4
Our aim in this paper is to first evaluate the efficiency of the national anti-
corruption campaign and subsequently to understand who the winners (and losers)
are, especially in terms of students' poverty status, ability, and gender characteris-
1The prevalence of corruption in the Romanian, as well as many other countries public education
is acknowledged in the World Bank Report Gobal Corruption Report, 2013.
2Corruption in this setting refers to the giving of bribes for permission to cheat or for higher
scores than deserved.
3This exam became known in the media as the “Xeroxed exam,” referring to the fact that many
students were found to have identical test answers including in essay type exams.
4While similar policies are currently discussed in other countries, Moldova and Cambodia have
already implemented a similar policy targeting the endemic corruption in connection with the high
school exit exam, resulting in 56% and 26% of students passing the exam compared with over 94%
and 87%, respectively, in the past.
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tics. To accomplish our first objective, we evaluate the punishment and monitoring
components of the campaign. For teachers, the punishment side of the campaign
comprised threats of dismissals and imprisonment, while corrupt students risked be-
ing suspended from any retakes for over a year. The commitment to punish teachers
and students caught red-handed was demonstrated by the high number of trials re-
lated to exam fraud immediately after the 2010 Baccalaureate. The installation of
CCTV cameras in exam centers, the second component of the campaign, was an
effort to eradicate mass cheating and fraud. This measure was not announced until
May 2011, i.e., one month prior to the high-stake Baccalaureate exam. Just over
half of the counties had video surveillance in 2011, while the rest installed cameras
in 2012 when CCTV surveillance became mandatory. Hence, for the monitoring
part of the campaign we have access to quasi experimental variation in camera in-
stallation, which we utilize in a difference-in-differences (DD) framework, comparing
counties treated with the camera monitoring (some in 2011 and all in 2012) with
those not treated (all in 2009-2010 and some in 2011). This yields an estimate of the
effect of increased monitoring on high-stakes Baccalaureate scores. The punishment
component was implemented across the country at the same time, but because of
its strict implementation and since we can use a placebo test as control, we are able
to say something about the impact of the monitoring and punishment combined.
Having established that the anti-corruption campaign did have an overall effect
in lowering Baccalaureate scores and pass rates, we next investigate who the winners
and losers from the campaign are. We analyze the heterogeneous effects of the anti-
corruption campaign for the students: high vs. low ability, high vs. low income
(poor), and males vs. females. This will give us an idea of how different groups fare
in a more or less corrupt education system. Given that bribing requires economic
resources and is an opportunity to circumvent effort and ability in producing high
scores, we hypothesize that eliminating or decreasing corruption in relation to the
Baccalaureate benefits poor students and makes ability a more important predictor
of the Baccalaureate score. As the Baccalaureate score is the only or major admission
criteria for higher education in Romania, we expect our results on Baccalaureate
outcomes to carry over to the admission to higher education. To corroborate this
finding, we have collected additional data to directly investigate the consequences
of the (monitoring component of the) anti-corruption policy for admission to higher
education at an elite university.
We provide a number of interesting findings. We find that exam outcomes
dropped sharply already in 2011 and that the drop came from both the monitored
and non-monitored counties, yet it was larger in the monitored ones. By 2012, the
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average pass rate had almost halved. In the DD analysis we find that the presence of
CCTV cameras reduced the Romanian written exam score by 0.12 SD and the prob-
ability of passing the Baccalaureate by 8.3 percentage points. We interpret these
estimates as the additional effect of introducing monitoring. The analogous analysis
of a no-stakes exam, with no scope for corruption (the oral Romanian exam), re-
veals neither a general drop in scores in 2011 or 2012, nor a decrease in response to
monitoring. We interpret this as suggestive evidence that punishment works well,
in particular when complemented with monitoring. Moreover, we corroborate this
finding with very similar pattern for pass rates at the baccalaureate in Moldova,
a country with a very similar educational structure as Romania which introduced
harsher punishments in 2012 and CCTV cameras in 2013.
As expected, the campaign increases the importance of ability for exam out-
comes, implying efficiency gains. More surprisingly, our findings contradict our
original expectation that fighting corruption should close the score gap between
poor and non-poor students. The results indicate that the anti-corruption measures
made the already underperforming poor students relatively worse off than non-poor
students. The campaign induced an increase in achievement gaps, in that groups
performing relatively worse prior to the campaign (low ability, poor, males) became
even more worse off relative to the groups performing better. This was likely the
result of the structure of corruption and the pre-existing inequalities hidden behind
it, as we discuss in section 6. Importantly, we are also able to investigate the conse-
quences of the anti-corruption policy (the monitoring component) for admission to
higher education. Using data from an elite university, we show that, while the ability
and gender composition of students at this top school was unaffected by the intro-
duction of cameras, the monitoring significantly reduced the chances of admission
for poor students, hence confirming most of the results found for the Baccalaureate.
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature on fighting corruption
and on the economic consequences of corruption. Economic theory argues that the
right combination of increasing the probability of detection (through monitoring)
and the threat of punishment may reduce corruption by increasing its costs (Becker
and Stigler, 1974). However, evaluation of policies that combine punishment and
monitoring has proven to be a challenging task (Hanna et al., 2011; Svensson, 2005).
The setting we have for the year 2011 is one where, akin to a Becker-Stigler model
of crime, we have a combination of incentives and varying detection probabilities.
Counties that installed cameras faced both a stronger incentive (credible punishment
threat) and increased monitoring, whereas counties that did not install cameras faced
the new punishment threats but no increase in actual monitoring. This allows us
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to bring additional evidence on the interplay between punishment and monitoring
and their effects on exam outcomes. Our research therefore complements the lit-
erature on anti-corruption policies, which has so far explored monitoring through
official audits (Ferraz and Finan, 2008, 2011; Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2003)
and community-based monitoring interventions (Duflo et al., 2012; Reinikka and
Svensson, 2004, 2005; Olken, 2007), and has also analyzed changes in incentives
(Banerjee et al., 2008; Duflo et al., 2012). Some of these studies shed light on the
interplay and relative effectiveness of monitoring and incentives in discouraging dis-
honest practices.5 Our paper offers evidence that monitoring is effective insofar as
it enables incentive schemes to operate better, even in the high-stakes setting of a
high school exit exams of crucial importance for future education and success in the
labor market. The paper also contributes additional evidence of the effectiveness of
monitoring to an emerging literature on the role of CCTV cameras in combating
crime (Priks, 2014, 2015; King et al. 2008, Welsh and Farringdon, 2009, 2003).6
One important contribution of our paper is the estimated impact of fighting cor-
ruption on equality of educational opportunity. While social scientists have argued
that (income) inequality is positively correlated with the level of corruption (see,
e.g., You and Khagram, 2005; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005), little is known about
the distributional consequences of the various means to fight corruption and par-
ticularly how curbing corruption influences inequality of opportunity in a society.
This is problematic as corruption might adapt and transform to circumvent new
constraints, generating a redistribution of resources and opportunities that could
increase inequality. Importantly, empirical evidence on the welfare consequences of
5Nagin et al. (2002) report on a field experiment which showed that that decreasing the rate
of monitoring observable by employees led them to shirk more, independently of how good their
alternatives in the labor market were relative to their job. Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003)
examine the effects of wages and audits during a crackdown on corruption in Buenos Aires hospitals.
They find that the wages played no role in reducing corruption (inferred from the drop in previously
inflated hospital input prices) when the probability of detection was close to 100%, but only
when auditing was less frequent. Duflo et al. (2012) show that monitoring with tamper-proof
cameras worked in reducing teacher absenteeism insofar as it was instrumental in implementing
an incentivizing attendance-based wage scheme. Their model predicts that at the very least,
punishment prospects (fear of dismissal) should put a bound on dishonest behavior. Banerjee et al.
(2008) follow the punishment approach of incentives and show that credible threats of punishment
(through pay cuts and dismissal) were indispensable in getting government nurses in India to
come to work, even when camera monitoring was in place. The impact of changing monitoring
or incentives of corruption and shirking linked with the education process is also illustrated in
Glewwe et al. (2010).
6The effectiveness of CCTV cameras in reducing crime is a current topic, with million dollars
being spent in this public safety infrastructure. Priks (2014) and Priks (2015) documents the
causal effects of CCTV cameras on unruly behaviour and some types of crime, using temporal
variation in CCTV installation in Swedish stadiums and underground. King et al (2008) showed
that property crime was reduced as a result of CCTV monitoring on the streets of San Francisco.
139
corruption remains very scarce.7 By separating the effects of corruption elimination
between low- and high-income students and between low- and high-ability students,
we will also infer the consequences of corruption on educational opportunity for
students from different backgrounds a perspective neglected in previous studies.
Allocative inefficiencies, for instance in the selection into higher education, can have
great consequences for longer-run economic development and economic inequality
(Banerjee et al., 2012). Our paper also related to the large literature on how credit
constraints (in this paper in the form of bribes) affect continuation to higher ed-
ucation, especially with regard to selection across the ability and family income
distribution (see Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2012, for a survey).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the setting and the anti-
corruption initiatives. Section 3 provides the details of our data. Section 4 provides
a graphical analysis of the data. Section 5 outlines our empirical strategy. Section
6 presents our main empirical findings. Section 7 presents the effects on admission
to university. Our conclusions are presented in Section 8.
2 Background
2.1 The Romanian education system
The Romanian pre-university education starts with elementary school, which is di-
vided into primary school (1st to 4th grade) and secondary school, or gymnasium
(5th to 8th grade). Upon graduation from secondary school, i.e., at the end of 8th
grade, the students need to pass a national standardized exam. The score from
this exam and the student's graduation grade point average (5th to 8th grade) con-
tribute with equal weights to the student's tertiary or high school admission grade.
Based on this score and a comprehensive list of ranked high schools, the student
is systematically allocated by the Ministry of Education (through a computerized,
transparent allocation procedure) to a high school and a specific track at that school:
i) a theoretical track, which includes humanities and sciences,8 ii) a technological
track, which includes technical training, services, and natural resource- and envi-
ronment protection-oriented education, or iii) a vocational track, which includes
7Exceptions include Ferraz et al. (2012), who explore variation in corruption in education
across Brazilian municipalities, showing how more corruption translates into lower scores for the
students, thereby assessing the efficiency costs of corruption, and Choe et al. (2013), who show
survey evidence from Bangladesh that corruption in education is most taxing for the poor and less
educated. Similarly, Hunt (2007) shows evidence from Peru that the victims of misfortune (crime)
are also more likely to be victims of bribery.
8The theoretical track is typically the most popular among high-ability students.
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arts, military, theology, sports and teaching (for more details on the allocation, see
Pop-Eleches and Urquiola, 2013).
Upon completion of high school, students take the Baccalaureate exam. This
high-stakes nationwide standardized test is mandatory in order to obtain a tertiary
education degree. Admission to university or further training as well as access to the
labor market are almost exclusively based on this test.9 The exam takes place every
year in June and consists of a few oral and written standardized tests, with slight
alterations across years.10 The tests within each subject and may have different
degrees of difficulties across tracks, but they are standard within one track. The
only exception is the written exam in Romanian language and literature, which is
the one test that is identical for all students regardless of track, and its format has
remained unchanged over the years.
2.2 The Baccalaureate and the Anti-corruption Campaign
The pressure of passing the Baccalaureate exam (with high scores) has been con-
stantly rising since about 2002. It was around then that the increase in the number
of private universities and the introduction of tuition fees in public higher education
began. This made the university admission exams less relevant as the Baccalaureate
scores attained increasing shares in the admission criteria (up to 100%), raising the
stakes of the high school exit exam. The combination of the high stakes and poor
remuneration of public school teachers created an endemic corruption environment
surrounding the Baccalaureate exam, as also documented by Borcan, Lindahl, and
Mitrut (2014).11
The unofficial payments behind the Baccalaureate exam can be summarized as
follows:12 i) Collective bribes which are funds collected from the students before, or
just before the exam. These are voluntary but very common, usually perceived as a
9All tests and school grades in Romania are scored on a scale from 1 to 10, and to pass a student
must obtain a minimum score of 5 on each test. However, to pass the Baccalaureate a student
needs at least 5 on each exam and a minimum overall average score of 6.
10The most important changes were the exclusion of oral tests from the overall score starting
in 2010 and the elimination of the fourth written test. All these tests displayed abnormal score
distributions highly concentrated at the top marks.
11A 2003 World Bank Report on corruption in Romania reveals that more than 67% of the
respondents alleged that all or almost all public officials in Romania are corrupt, while more than
50% of the respondents believed that bribery is part of the everyday life in Romania. The figure
was particularly high for the education and health systems, as up to 66% of the respondents
confirmed that they were paying the so-called atentie (unofficial payments or bribes). According
to the Global Corruption Barometer from Transparency International, in Romania in 2010/2011,
37% of respondents believed the education system was corrupt or extremely corrupt, which was
above the world average.
12This distinction is based on examples of bribes documented in the court cases and official press
releases of the National Anticorruption Directorate (retrieved from www.pna.ro - in Romanian).
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norm by all students and are used to “grease the wheels”( “protocol” meals or, small
gifts for the exam committee) or directly given to the exam committee and proctors
to turn a blind eye or even help in-class cheating. Because these bribes affect what
happens during the exam, it is this type of corruption (“pay to cheat”) that the
CCTV monitoring can reduce. ii) Individual bribes, which are large sums (hundreds
of euro) transferred privately by the more aﬄuent students to members of the exam
committee to increase the student's score, or to replace the exam paper with a correct
version.13 This is usually done with the help of a student's teacher or school principal
who act as intermediaries for the bribe transfers. The corruption trials following the
2010 exam illustrate this form of bribing: “The defendant [school principal, name]
claimed and received from the defendants [names] the total amount of 7.000 RON,
which she then transferred to the defendant [name]. This money was received in
order for the latter, as examiner in Romanian language, to give higher scores for
the (contributing) candidates” (National Anticorruption Directorate Press release
No. 473/VIII/3, 2010). Thus, while punishment threats may affect the incidence of
individual bribes, CCTV monitoring cannot capture these private deals. The fact
that the pass rates of 80-90% until 2009 did not reflect ability but rather mass fraud
was common knowledge among teachers, principals, parents, and students.14
Following the 2010 Baccalaureate, which was marked by a surge in grade-inflating
corruption generated by the 25% public sector wage cut in May 2010, a high number
of teachers were brought to trial on allegations of selling grades.
In response to this scandal, the Ministry of Education started a Baccalaureate
“cleaning” campaign in 2011. In a first step, the Ministry publicly appealed to all
schools and teachers involved in the exam to better enforce the examination rules
and threatened to punish teachers caught receiving bribes with a pay cut and/or
jail,15 while also promoting a zero tolerance policy against collective bribes. Addi-
tionally, a new rule stipulated that parents and NGOs had the right to enroll as
13“Around the time of the Baccalaureate exam, June 2010, in the exam center [name], the
defendants [name] - principal, [name] - deputy principal, [name] - secretary and [name] - teacher,
[...] have [...] planned and organized a fraudulent exam, in which students who paid various
amounts of money passed the tests. [...] On June 28, 2010, after the written Romanian exam,
upon a police search of the high school premises, 56 envelopes containing money and the names of
the students [who have contributed] have been identified. In total 91.850 RON (equivalent to 21,360
EUR) and 7,750 EUR have been found. In addition, [the principals] have received 19,000 RON,
1,850 EUR and 8 envelopes containing unspecified amounts from students interested in passing the
exam.” Press release No. 633/VIII/3, National Anticorruption Directorate, November 29, 2010.
14For a more detailed treatment of the state of corruption in Romania, particularly in the
education system, see Borcan, Lindahl, and Mitrut (2014). Based on PISA test scores, the authors
also document the strong contrast between national exam scores and true ability compared with
other European countries.
15Threats ranged in severity from being excluded from the examination for a few years to going
to jail (following the 2010 example).
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exam proctors in order to increase transparency. In terms of harsher punishments,
the new rules also stipulated that students caught cheating would be banned from
re-takes for at least one year. On top of these measures, there was a recommen-
dation to organize the exam, when possible, in centers equipped with surveillance
cameras. The introduction of CCTV cameras was reinforced in May 2011 through
public appeals by the Ministry of Education to the county inspectorates. However,
because the request was not binding, each of the 42 county inspectorates decided
independently whether or not to install CCTV cameras in the examination centers
by the end of May.16 As a result, twenty-five counties had cameras installed in the
examination centers and 17 did not, blaming lack of funds. Where installed, the
cameras were placed in the front of the room, or on the hallways, and the camera
footages were collected and screened by the county inspectorates. Descriptive statis-
tics (Appendix C, Table C1) confirm that the counties that did not install CCTV
cameras in 2011 were poorer than the others. We discuss the county self-selection
later on.
Thus, in 2011, counties that installed cameras faced both a credible punishment
threat and increased monitoring, while non-implementers faced a credible punish-
ment threat but no additional actual monitoring.17 Consistent with this, the na-
tional average pass rates plummeted to a staggering 44.5% (from around 70% in
2010). Both implementers and non-implementers of the camera policy sustained a
drop in the pass rates, but the drop was much larger in the monitored (pass rates de-
creased to 41%) compared to the non-monitored counties (where pass rates dropped
to 51%). In 2012, the Baccalaureate methodology was further modified and CCTV
cameras became mandatory in all counties, which reduced the pass rates even fur-
ther to 41.5%.
The gradual introduction of monitoring allows us to compare education outcomes
in a corrupt (in 2011 in non-monitored counties and in 2010 and before) and a non-
(or less) corrupt system (in 2011 in monitored counties and in 2012 in all counties).
This variation sets the foundation for our empirical strategy, as described in Section
4.
16Metodologia de organizare si desfasurare a examenului de bacalaureat, 2011, Annex 2 of the
Ministry of Education's Decision no. 4799/31.08.2010, concerning the organization of the Bac-
calaureate exam.
17However, the latter counties may have expected a higher rate of monitoring due to the in-
creasing pressure from counties that complied. For instance, counties that decided against the
Ministry's recommendation may have feared being targeted with more frequent inspections. Since
agents' behavior responds to perceived monitoring, which does not necessarily coincide with ob-
jective monitoring (Nagin et al., 2002), we can plausibly assume that the expected detection prob-
ability increased also in non-implementing counties, but to a lower extent than in implementing
counties.
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3 Data
For the purpose of our empirical investigation we employ several datasets:
i) Administrative data provided by the Ministry of Education and covering the
universe of students enrolled at the Baccalaureate exam (typically 200,000 students
every year) from 2009 to 2012. From this source we retrieve each student's exam
outcome (scores and whether the student passed or not), track (theoretical, techno-
logical or vocational), date of birth, gender, and the county, locality, and school of
enrollment.18
ii) Administrative data covering the universe of students admitted to high schools.
This data contains information on each student's high school and secondary school,
the average scores in 5th through 8th grade, and the average scores on the 8th grade
national standardized exam. We employ data from 2005-2008 of the same students
who took the Baccalaureate in 2009-2012 (about 600,000 students, as some postpone
high school education). In what follows we will use the average scores of the four
years of lower secondary school (gymnasium) as a proxy for ability, as it captures
all scores in all subjects during these four years (see also Pop-Eleches, 2009).19
iii) Because the administrative data under i) and ii) does not cover student
poverty status, we construct this measure from individual information on the stu-
dents eligible for the Money for High School (MHS) public program of financial
assistance for high school students from poor households, for the cohorts 2009-2012.
This data contains information on all eligible students' school and family income
for each year when they submitted an application. The MHS (administrated by the
Ministry of Education) disbursed a monthly allowance of 180 RON (∼53USD) per
student. An applicant was eligible if the gross monthly income per family member
was not higher than 150 RON in the 3 months prior to applying.20 This warrants
18We opted to use data from 2009-2012 because joining the 2008 Baccalaureate data and cor-
responding high school admission data (admission in 2004 was somewhat different than in the
following years) yielded a slightly lower matching rate, causing a risk of having a selective sample
of students in 2008.
19Moreover, the 8th grade exit exam is not a high stake test compared with the Baccalaureate,
as all students in Romania are admitted to high school, diminishing the incentives to inflate this
grade through corruption (for more details on the centralized transition from 8th grade to high
school in Romania, see Pop-Eleches and Urquiola, 2013). Finally, following the 2011 anti-cheating
initiatives and threats (installing video cameras in schools during the exam, threatening staff with
dismissal), the passing rate for the Baccalaureate dropped by more than 45% in 2011 relative to
before (see Borcan, Lindahl, and Mitrut, 2014), whereas the drop was much smaller (about 17%)
for the 8th grade standardized exam.
20Students could reapply at the beginning of every school year. The MHS funds have been
disbursed every year since 2004 with no limit on how many times a student can apply as long as
they were eligible. However, because of the rising number of requirements, from 2009-2010 a new
criterion was introduced demanding that the student have a very good school attendance rate. A
little over 100 students were denied the allowance because of low attendance in 2010-2011.
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the use of MHS beneficiary status as a proxy for the economic status of the stu-
dents' families (which we code using an indicator for poor students). For further
discussion, please see Appendix B.
When we merge the datasets i), ii), and iii), we obtain our working sample of
553,903 students for whom we have historical school data from grade 5 (beginning
of lower secondary) to grade 12 (the end of high school). Additionally, in an at-
tempt to understand the allocation of students to university studies following the
anti-corruption campaign, we will merge this data with individual data from the
admission to a top Romanian university from 2009 to 2012, generating a sample of
15,395 students. We discuss this data when we address this issue later in the paper.
Table 1 outlines some key statistics for our main variables, separately by year.
We note that the Romanian language written exam scores (the test most amenable
to comparison, as it is identical for all students and similar across years) declined
from an average of 7.07 in 2009 and 7.32 in 2010 to 6.51 and 6.37 in 2011 and 2012,
respectively.21 The overall Baccalaureate pass rate declined from 85.2% in 2009 and
75.3% in 2010 to 54.9% and 51.9% in 2011 and 2012, respectively.22 It is important
to note the drop in the 2010 pass rates, in spite of the increase in corruption (see also
Figure 1 below). The main explanation behind this fall, as also supported by the
2010 official report from the Ministry of Education and Borcan, Lindahl, and Mitrut
(2014), lies in a few changes in the exam structure (see Appendix C, Figure C2): a)
The oral Romanian exam, compulsory for all students, was rendered irrelevant to
the calculation of the overall Baccalaureate grade (and passing). Before 2010, 99%
of the students passed this exam (a minimum grade of 5), with 50% of the students
receiving an implausible score between 9 and 10 (out of 10). b) One elective exam
was removed in 2010. Before this year around 75% of the students chose physical
education for this elective test (of whom more than 90% scored a maximum score
of 10).
Table 1 also shows that the share of poor students (as proxied by the MHS
recipient status) is relatively stable across years (about 22%), while the number of
males taking the exam decreases slightly (from about 50% in 2009 to 45% in 2011).
Furthermore, higher ability students, as proxied by students with an above median
21The increase in 2010 is discussed in Borcan, Lindahl, and Mitrut (2014) to be a direct conse-
quence of the 2010 public sector austerity measures and the sudden increase in corruption related
to the Baccalaureate.
22Note that the higher pass rates in our descriptive statistics tables compared with the national
averages are due to the fact that we do not include exam re-takes (i.e., instances where a stu-
dent who has failed the exam in previous years re-takes the exam) in these numbers (or in the
estimations). However, when we repeat our analyses including the exam repeats, the results are
essentially the same, just slightly larger in magnitude.
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5th-8th grade score, seem to be proportionally more numerous in 2011 and 2012.
This apparent (positive) change in the composition of test takers indicates that our
results could actually be a lower bound of the true effects of the anti-corruption
campaign.
4 Graphical Evidence
We start with an illustration of the evolution of exam outcomes over time in Fig-
ures 1 and 2. These figures summarize the essence of our findings. Figure 1 shows
the 2004-2012 pass rates and written Romanian averages, separately for early and
late installers. The notable patterns are: 1) in both early and late implementers,
the Romanian written scores and the overall pass rates dropped quite sharply in
2011,23 suggesting that the anti-corruption campaign as a whole was effective in
both types of counties and that the part of this campaign that included threats of
punishment played the largest role; 2) the drop in performance in early implemen-
tation counties is larger in 2011 than in late implementation counties, suggesting
that monitoring per se was effective; 3) while early implementation counties display
constant performance levels in 2012 relative to 2011, the score in late implementa-
tion counties continue to drop in 2012, reaching levels below the early implementers.
This suggests that monitoring had an effect not only if introduced in combination
with punishment (as was the case in 2011 for the installing counties), but also in
situations where punishment for corruptive behavior had been in place for a year;
and 4), the score for the late implementers continued to drop in 2012, when the
objective monitoring was introduced and were reaching levels below the early im-
plementers, even though the late implementers had higher scores in 2010. This may
indicate that the late and early implementers may differ along some characteristics,
suggesting the need to account for self-selection into treatment.
These patterns are perfectly preserved in Figure 2, which displays the evolution of
scores from 2009 to 2012, separated by ability, gender and poverty status (Figures
2A, 2B and 2C, respectively). Figure 2A reveals very similar score evolutions in
early and late implementers for high-ability students (above the median 5th-8th
grade graduation score). Low-ability students start off at much lower scores and
sustain a much sharper drop when corruption-fighting strategies are in place. The
same applies for the performance of male relative to female students. The most
striking contrast is perhaps between poor and non-poor students. The score dip
23As we explain in the data section, there is a drop already in 2010 for pass rates because of
changes in the exam structure.
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associated with camera monitoring in 2011 is larger for the already worse-off poor
students. Overall, the graphs indicate that the camera monitoring was effective
in reducing the cheating and fraud opportunities, particularly for groups prone to
engage in corrupt behavior. However, the pattern observed is also that the dispersion
in exam outcomes between groups increased, and those who performed poorly on the
Baccalaureate prior to the corruption-fighting measures did even worse after their
introduction. Note also that the patterns across groups are very similar regardless of
whether or not we look at the overall change from 2010 to 2012, or if we investigate
the pattern related to the installation of CCTV cameras. This suggests that we can
potentially use the well identified estimates from the effect of camera installation to
draw inference about how groups fare before and after the introduction of corruption-
fighting measures.
In what follows we test the camera impact for the entire sample and by groups
more formally. It should be noted that later installers were, on average, better
off before 2010 and that we observe parallel trends before 2011 in early and late
implementers for average pass rates but that the trends converge somewhat for
the written Romanian score. We discuss issues of selection into camera treatment
in the identification section below. In the estimations we will also add student
controls in order to control for possible compositional sample changes over time
across treatment and controls. In addition, we will present results from placebo
regressions, using outcomes from a no-stakes exam. We argue that if we do not
find an effect (of monitoring or of the threat of punishment) on such a low-stakes
outcome, it will be a strong indication that our main results are unlikely to be driven
by unobservable factors that could have potentially affected achievement even in
the absence of anti-corruption measures. Additionally, we will show that possible
differential pre-reform trends do not affect our main results.
5 Estimation strategy
To assess more formally the impact of corruption-fighting measures on exam out-
comes, we employ a difference-in-differences (DD) strategy. In particular, we use
the variation between counties and over time in the installation of CCTV cameras
to separate out the effect of actual monitoring from the effect of harsher punishment
captured by the 2011 and 2012 year indicators. The general specification is:
yict = α + βTct + γ
′ ·Xict + ϕt + θc + ict, (1)
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where i indexes a student attending a school in county c in year t. yict is one
of our two main outcomes of interest, i.e., 1) the score on the standardized written
Romanian language exam and 2) an indicator equal to 1 if the student passed the
Baccalaureate exam and 0 otherwise; Tct is an indicator equal to 1 if the student
is CCTV monitored (for all counties in 2012 and for 25 counties in 2011) and 0
otherwise; Xict includes indicators for gender, for whether the student comes from
a poor family, for the graduation score prior to entering high school as a proxy
for student ability (as described in Section 3), for high school track and for rural
area; ϕt includes year indicators; and θc includes 41 county indicators. In some of
the estimations we replace the county indicators with a full set of school or family
indicators. In all regressions we cluster the standard errors at county level, since
the treatment implementation is county-wide (resulting in 42 clusters).
The DD estimate, βˆ, will capture the impact of CCTV installation on exam
scores, based on the variation in exam outcomes within counties over time (after vs.
before camera installation). Since no county had cameras installed in 2009-2010 and
some counties installed them in 2011 and the rest in 2012, this estimate will be a
weighted average of the exam score effects for those installing cameras in 2011 and
2012, respectively.
The 2011 and 2012 year coefficients are of interest since they capture the shift
in exam outcomes relative to earlier years, net of the impact of cameras. However,
these indicators can be interpreted causally only under the very strong assumption
that the sole source of variation in exam outcomes 2011-2012 relative to before is
the corruption-fighting campaign. This is obviously a restrictive assumption as a
number of other factors might have changed across years, e.g., different changes as
a result of the overall economic situation. To investigate the plausibility of this
assumption, we estimate equation (1) using as outcome the scores from the low-
stakes oral Romanian exam. This exam is also part of the Baccalaureate and covers
the same topics as our main outcome, i.e., the written exam, but does not count
towards the overall grade and there is consequently no scope for corruption. Hence,
in our model using performance in this exam as the dependent variable, the year
indicators' coefficients can be read as pure year effects. If the estimates for the
year indicators and the DD indicator are zero, we believe we can make a reasonably
strong argument for an interpretation of the year indicators as saying something
about the overall impact of punishment threats. This is especially likely since the
changes in exam scores (as shown in Figures 1 and 2) are so large it would be
unlikely to find other factors that could explain this whole shift. Yet, we need to be
cautious when interpreting the year effects as effects of the anti-corruption policy
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(see Section 6.1.2 below). Similarly, when we estimate equation (1) separately by
sub-groups, we focus on comparing the resulting estimates across these groups. The
identifying assumption is then that there are no other factors that could explain,
e.g., a diverging pattern.
Finally, the question of self-selection of counties into the CCTV monitoring treat-
ment warrants some discussion. Since the CCTV surveillance was not enforced in
2011, county inspectorates had the final decision on the matter. The choice not to
install cameras was typically motivated by lack of funds. Thus, any claim of ran-
dom assignment into camera treatment would be untenable in this context. To learn
more about the selection into exam monitoring, we look at the mean differences in
outcomes and controls between early and late installers in the pre-reform years 2009-
2010 (Appendix C, Table C1). We learn that student ability or performance does
not differ across counties, and neither do our survey-based proxies for corruption
norms.24 Yet, on average, early installment counties seem to have significantly fewer
poor students and be slightly larger. This supports the official justifications and also
reassures us that the factors affecting the monitoring decision are accounted for in
our baseline regressions. Under the assumption that county fixed effects or specific
time trends account for any unobserved county-level characteristics related to the
camera decision, poverty, and the observed exam outcomes, the DD estimator yields
the causal impact of the CCTV monitoring on exam outcomes.
6 Results
Our aim is two-fold. First, we aim to assess the impact of the corruption-fighting
campaign and particularly to understand the separate impact of the campaign mech-
anisms, i.e., monitoring and increased threat of punishment (Section 6.1). Second,
we inquire about who benefits and who loses from curbing corruption by looking
at the heterogeneous effects of the campaign on the high-stake Baccalaureate exam
scores for poor vs. non-poor, males vs. females, and most vs. least able students
(Section 6.2). Additionally, we attempt to understand whether the transition from
a system with unhindered corruption (2010 and before) to one where corruption
opportunities should be drastically reduced (2011 and 2012) by the anti-corruption
24We compute a proxy based on the share of people having an informal network, at the county
level, using the answers to a question from the 2007 Romanian Barometer of Public Opinion:
“Is there anyone (i.e., informal network) that could “help” you solve (i.e., informally): issues in
court/trials, medical problems, city hall, police, or issues related to the local authorities.” We also
compute of a proxy for the level of confidence in justice, based on perceived trustworthiness of the
justice courts, elicited in the same survey.
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campaign significantly changed the composition of students admitted at an elite
university (Section 7).
6.1 The Overall Impact of the Campaign
6.1.1 The effect of installing CCTV cameras
Table 2 presents results from estimating equation (1) for the scores on the written
Romanian exam, a standardized test that has the same structure across years and
tracks (columns 1-2), and for the probability of passing the Baccalaureate exam
(columns 3-4). In columns (1) and (3) we only include the CCTV monitor indicator,
year indicators (base is 2010), and county indicators, while in columns (2) and (4)
we add the controls described previously.
We note in column (1) that the written Romanian score decreases by about
0.22 points due to camera monitoring, which is equivalent to a 0.12 SD decrease
in scores on the Romanian exam relative to the sample mean. The CCTV camera
effect remains very similar in column (2) when we include the rest of our control
variables. For the probability of passing the Baccalaureate exam, the main results
show a similar pattern as for the written Romanian exam. In particular, the impact
of CCTV camera monitoring lowered the probability of passing the Baccalaureate by
around 8.3 percentage points. We also note that, relative to 2010, the 2011 and 2012
year indicators clearly exhibit much lower values.25 Yet, at this point it is difficult to
assess whether these negative coefficients indicate a response to punishment threat
or some other changes. We provide details on the effect of the punishment threat
on exam outcomes in the next subsection.26
There are several concerns related to whether the CCTV monitoring in Table
2 above can indeed be interpreted as the effect of the campaign exclusively due
to increasing monitoring. In particular, the negative impact of monitoring on test
scores may reflect not only corruption fighting per se but (also) test anxiety from
the newly introduced CCTV cameras. While we cannot fully dismiss this possibility,
we believe that anxiety from monitoring would not account for such a large drop in
scores. In the same line, Bertoni et al. (2013) show that the negative impact of the
25One apparent surprising result is the negative coefficient of the 2009 indicator for the written
Romanian exam score. The reason for this pattern is the escalading corruption in relation to the
Baccalaureate grades, which, especially for the written Romanian exam, peaked with the 2010
exam following a 25% wage cut for all public school educators as shown in Borcan, Lindahl, and
Mitrut (2012).
26We also note that the 2009 year indicator is positive when we look at the probability of
passing the Romanian exam. This is because the probability of passing drops already in 2010 due
to additional changes in the exam structure/passing requirements as discussed in Section 2.
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presence of an external examiner on test scores is due to reduced cheating rather
than to anxiety. Moreover, the evidence from the psychology literature (Chapell et
al., 2005) indicates that females display higher levels of anxiety during tests than
males, while we will show in the heterogeneity analysis that males perform worse
compared with females following the campaign.
We also address some additional concerns in alternative specifications which
introduce tighter controls (county specific trends, school and family fixed effects),
all of which leave the results unchanged. To save space, we report and discuss these
robustness tests in Appendix 1.
Our results seem to indicate that monitoring lowered the exam scores as a result
of reduced ability to engage in petty and mass in-class cheating, which had been
possible in the past, as discussed in Section 2.2, subsequent to collective bribes being
paid to the exam committee members. Yet, we cannot fully exclude that, even in
the presence of CCTV monitors, some students would resort to individual bribes
(before/after the exam takes place). We will return to this point in our heterogeneity
analysis.
6.1.2 Can we separate out the punishment from the overall effect of the
campaign?
We have shown that the CCTV monitoring part of the campaign indeed had an im-
pact on curbing corruption as it resulted in statistically significant lower test scores
and pass rates. Interpreting the year effects in Table 2 as showing the effects of
the threat of punishment, net of increased monitoring, is much more problematic.
To convincingly establish that the threats of prosecution for teachers and re-take
restrictions for students were credible enough to reduce corruption, we would ide-
ally like to contrast the written exam with a no(low)-stakes exam with no scope
for fraud and thus no impact of the anti-corruption campaign on the scores. This
test would be more compelling if this exam's intrinsic features were comparable to
the high-stakes exam that it is compared against. Conveniently, the Romanian lan-
guage is tested both via an oral and a written exam during the Baccalaureate, both
covering the same topics.27 However, since 2010, the oral exam has been rendered
irrelevant for the calculation of the overall Baccalaureate score and converted to an
objective aptitude test, which students cannot fail, but in which they can qualify as
an “excellent,” “good,” or “sufficient” language user (performance levels are marked
by a score of 3, 2, and 1, respectively). As the same skills are required for the two
27The Romanian language exam covers the same topics from all four high school years; the oral
exam takes place a couple of weeks before the written.
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exams but the written one is a high-stakes while the oral is a no-stakes, the oral
exam is the ideal placebo test described above. To make the Romanian written
and oral exams comparable we start by translating the latter exam scores, available
only on a non-cardinal scale, into percentile ranks using the data from 2010-2012.28
Next, we standardize both the percentile rank oral Romanian scores and the written
Romanian scores (mean zero, standard deviation one) for the 2010-2012 cohorts.
We report the results from this exercise in Table 3. Note that the structure
of Table 3 is somewhat different from Table 2. In columns 1-4 we show results
for the written Romanian exam and in columns 5-8 for the oral Romanian exam,
both standardized.29 Columns 1 and 5 show results from a simple specification
with only (except for county fixed effects) an indicator variable equal to 1 in 2011
and 2012 (After11 ), when the corruption-fighting campaign was in effect, and zero
in 2010, when it was not.30 In column 1, we find that the scores on the written
Romanian exam decreased sharply in 2011-2012 relative to 2010, which is line with
the graphical evidence in Section 4. The drop is equivalent to about one-third of a
standard deviation. When we look at the oral exam (column 5) we find instead a
small increase in scores. This suggests that the impact of the overall campaign in
curbing corruption is real.
Next, in columns 2 and 6 we also add the camera indicator in an attempt to
tease out the effect of increased monitoring from the overall effect of the campaign.
In these specifications, we argue that the 2011-2012 indicator captures the impact
of the threats of punishment for the written Romanian exam. In column 2 we see
that the monitoring did make up a non-trivial part, about one-third, of the overall
campaign effect. The DD estimate is statistically insignificant and very small when
we look at the oral exam. We also estimate the model allowing for separate year
effects (as in Table 2) and see again that the 2011 and 2012 year indicators for the
oral exam have the opposite sign and are much smaller in magnitude than those
for the written exam, confirming that performance was not negatively affected by
28We use percentile ranks since the oral exam is expressed on an ordinal scale. This is a useful
transformation because if, for instance, the distribution of scores is such that there are relatively
few students with a level 3 score, then these students get a higher rank score. Note also that, since
we also want to compare the estimates for the year indicators, we rank the scores using all three
years combined.
29Because the oral Romanian exam is a no-stake exam, the use of CCTV cameras was optional
(even in 2012), and actually very few schools monitored this exam. We do not know which schools
had CCTV cameras during the oral Romanian exam.
30We experimented with an regression discontinuity design using birth months as running vari-
able, hence just adding month of birth to the specification in columns 1 and 5. This generated
similar results for the 2011-2012 treatment dummy. However, the sensitivity analysis revealed
problems with endogenous location around the cutoff due to a very non-strict rule of when during
the year a pupil could start school.
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a general year trend; if anything, scores may have actually increased, in which case
the 2011 effect for the written exam may be underestimated. By association with
the baseline findings, these results tell us that the year effects do not seem to explain
the negative 2011 change in written exam scores.
Overall, these results lend support to our hypothesis that the increased threat
of punishment brought by the campaign has curbed corruption, as seen in the drop
in scores. Importantly, the drop in scores in non-monitored counties supports this
hypothesis, but this does not imply that the incentive effect is independent from
that of monitoring. Given that these counties would have plausibly also perceived a
higher detection risk, even in the absence of cameras, the punishment threat came
into effect because it was enabled by enhanced monitoring. The campaign was even
more effective when the probability of detection was even higher, in the presence of
CCTV monitoring.
6.1.3 Additional evidence on the effectiveness of monitoring combined
with punishment
The setup we have does not include a situation where monitoring increases in the
absence of punishment. However, as theory and a few empirical studies suggest,
increasing the probability of detection is unlikely to work without increasing the
costs to being detected, and equally, punishment is ineffective if the chances it will be
applied are very low. To offer additional evidence that monitoring and punishment
are most effective if combined, we take advantage of a similar policy in Moldova, a
neighbor country with a very similar education system as Romania,31 facing similar
corruption problems in connection with the high-stake Baccalaureate exam. Inspired
by the Romanian anti-corruption policy, a crackdown on Baccalaureate corruption
in Moldova started in 2012, when the Ministry of Education obliged students to
sign a special document just before the exam confirming that they are free of any
additional source of cheating (mobile phones, books) during the exam and if caught
with any source of cheating they would be banned from the exam for at least a
year, regardless of whether they used the source or not. If caught taking bribes or
letting the students cheat, teachers would also be punished.32 In addition to these
31In Moldova more than 76% of the population speak Romanian as their native language, and
the Baccalaureate, which is very similar to the one in Romania, includes also a Romanian language
written test.
32There was no clear rule but the methodology stipulated that the punishment would be ac-
cording to the Moldavian Labor Code. In addition, in 2012 the methodology introduced a rec-
ommendation to install CCTV cameras, but this recommendation was not followed (“The video
cameras may be introduced in exam centers”). (Source: The Baccalaureate Methodology for the
organization of the 2012 Baccalaureate exam, section IV, article 50.)
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punishment threats, a new methodology prescribed mandatory installation of CCTV
cameras in all exam centers in 2013.33 This roll-out is similar to the Romanian
anti-corruption campaign, but with a one-year lag; yet the threat of punishment in
2012 in Moldova was not as credible as it was in the 2011 Romanian case (due to
Romania's unprecedentedly high number of trials related to the 2010 exam fraud).
Therefore, we expect a less significant drop in pass rates in 2012 in Moldova relative
to the large drop in 2011 in Romania.
Figure 3 shows a comparison of the evolution of pass rates in the two countries
from 2007 to 2013. The Moldavian pass rates were still anchored at above 90% until
2012, while in Romania, where the campaign was well underway in 2011, the pass
rates were drastically reduced to 44%. Moldavian pass rates sustained a mild drop
in 2011 and 2012, reaching 88.3% in 2012. However, when the CCTV cameras were
introduced in 2013, we note a 20% drop in pass rates in Moldova (reaching 68.3%).
The figure suggests that the intended effects of the anti-corruption campaign were
felt in both countries when a high level of monitoring coupled with punishment was
reached (in 2011 and 2012 in Romania and in 2013 in Moldova).
We conclude that monitoring and punishment interact with each other and, more
specifically, that monitoring enables and enhances the effectiveness of punishment.
6.2 Heterogeneous Effects of the Anti-Corruption Campaign
After having established that the campaign had a drastic effect on the test scores and
probability of passing the Baccalaureate high-stake exam for the average student,
in this section we focus on the efficiency and distributional side effects of curbing
corruption and, in particular, look at the heterogeneous impact for students who
differ in ability, poverty and gender. We already saw from the evolution of scores
in Figures 2a-2c that the groups particularly affected by the camera policy are the
same groups for which the exam outcomes dropped the most from 2010 to 2012:
poor, low-ability, and male students.
To lend additional credibility to these findings we now turn, in Table 4, to a
regression analysis using the DD approach as specified in equation (1), but now
applied to sub-samples of students that differ in background characteristics: ability
(columns 1 and 4), poverty status (columns 5 and 8), and gender (columns 9 and
12).34 We estimate separate regressions for low- and high-ability,35 poor and non-
33The Baccalaureate Methodology for the organization of the 2013 Baccalaureate exam, section
IV, article 48.
34Results with school indicators are very similar.
35We divide students into high and low ability, according to an average graduation score
above/below the median 8.81.
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poor,36 and male and female students, respectively. To save space, we only show
results for the full specification, including the camera and year indicators, as well as
additional controls. The estimates for the camera and year indicators from specifi-
cations that do not include controls for background variables are almost identical.
This is reassuring as it means that mean-reversion is not driving the differences in
results across groups.
Focusing on the camera effect, we find larger negative effects for low-ability
students than for their high-ability peers. For the written Romanian exam (columns
1-2), the exam monitoring resulted in 0.354 unit lower test scores (about one-sixth of
a standard deviation), which is three times as large of a drop as seen for high-ability
students; for the pass rates we also see difference between high and low-ability
students, but it is smaller and not statistically significantly different. Next, the
results for poor and non-poor students confirm again the graphical analysis from
Section 4: as a result of the camera policy, poor students'test scores decreased twice
as much and pass rates about 50% more compared with non-poor students. For
males and females we see a smaller difference, although the directions of the effects
reconfirm that those doing worse pre-campaign lose more.
Next, we attempt to draw some inferences about changes over time, from a fully
corrupt (in 2010) to a less corrupt system (in 2012 when the anti-corruption policy
was fully implemented). We use a similar placebo test as in Table 3 for the years
2010-2012. Table 5 shows results separately by ability (Panel A), poverty (Panel B)
and gender (Panel C) for the low-stakes oral and the high-stakes written Romanian
exam. As in Table 3, for comparability, both outcomes are standardized results.
The magnitudes of the differences in the estimates across groups are qualitatively
similar as in Table 4, although here expressed in standard deviation units. The
pattern of estimates for the oral exam is quite striking, as the estimates for the
camera indicator and the year indicators are very similar across groups regardless of
whether we compare high and low ability, poor and non-poor, or males and females.
The only exception is for the oral exam in 2012, where low-ability students scored
lower than high-ability students (conditional on camera implementation). However,
this difference is still half as big as the difference for these groups on the high-stakes
exam. This is very reassuring and suggests that the difference in year effects across
groups for the Romanian written exam can credibly be said to reflect the overall
effect of the campaign, as there are no comparable differences between pre- and
post-campaign years for the low-stakes exam.
36Poor students are defined according to MHS recipient status; see the discussion in Appendix
B.
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From the estimates reported in Table 5 we can therefore conclude that the drop in
Baccalaureate high-stakes exam scores caused by i) the camera installation is about
0.18 SD larger for the low-ability students, 0.13 SD units larger for poor students,
and about 0.08 SD units larger for males; ii) the corruption-fighting initiatives, such
as threat of punishment (net of the CCTV monitoring), is about 0.20 SD larger for
the low-ability students, 0.06 SD units larger for poor students, and about 0.05-0.10
SD units larger for males; iii) the combined effects of the anti-corruption campaign
one year after implementation (in 2012 vs. 2010) is about 0.43 SD larger for the low-
ability students, 0.19 SD units larger for poor students, and about 0.18 SD units
larger for males.37 Hence, both the monitoring and the punishment component
of the anti-corruption campaign reduced the corruption opportunities in the high-
stakes tests more for poor and low-ability students, driving their larger drop in scores
between 2010 and 2012. We conclude that our estimates show that disadvantaged
students became even worse off following the corruption-fighting initiatives. While
in the case of ability the campaign revealed the true standing of students, in the
case of poor students the campaign may have had adverse effects an issue explore
further below.
Figure C1 (Appendix C) provides an alternative way of presenting the hetero-
geneous effects, by displaying the written Romanian exam score distributions sep-
arately by group (and by subgroup), for 2010 (unhindered corruption) compared
with 2012 (little or no corruption). The distribution by ability (in Figure C1[a])
shows the high-ability students to the far-right of the distribution scores; the score
distribution for this group is slightly flatter in 2012 than in 2010. In contrast, the
low-ability students'score distribution becomes flatter and also less spread out, with
a larger spike at 5 (the passing threshold) in 2012 relative to 2010. Figure C1(b)
shows that males are worse off in 2010 and their situation further deteriorates in
2012. Next we consider the differences between poor and non-poor students. The
score distributions by poverty status (Figure C1[c]) display a large frequency shift
from high to low scores in 2012 relative to 2010 for both poor and non-poor, but
more pronounced for the already disadvantaged poor students.
To conclude, the heterogeneity results shown in this section indicate some inter-
esting findings. First, in line with our initial hypothesis, the high-ability students,
even after controlling for their poverty status, seem to benefit relatively more from
a system with little or no corruption. This is not surprising as high-ability stu-
dents should be less reliant on cheating or paying bribes to pass the exam. The
37We do not show specifications with only year effects for 2012, but the total effects of the
campaign in 2012 vs. 2010 can simply be obtained from the table by adding the camera and year
2012 estimates for each group and then comparing these sums across groups.
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differences in CCTV monitoring and the year effects between students of different
abilities are quite large and statistically significant, hinting that the low-ability stu-
dents had relied to a larger extent on cheating and/or other means of fraud before
the campaign.
Secondly, we show that the poor students may perform worse in a less corrupt
system. This is actually not in line with our prior that, while both poor and non-
poor students would benefit from collective bribes and cheating, the non-poor would
additionally benefit from individual bribes as this form of corruption requires sizeable
bribes (money) and access to the corruption networks (see discussion in Section
2.2). Intuitively, the non-poor should be able to afford the required payments, as
well as gifts and private tutoring with in-class teachers. Moreover, those from a
privileged economic background typically also enjoy a high social standing, which
should grant them easy access to the nepotistic networks.38 Overall, if the campaign
would eliminate both forms of corruption, we would expect the non-poor students
to lose more in a non-corrupted environment.
So what could explain the wider score gap between poor and non-poor students?
One potential concern is that the proxy for poverty reflects not only socioeconomic
status but also some potential effect of the MHS program (used to define poverty
status) on the recipients. In order to ensure that this is not the case, we compare
students just below with students just above the cutoff income for receiving MHS
in 2005-2006, which was the only year when funds were short of the demand and
some eligible students did not receive the money (to save space, the details on the
data and strategy for this test are shown in Appendix B). The RD estimate of the
treatment effect is insignificant, indicating that a potential MHS treatment is not a
concern here. We therefore proceed to discuss some other potential channels leading
to the observed increased score gap:
i) Increased private tutoring or parental investment for the non-poor. To rule
out the private tutoring channel we consider additional data from the 2010-2012
Romanian Household Budget Survey and observe no increase in private tutoring
for high school students in 2010-2012. It is also possible that parents of non-poor
students may have substituted bribes for more time spent working on homework
or exam preparation. This is less likely to have generated a large effect in 2011,
as the camera policy was implemented in May, leaving very little time for extra
preparation. However, in 2012 this behavioural effect could partly account for our
result.
38Note that this is also in line with the generally lower performance of poor students relative to
non-poor before 2011.
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ii) Stronger cheating norms for the poor. One way to dismiss this channel is to
look at the share of students eliminated from the exam (caught cheating) (see Table
C2), which before 2011 shows no difference between rich and poor students.
iii) Collective vs. individual bribes. We believe that one key to understanding
the detrimental effects of the campaign on the poor lies in the various mechanics
of the bribing process. If poor cheat as much as rich, without being able to afford
bribes, the poor students'ability to take part in the fraud can only come as a result
of free-riding. A good candidate explanation for this opportunity lies in the mech-
anism of collective bribing, which is essentially used to provide a “public good.” If
some students contribute, the benefit is collective and everyone, including poor stu-
dents, can take advantage of the slack proctoring. Given some level of ability, the
annihilation of cheating practices (likely coupled with particular unobserved traits,
like motivation and the educational investment of poor students throughout high
school) generates lower results for the poor students. This implies that monitor-
ing and punishment reveal wide pre-existing inequalities, previously concealed by
corruption. A complementary explanation may lie in that only richer students can
afford individual bribes. Recognizing the existence of a well-developed market for
bribes, the poor student could not afford the required amounts or services. More-
over, following the implementation of the anti-corruption campaign it is likely that
teachers could have substituted collective for more individual bribes, pricing out the
poor students.39 It is unlikely that monitoring and punishment threats can fully
eradicate this form of corruption, as revealed by further anecdotal evidence from
crackdowns on corruption in some exam centers in 2012 and 2013.
7 The Short-Term Impact of the Anti-Corruption
Campaign: Preliminary Evidence from Admis-
sion into an Elite University
As revealed in the heterogeneity analysis, the corruption-fighting campaign led to a
separation of ability types and a reshuﬄing of the students in the score distribution,
by income. These changes may have direct implications for the selection of students
into higher education.40 In this section we document the short-term consequences
39This displacement effect has been documented in the CCTV and crime literature. See Priks
(2015).
40The total number of students in higher education (university) decreased from 775,319 in 2009
to 464,592 in 2012. The biggest drop took place at the private universities (from more than 300,000
to less than 100,000 students in four years), while the number of students enrolled (regardless of
year of study) at public universities decreased from about 452,892 in 2009 to 364,916 in 2012.
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of the anti-corruption campaign by using admission data from an elite university in
Romania.41 This university admits about the same number of students every year;
all admitted students are ranked according to an overall score and the top 55 to
65% are exempt from the tuition fee (la buget), while the rest pay a monthly fee.42
We have the following information for the admitted students at this elite university
from 2009 to 2012: the overall Baccalaureate grade, the overall high school grade,
name and date of birth, the county and school they come from, whether or not
they are tuition exempt, and home department at the university. We merge this
information with our main data by name, date of birth, gender, county and the
Baccalaureate grade and end up with a sample of 15,395 admitted students with
a full education history.43 In what follows we label the group of tuition-exempt
students “top students” and the group of tuition-paying students “good students.”
To understand whether there is any change in the composition of students ad-
mitted in the elite higher education due to corruption-reducing measures, in Table
6 (Panel A all students; Panel B top students; Panel C good students), we provide
estimates from regressions based on equation (1), but where the dependent variable
is student's ability (columns 1-3), poverty (columns 4-6), and male (column 7). We
cannot infer anything from the changes in these outcomes across years for two rea-
sons. First, since the mean 5th-8th grade score, which we, as before, use as a proxy
for ability, increased from 2010 to 2012, there is an increased likelihood that among
those admitted to the elite university, we will observe a higher mean ability score
over time. The same argument holds when we look at the changed composition of
the top 20% Baccalaureate performers below. There is also a slight change in the
fractions of poor and males over time. Second, the admission rules changed slightly
every year.44 We therefore standardize the ability score to have mean zero and SD
41This is one of the oldest and highly regarded universities in Romania, with a long tradition
of attracting elite students from all over the country. Students admitted here are usually in the
top 15% of the overall high school scores and Baccalaureate grades. The proportion of accepted
students coming from CCTV-monitored counties is about 77%.
42The number of students admitted to the university was relatively constant across years: 4,742
(in 2009), 3,792 (in 2010), 4,937 (in 2011), and 4,648 (in 2012); students are exempt from the
tuition fee (la buget) contingent on the Ministry of Educations budgetary allocation each year; the
remaining students need to pay a tuition fee of roughly 85 USD/month.
43We cannot fully merge the two data sets because of some duplicates. We do not have the
Baccalaureate (they are from older cohorts), the poverty and/or ability measure for about 2,400
students. The attrition rate is however fairly constant across years, at less than 10%. Note that
our final sample of 15,395 students includes 660 students who took the Baccalaureate before the
university admission year (i.e., about 85% took the Baccalaureate in 2009 and 2010 and applied
in 2011 and 2012, respectively). This may signal that our results are contaminated with students
who got accepted with inflated Baccalaureate grades. In the regressions below we control for these
students, although the results are very similar if we exclude them from the regressions.
44While the Baccalaureate grade remains the most important piece of the final admission score,
its share changed from 50% of the admission score (in addition to 25% high school grades and 25%
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one for each year in the estimations. Hence, we can only credibly separate out the
effect of camera monitoring on the composition of admitted students.
The insignificant camera estimate in column 1 (Panel A) indicates that the ad-
mitted students are on average of the same ability, regardless of whether or not
they were treated with additional monitoring (in addition to punishment threat).
This holds both for poor and non-poor students (columns 2-3). Admitted CCTV-
monitored students are 3.3% less likely to be poor than those not monitored (column
4), while a breakdown of this effect by groups below and above the 50th ability per-
centile (columns 5-6) shows that the disadvantage of poor students arises mainly in
the low-ability group. The composition in terms of gender has not changed (column
7).
Interestingly, the results in Panel B for the top students show a clearer pattern,
especially for the composition in terms of ability (column 1): the admitted students
from CCTV-monitored counties seem to have a higher ability, for both poor and
non-poor students (columns 2-3), even though the results are less precise for the
poor due to small sample size. Also, similar to Panel A, among the top admitted
students, those who were CCTV-monitored are less likely to be poor (column 4).
This effect comes from the lower ability poor students (column 5). The results in
Panel C for good students mirror the results in Panel A, but are not significant.
As an additional exercise, we run the same regressions on a subsample of Bac-
calaureate students who were in the top 20% of the final Baccalaureate scores each
year. We expect these students to be the top contenders for elite universities. The
estimates, displayed in Table 7, convey the same effects of the campaign on student
composition that we see for the university admission sample (particularly the top,
tuition-exempt students). The results reassure that monitoring contributed to an
improvement in ability, but also confirm that the poor students'chances to snag the
top places were significantly reduced.
Taken together, these estimates strengthen the finding that the anti-corruption
campaign resulted in increased inequality between poor and non-poor students. The
poor students with low-ability had significantly reduced chances of entering higher
education, especially those with tuition-exempt status. Interestingly, the ability is
the university's own admission exam) in 2009 and 2010 to 67% (and 33% high school grades) in
2011 and 100% of the admission score in 2012. This change implies that the 2011 and particularly
the 2012 admission scores were far less inflated than earlier, due to both the anti-corruption policy
and the change in admission rules, reflecting the true composition of students. This should have
led to a better composition in terms of admitted students'ability. However, another effect works in
the opposite direction: the elimination of the very competitive own admission exam (potentially
to attract more students) may have meant that lower ability students stood a better chance to be
admitted. This may bias the camera and the 2011 and 2012 year effects downwards.
160
more important now, especially for the non-poor students admitted on a tuition-
exempt basis.
8 Conclusions and Discussion
This paper adds a new building block to the understanding of corruption in two
dimensions. Firstly, it provides additional evidence that punishment coupled with
monitoring are effective in reducing corruption even in settings where the potential
gains from corruption are very large. Second, it analyzes the ramifications of fighting
corruption from a distributional perspective - an issue largely overlooked in previous
studies.
We make use of a setting where corruption in education is rampant and has large
gains for students, i.e., the Romanian national school-leaving exam, the Baccalau-
reate. We exploit a nationwide anti-fraud campaign that began in 2011 featuring
both increased credible threat of punishment (for teachers and students) and in-
creased monitoring during the exam. We make use of the variation across years and
counties in closed-circuit TV (CCTV) exam monitoring to calculate the effect of the
campaign on Baccalaureate exam scores. Our results indicate that the campaign
was more effective when the probability of detection was higher, i.e., in the presence
of CCTV monitoring. While the punishment component was implemented in the
whole country at the same time, because of its strict implementation and the use
of a placebo exercise, we can say that increased punishment brought about by the
campaign has curbed corruption, as seen in the drop in test scores. We conclude
that monitoring and punishment interact with each other and, more specifically,
monitoring enables and enhances the effectiveness of punishment.
After having established that the campaign had a drastic effect on the test scores
and on the average student's probability of passing the Baccalaureate high-stake
exam, we show the efficiency and equity side effects of curbing corruption and, in
particular, look at the heterogeneous impact by students' ability, poverty and gender.
Not surprisingly, we find that high-ability students seem to benefit relatively more
from a system with little or no corruption, as the low-ability students relied to a
larger extent on cheating and/or other means of fraud before the campaign. Yet,
when it comes to the poor, disadvantaged students, we show that they perform even
worse in a non-(less) corrupt system, an ex-ante unexpected pattern.
Finally, we also look at the composition of students at an elite university. The
results strengthen the finding that the anti-corruption campaign revealed a greater
inequality between poor and non-poor students than the apparent pre-campaign
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level. More exactly, we find that poor students' (with low ability) chances of entering
higher education went down significantly, especially with regard to tuition-exempt
admission.
An important lesson from these results is that anti-corruption programs are not
a cure for all ills. In terms of inequality of opportunity, the finding that poor stu-
dents do worse in a non-corrupt state is especially important for policy makers. This
result uncovers the wide pre-existing inequalities between the poor and the well-off
students, which corruption had only concealed. The implication is that, in addi-
tion to maintaining the anticorruption strategies, there is a need for more in-depth
investigation of the differences in achievement between poor and non-poor. The
implications of these findings extend to other countries, such as Moldova or Cam-
bodia, where, similar anti-corruption measures for high-stake exams are currently
being discussed and implemented, and where the initial inequality level is already
very high.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Baccalaureate score evolution 2004-2012, by early and late camera instal-
lation
Figure 1A. Romanian Scores
Figure 1B. Pass Rates
Notes: The figure displays the average Romanian written exam scores (left) and overall pass rates
(right) separately for counties that did and did not implement the camera in 2011. The average
scores are displayed on the y-axis, while the x-axis displays the years from 2004 to 2012.
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Figure 2: Baccalaureate average scores, by early and late installation, and by groups
Figure 2A. By Ability
Figure 2B. By Gender
167
Figure 2C. By Poverty
Notes: The figures display the average Romanian written exam scores (top) and overall pass rates
(bottom) by groups (by ability Figure 2A, by gender Figure 2B, and by poverty status Figure
2C) and separately for counties that did and did not implement the camera in 2011. The average
scores are displayed on the y-axis, while the x-axis displays the years from 2009 until 2012.
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Figure 3: Baccalaureate National Pass Rates in Romania and Moldova, 2007-2013
Notes: The figure displays the average national pass rates in Romania 2007-2012 (blue) and
Moldova 2007-2013 (red dashed). The figures for Moldova are retrieved from the government
website www.bloguvern.md. The figures for Romania are the authors own calculations using the
available individual-level datasets (hence the 2013 figure for Romania is missing). The average
pass rates are displayed on the y-axis, while the x-axis displays the years from 2007 to 2013.
Table 1: Summary statistics
2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Written Romanian score 7.073 1.769 7.323 1.570 6.510 2.007 6.377 2.065
Pass 0.852 0.354 0.753 0.431 0.549 0.498 0.519 0.500
Oral Romanian score 2.545 0.661 2.584 0.654 2.560 0.672
Percentile rank oral ** -0.038 1.007 0.033 0.998 0.006 1.002
Percentile rank written ** -3.202 0.131 -3.265 0.153 -3.273 0.153
Poor 0.200 0.400 0.222 0.415 0.229 0.420 0.227 0.419
Ability (Score 5-8th grade) 8.635 0.927 8.619 0.939 8.650 0.934 8.732 0.897
Male 0.455 0.498 0.466 0.499 0.465 0.499 0.451 0.498
Theoretical track 0.509 0.500 0.485 0.500 0.501 0.500 0.530 0.499
Rural 0.043 0.202 0.048 0.214 0.051 0.220 0.053 0.223
N* 146,576 143,380 136,902 127,045
Notes: The table displays descriptive statistics by year for the overall sample. *The number of
observations for the Romanian written and oral exams is slightly smaller; **Standardized numbers
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Table 2: The impact of the anti-corruption campaign: main results; 2009-2012
academic years
Written Romanian Baccalaureate pass
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Camera -0.222** -0.237*** -0.083*** -0.084***
(0.088) (0.084) (0.026) (0.025)
Year12 -0.719*** -0.888*** -0.151*** -0.180***
(0.068) (0.057) (0.021) (0.018)
Year11 -0.667*** -0.707*** -0.150*** -0.158***
(0.051) (0.052) (0.015) (0.014)
Year09 -0.253*** -0.297*** 0.099*** 0.090***
(0.051) (0.056) (0.009) (0.009)
Male -0.483*** -0.039***
(0.015) (0.002)
Poor -0.299*** -0.061***
(0.018) (0.004)
Ability 1.038*** 0.184***
(0.019) (0.007)
Theoretical 0.602*** 0.186***
(0.030) (0.010)
Rural -0.163*** -0.037**
(0.048) (0.015)
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 547,447 547,447 553,903 553,903
R-squared 0.061 0.497 0.102 0.376
Notes: The table displays the estimates from the baseline Difference-in-Differences specifications
for the changes in the Romanian exam scores and exam pass probability when the students were
treated with the camera monitoring, relative to before the monitoring was introduced. Standard
errors are clustered at county level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Placebo test by ability, poor, and gender. Written Romanian vs. percentile
rank oral Romanian score, standardized; 2010-2012 academic years
High-stakes exam Low-stakes exam
Written Romanian exam Oral Romanian exam
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PANEL A: Ability High ability Low ability High ability Low ability
Camera -0.046 -0.228*** 0.053 0.086
(0.042) (0.066) (0.039) (0.071)
Year12 -0.331*** -0.581*** -0.041 -0.150**
(0.045) (0.067) (0.044) (0.074)
Year11 -0.271*** -0.445*** 0.017 0.008
(0.032) (0.047) (0.030) (0.050)
Poor -0.222*** -0.120*** -0.141*** -0.168***
(0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.018)
Ability 0.787*** 0.502*** 0.389*** 0.504***
(0.017) (0.011) (0.021) (0.019)
Theoretical 0.283*** 0.304*** 0.174*** 0.170***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.022) (0.035)
Male -0.283*** -0.211*** -0.142*** -0.167***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013)
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 202,032 198,056 202,032 198,056
R-squared 0.289 0.341 0.082 0.134
PANEL B: Poverty Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor
Camera -0.273*** -0.146*** -0.000 0.012
(0.048) (0.039) (0.027) (0.019)
Year 12 -0.466*** -0.402*** -0.055 -0.029
(0.038) (0.031) (0.035) (0.025)
Year 11 -0.378*** -0.328*** 0.054** 0.050***
(0.036) (0.031) (0.025) (0.018)
Ability 0.509*** 0.588*** 0.490*** 0.472***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017)
Theoretical 0.281*** 0.315*** 0.131*** 0.174***
(0.023) (0.015) (0.023) (0.027)
Male -0.291*** -0.232*** -0.229*** -0.131***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008)
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 89,375 310,713 89,375 310,713
R-squared 0.476 0.522 0.274 0.286
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High-stakes exam Low-stakes exam
Written Romanian exam Oral Romanian exam
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PANEL C: Gender Male Female Male Female
Camera -0.216*** -0.140*** 0.014 0.002
(0.048) (0.036) (0.026) (0.016)
Year12 -0.471*** -0.370*** -0.036 -0.032
(0.037) (0.029) (0.033) (0.023)
Year11 -0.366*** -0.310*** 0.062** 0.044***
(0.037) (0.030) (0.025) (0.015)
Poor -0.184*** -0.152*** -0.201*** -0.126***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011)
Ability 0.523*** 0.619*** 0.476*** 0.474***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.015) (0.014)
Theoretical 0.342*** 0.287*** 0.194*** 0.138***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.026) (0.024)
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 182,943 217,145 182,943 217,145
R-squared 0.485 0.488 0.272 0.265
Notes: The table displays the estimates from the baseline Difference-in-Differences specifications
for the Romanian written exam performance (columns 1-4) and the Romanian oral exam perfor-
mance (columns 5-8), for different subgroups of students, divided by: ability (Panel A), poverty
status (Panel B), and gender (Panel C). Both dependent variables are expressed in standardized
percentile rank scores, using data from 2010-2012. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at
county level.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Composition of cohorts admitted to an elite university 2009-2012
Ability (Standardized) Poor Male
All Poor Non-poor All Low ability High ability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: ALL ADMITTED STUDENTS
Camera 0.057 0.059 0.058 -0.033*** -0.051** -0.016 -0.025
(0.049) (0.198) (0.045) (0.012) (0.024) (0.020) (0.022)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 15,395 813 14,582 15,395 7,762 7,633 15,395
R-squared 0.039 0.085 0.040 0.039 0.048 0.039 0.019
Panel B: TUITION-EXEMPT STUDENTS (the top students)
Camera 0.130*** 0.161 0.128** -0.035** -0.060** -0.019 -0.040
(0.045) (0.154) (0.048) (0.013) (0.024) (0.022) (0.029)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 9,777 546 9,231 9,777 3,973 5,804 9,777
R-squared 0.045 0.079 0.046 0.038 0.052 0.037 0.020
Panel C: TUITION-PAYING STUDENTS (good students)
Camera 0.082 -0.015 0.086 -0.032 -0.038 -0.023 -0.042
(0.086) (0.470) (0.072) (0.027) (0.036) (0.038) (0.040)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 5,618 267 5,351 5,618 3,789 1,829 5,618
R-squared 0.027 0.207 0.026 0.059 0.064 0.080 0.023
Notes: The table displays the baseline Difference-in-Differences specifications for the composition
of admitted university students in terms of ability (columns 1-3), poverty status (columns 4-6) and
gender (columns 7). The estimates for the changes in composition in terms of ability are further
divided by poverty status (columns 2 and 3) the estimates for the changes in terms of poverty
status are further divided by students ability (columns 5 and 6). All regressions include a dummy
indicator for students who took the Baccalaureate before the year of university admission. Results
are similar if we do not include this indicator. Standard errors clustered at county level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 7: Composition of students in the top 20% of the final Baccalaureate score
distribution.
Ability Standardized Poor Male
All Poor Non-poor All Low ability High ability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Camera 0.047** 0.092*** 0.038* -0.023*** -0.020*** -0.024 -0.008
(0.020) (0.030) (0.020) (0.007) (0.007) (0.018) (0.008)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 108,461 11,681 96,780 108,461 100,383 8,078 108,461
R-squared 0.030 0.041 0.028 0.046 0.043 0.074 0.003
Notes: The table displays the baseline Difference-in-Differences specifications for the composition
of students in the top 20% of the Baccalaureate final score distribution, in terms of ability (columns
1-3), poverty status (columns 4-6) and gender (columns 7). The estimates for the changes in
composition in terms of ability are further divided by poverty status (columns 2 and 3) the estimates
for the changes in terms of poverty status are further divided by students'ability (columns 5 and
6). Results are similar if we do not include this indicator. Standard errors clustered at county
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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A Appendix – Robustness and further tests
Table A1 demonstrates (in columns 1-5 for the written Romanian test and columns
6-10 for the probability of passing the Baccalaureate) that our results in Table
2 are robust to different specifications. First, since we saw some evidence from
the graphical analysis that there was a tendency for the written Romanian exam
scores to converge between 2009 and 2010, we want to investigate if controlling
for this pattern changes the conclusions. Columns (2) and (7) include the county-
specific trends, which does not change the main results (shown in columns 1 and 6).
This accounts for potential selection of counties due to pre-campaign performance
or corruption trends (assuming these would be linear). Columns (3) and (8) add
a placebo camera indicator (equal to 1 in 2010 for the counties that were first
monitored in 2011 and in year 2011 for the counties that were first monitored in
2012, and 0 otherwise), which is not significant, while the magnitude of the main
coefficients does not change, even though the camera indicator in column (3) is not
statistically significant.
We also exclude observations in 2010 and hold as benchmark the year 2009.
This is done to rule out concerns about the estimates of interest being driven by
the contrast to the exceptional events in the 2010 “Xeroxed exam.” The results
shown in Table A2 confirm that this is not the case. Moreover, when restricting the
sample to 2011 and 2012 (hence the variation in monitoring comes only from late
implementers), we find that counties that implemented the camera later sustained
a larger drop in scores than the early implementers.
Second, one might worry that our controls are not sufficient to adjust for com-
positional differences between counties that were early or late camera implementers.
In columns (4) and (9) we replace the county indicators with school indicators and
find that the estimates and standard errors are almost identical to the baseline ones.
Lastly, using the location, family name, and father's initial, we detect a sample of
about 90,000 sibling students. In this sample, the exogenous variation in scores
stems from a monitored and an un-monitored sibling, after netting out everything
common to the siblings (e.g., family investment in children's education).45 The
45Based on intra-class correlations of 5th-8th grade performance, we keep the groups of two as-
sumed siblings (for whom the intra-family correlation is 30%, a typical estimate from the literature
on sibling correlations in educational achievement; see Bjrklund and Jntti, 2012). Thus, the most
popular surnames (seemingly yielding larger groups of siblings) are automatically excluded, thereby
increasing the likelihood that we indeed identify siblings. A critique to this approach is that the
exclusion of most popular names could entail the systematic exclusion of low-income students. We
therefore face a trade-off between precision of sibling pairing and the extent to which the sibling
sample is representative. Yet, the analysis using the extended sample of siblings (allowing for up
to four students per “family”) yields very similar results. At worst we have a random sample of
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estimates shown in columns (5) and (10) do not depart from the baseline results,
supporting that the pre-2011 scores were artificially inflated and that the sharp drop
in scores is the impact of the anti-corruption intervention.
We have also checked whether our results are affected by the fact that our main
sample excludes exam re-takes (47,910 observations) and students for whom we
do not have ability as proxied by the 5th-8th grade scores (201,000 observations).
Including re-takes and repeating the analysis without controlling for ability yield
similar results as our baseline analysis.
students, and the results should be similar to the baseline estimates if the anti-corruption campaign
had an effect on exam outcomes.
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Table A2: Sensitivity check: the main results without the 2010 academic year
Written Romanian Baccalaureate pass
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Camera -0.230** -0.229** -0.239** -0.092*** -0.090*** -0.093***
(0.098) (0.095) (0.095) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
Year12 -0.457*** -0.607*** -0.605*** -0.241*** -0.265*** -0.266***
(0.093) (0.094) (0.093) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020)
Year11 -0.407*** -0.414*** -0.413*** -0.243*** -0.243*** -0.245***
(0.080) (0.084) (0.084) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Male -0.504*** -0.500*** -0.037*** -0.034***
(0.018) (0.015) (0.002) (0.002)
Poor -0.326*** -0.240*** -0.068*** -0.056***
(0.019) (0.011) (0.004) (0.003)
Ability 1.099*** 0.897*** 0.186*** 0.135***
(0.021) (0.029) (0.006) (0.005)
Theoretical 0.643*** 0.369*** 0.205*** 0.130***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.010) (0.010)
Rural -0.169*** -0.040**
(0.059) (0.018)
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE No No Yes No No No
Observations 405,046 405,046 405,046 410,523 410,523 410,523
R-squared 0.044 0.491 0.542 0.114 0.397 0.456
Notes: The table displays estimates from the baseline Difference-in-Differences specifications, for
the written Romanian exam scores and Baccalaureate pass probability, excluding the year 2010.
Standard errors clustered at county level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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B Appendix – How good is our poverty proxy?
In this digression we scrutinize the quality of our poverty proxy. Firstly, we need to
clarify what part of the income distribution the MHS status represents. Using the
Romanian Household Budget Survey we have identified these students in households
situated in the 10%-40% quantiles. This means that our analysis does not capture
students living in extreme poverty, nor Roma children of the age of these cohorts,
since these are the most likely to be high school dropouts. This is bound to slightly
reduce the external validity of our finding.
Secondly, we try to rule out the concern that the effects of the MHS program on
the beneficiaries' performance might confound our interpretation of the interaction
estimates. We extract some evidence from a special feature of the MHS program.
The disbursement of MHS funds has been carried out every year since 2004. How-
ever, in the beginning of the program, the funds fell short of the demand. This meant
that from a total of about 76,500 eligible students (income below 150 RON, equiv-
alent to 35 EUR, per household member) in the academic year 2005-2006, 31,547
were omitted from the program.46 Some of these students applied and received the
MHS funds in subsequent years, but 19,743 students never benefited from the MHS.
We therefore use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the treatment effect
of receiving money on exam scores, for the marginal student just receiving money,
relative to the marginal student who never received the money The cutoff for re-
ceiving the money was set within each county, but varied only marginally around
30 RON. However, this means that as long as we include county fixed effects in the
regression, we are able to use a sharp RD design. Hence, we estimate the effect for
a weighted average of marginal students just receiving money, where the weights
are given by the number of students at each cutoff. In order to capture all targeted
students' exam outcomes (i.e., students who were eligible and applied for MHS in
2005-2006), we make use of the 2006-2010 Baccalaureate sample. The drawback
with this sample is that we do not have corresponding data about the 5th-8th grade
score, nor other background variables, apart from high school track.
46In our sample, these students who were not allotted the MHS in 2005-2006 despite being
eligible, report incomes between 30 and 150 RON per family member, and the mean income
is 82.6 RON. In the subsequent years the funds allocated from the national budget for MHS
were adjusted at the beginning of each year in response to the demand, leaving no more eligible
requests unsatisfied. The schools where the applications were registered had to submit their lists
of applicants to the Ministry, which disbursed the funds, and typically they ranked the students
by income, drawing the line according to the funds available. However, because of rising demands,
from 2009 to 2010 a new criterion was introduced demanding that the student must have a very
good school attendance rate. A little over 100 students were denied the allowance because of low
attendance in 2010-2011.
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We estimate the following equation:
yict = α + β0NMHSict + β1inc06ict + γ
′ ·Xict + θc + ict, (2)
where NMHSict is an indicator equal to 1 if the student is a non-beneficiary,
inc06ict is the family income in 2006, and Xict is an indicator for theoretic track.
The coefficient of interest, which yields the effect of the program, is β0.
When we estimate this model, we get virtually no effects from the program
once we control for income (Table B1). We interpret this as evidence that the MHS
program did not affect the performance of the recipients relative to their comparable
peers, and thus it can be used as a proxy for poverty status. The caveat is that
some students may have underreported income, making some sorting around the
cutoff a possibility (see Figure B1). The results hold also when we exclude those
with close to or zero income, the easiest to misreport. Nonetheless, we interpret the
RD estimate as suggestive rather than causal here.
Figure B1: Income margin density of the MHS applicants.
Notes: The figure displays the density bar chart of the MHS applicants income margin relative
to the 30 RON cutoff in 2005-2006. The figure excludes applicants who reported 0 income.
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Table B1: The MHS treatment effect. RD regressions
Written Romanian Baccalaureate pass
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NMHS 0.146*** -0.020 0.021*** -0.002
(0.023) (0.042) (0.005) (0.008)
Income 2006 0.210*** 0.029***
(0.044) (0.010)
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Track control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 64,506 64,506 64,511 64,511
R-squared 0.159 0.160 0.180 0.180
Notes: The table displays estimates from a sharp Regression Discontinuity in exam scores around
the cutoff of income below which students are treated with the “Money for Highschool” financial
support. NMHS is an indicator equal to 1 if the student did not receive the financial support.
Standard errors clustered at county level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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C Appendix – Supplementary Figures and Tables
Figure C1: Romanian written exam scores density 2010 vs. 2012
Figure C1.a. By ability
Figure C1.b By gender
Figure C1.c By poverty status
Notes: The figure displays written Romanian exam score distributions in 2010 (left) and 2012
(right), for different subgroups of students, divided by: ability, gender and poverty status.
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Figure C2: Changes at the 2010 exam. All test score distributions in 2009 and 2010
Notes: The figures display the score distributions for each written test in 2009 (blue) and 2010
(red dashed): 1) the written Romanian exam (top-left); 2) the track-specific exam (top-right); 3)
the first elective exam (bottom-left); and 4) the second elective exam (bottom-right). Note that the
second elective was removed in 2010, and before that, around 75% of the students chose physical
education as their second elective test.
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Table C1: Self-selection into camera treatment
Early installation Late installation Difference County clustered
SE p-value
Pass 0.791 0.828 -0.037 0.220
Romanian exam score 7.175 7.239 -0.064 0.593
Ability 8.632 8.618 0.014 0.742
Male 0.459 0.462 -0.003 0.618
Poor 0.184 0.263 -0.079 0.033**
Theoretical 0.504 0.483 0.021 0.387
Rural 0.038 0.060 -0.022 0.247
Log county population 13.343 12.957 0.386 0.040**
Trust in justice 1.866 2.032 -0.166 0.103
Corruption BOP 0.558 0.379 0.179 0.331
Unemployment April 8.02 9.019 -0.999 0.348
County share Romanians 0.852 0.802 0.050 0.367
N 191970 97986
Notes: The figure displays individual and county summary statistics for the joint years 2009-2010,
separately by early and late camera installation. The trust in justice variable is an average county
score calculated by us using the answers to the question “Can justice courts be trusted?,” from the
Romanian Barometer of Public Opinion 2007, Soros Foundation. The variable Corruption BOP
is a proxy developed by our calculations using the same Public Opinion Barometer. We use the
question: “Is there anyone (i.e., informal network) that could “help” you solve (i.e., informally):
issues in court/trials, medical problems, city hall, police, or issues related to the local authorities?”
P-values are based on standard errors clustered at county level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table C2: Share of students eliminated from the exam due to in-class cheating
Share of Eliminated Students
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Camera 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Year12 -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Year11 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year09 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Poor -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Poor x Camera 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Poor09 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Poor11 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Poor12 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Ability -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Theoretical -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rural 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
County FE yes yes yes no
School FE no no no Yes
Observations 553,903 553,903 553,903 553,903
R-squared 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.020
Notes: The table displays estimates from the baseline Difference-in-Differences specifications,
for the probability to be eliminated from the exam due to cheating. In addition to the standard
specifications in columns 1 and 2, columns 3 and 4 display the estimated parameters of all treatment
interactions with poverty status. Standard errors clustered at county level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
187



The Benefits of Local Party Alignment in National
Elections
Oana Borcan∗
University of Gothenburg
Abstract
This paper provides robust evidence that local officials deliver votes for
their parties in national elections. I use a sharp regression discontinuity de-
sign with closely-contested Romanian local elections in June 2012. I find up
to 5.4 percentage points increased turnout in government-aligned localities at
the July 2012 referendum launched by the governing coalition to dismiss the
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1 Introduction
A growing number of studies have brought under empirical scrutiny the issue of
political alignment at different tiers of government and associated electoral gains.
These studies have all produced the same intriguing find: locally aligned municipal-
ities may exhibit incumbency effects in municipal elections, but they don’t award
the parties in government with more votes in national elections. This line of inquiry
emerged from the vast literature on intergovernmental grants, which are clearly allo-
cated preferentially to municipalities controlled by the party in central government
(e.g. Bracco et al., 2015; Brollo and Nannicini, 2012; Sole´-Olle´ and Sorribas-Navarro,
2008).
The ensuing question is what are the gains for central governments. The working
assumption in these studies is that local politicians represent important “political
capital” for their parties, manifested in vote delivery in national polls, alongside
policy congruence and campaign efforts (e.g. Brollo and Nannicini, 2012; Grossman,
1994). However, although it was “widely accepted that federal politicians allocate
own-purpose expenditures for the purpose of enhancing their reelection chances”
(Grossman, 1994, p. 296) the anticipated national electoral bonuses from local
alignment did not surface so far.
This paper is the first to provide robust evidence of an alignment effect in na-
tional polls. To get around the endogeneity of mayor alignment, I use a regression
discontinuity design, and compare national polls outcomes in localities where an
aligned candidate narrowly won vs. narrowly lost the mayoral race. I use data
from the Romanian June 2012 local elections, and for the main outcomes I use data
from a 2012 nationwide referendum and immediate parliamentary elections. Using
these two elections, along with a battery of heterogeneity tests, I bring evidence that
alignment-driven electoral bonuses occur when: 1) the voter’s commitment problem
can be overcome (see Robinson and Verdier, 2013); 2) vote-buying practices are
common; 3) local politicians are left unchecked.
The first of these is evidenced by the referendum results. The July 2012 refer-
endum was launched by the coalition in government to decide the impeachment of
the president, who was affiliated with the opposition party.1 Importantly, a quo-
rum requirement of 50% voter presence made the referendum turnout the crucial
outcome ahead of the vote shares. Hence, any campaign promises or vote-buying
attempts were more likely to yield results since turnout is easily observed in con-
trast to the actual vote. I document a bias of up to 5.4 percentage points higher
1For details surrounding the referendum see http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/29/romanians-
unlikely-impeach-president-traian-basescu (in English)
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turnout in localities with mayors from the governing coalition than unaligned lo-
calities. By contrast, I find small and insignificant alignment effects on turnout at
the parliamentary elections, which is expected since turnout is irrelevant in that
context. Moreover, there are no significant alignment gains to vote shares neither
in the referendum nor in legislative elections. This is in line with the logic of the
voter commitment problem.
The second favourable circumstance is under widespread vote-buying practices.
Note that the very short time between local elections and the referendum rules out
pork-barrel spending as a way to attract votes (except perhaps promises, but the
parliamentary results seem to dismiss this channel too). Vote-buying is therefore a
plausible competing explanation. The results are suggestive of this channel, as the
alignment effect on turnout is fully driven by rural areas, where the RD estimate
is between 3.5 and 6.2 percentage points. This is in line with recent studies and
the abundant Romanian contextual evidence that identify higher social pressures,
more tightly-knit clientelistic networks, and a higher prevalence of vote buying in
rural areas (Funk, 2010; Vicente, 2014; Volintiru, 2012). To further substantiate
this channel, I also present heterogeneity tests which reveal larger alignment effects
in counties with higher perceived incidence of vote buying and in counties with
higher shares of out-migrants (the latter test is inspired by survey and trial evi-
dence that fraudulent ballot stuffing in migrants’names also occurs). That mayors
respond directly for these actions is evident from their role as leaders of the local
administrations and, in particular at the referendum, from undercover journalist
investigation reports (Biro, 2012). Another argument against pork-barrel spending
is that localities aligned even before 2012 have, if anything, lower turnout bonuses
than localities where the governing coalition is new in the local office.
The third condition identified above, namely lax checks and balances on mayors,
is evidenced by a heterogeneity analysis on races where the challenger has different
incentives to monitor the winner. In this case, the president’s party had high stakes
in the referendum, whereas other parties had low stakes. Consequently, the estimates
show zero alignment effects in narrow races between the governing coalition and
the president’s platform, and very large (up to 14 percentage points) effects in
races between the governing coalition and its allies. This points to the role of local
competition in keeping electoral misconduct in check. Since most national elections
have relatively more similar incentives for all parties, and since narrow races by
default reflect a balance of political influence at local level, this may account for
why the alignment effect in higher tier elections has not been found before.
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It should be noted that the main alignment estimate on turnout is robust to
various specifications, from OLS in small regions around the victory margin thresh-
old, to various polynomial approximations using the full sample. The tests for an
extensive set of covariates and vote margin density continuity at the threshold rule
out the sorting bias issues raised in Caughey and Sekhon (2011) as a threat to the
validity of RDD in electoral contexts.
Finally, I also inquire into post-referendum benefits from alignment. I show
that aligned locality revenues are larger than those of unaligned localities in 2013,
which reverses the 2011 pattern for these localities. The evidence suggests that
government transfers are preferentially directed towards localities of the governing
parties, although this cannot be causally linked to the local officials’ efforts in the
referendum. Going further, under fairly strong assumptions, I also use alignment as
an instrument for referendum turnout, and I show that localities with higher turnout
at the referendum also have significantly higher turnout and incumbent vote shares
at parliamentary turnout. This effect is clearly not large enough to show in the
reduced form, but it suggests that the referendum served as a mobilization exercise.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents an overview of the related
literatures and my contributions; section 3 describes the institutional setting; section
4 discusses the data; section 5 outlines the identification strategy and provides va-
lidity tests; section 6 displays the main results, the heterogeneity analysis and some
robustness checks; section 7 presents a brief heterogeneity analysis and a discussion
of mechanisms; section 7 presents the results from local revenues and parliamentary
elections; section 8 concludes.
2 Literature Review
This paper contributes to at least three strands of literature.
Firstly, it fills a gap in the literature surrounding partisan alignment, and the
political and economic advantages it may entail. A part of this literature investi-
gates the role of local officials’ partisan alignment in discriminate intergovernmental
transfers. A few earlier correlation studies (Grossman, 1994 and Snyder and Levitt,
1995 for the U.S. and Worthington and Dollery, 1998, for Australia) and more recent
causal analyses (Sole´-Olle´ and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008; Brollo and Nannicini, 2012;
Migueis, 2013; Bracco et al., 2015) found that localities aligned with the party in
power receive more transfers than those unaligned. A common assumption in these
studies is that local officials provide an important source of political capital for their
parties, partly because they can mobilize voters and provide electoral advantages
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also for higher-tier politicians. This assumption is also present in theoretical papers
that explain partisan transfers (e.g. Zudenkova, 2011 and Persico et al., 2011). Yet
to date there is no hard evidence in support of this assumption.
Earlier studies on reverse coattail effects (i.e. electoral success of lower-tier politi-
cians attracts the party’s success in higher-tier polls)2 showed mixed and no more
than correlational evidence (Ames, 1994, Samuels, 2000a, Samuels, 2000b; Broock-
man, 2009).
Only a few studies have tested this assumption in a causal sense, allowing the
possibility that local politicians may attract votes also through electoral corruption.
Brollo and Nannicini (2012) use data from Brazil in a RDD to show that the pres-
ident’s party penalizes unaligned mayors through smaller federal funds before local
elections. However, they find a minor, but not robust, electoral gain from alignment
in presidential elections.
Ade and Freier (2013) also use a close elections design to study the dependency
between mayoral and town council elections in Germany. They find that mayoral
winners attract a vote bonus for their co-partisans in council when the two elections
are simultaneous. This advantage is lost if elections are sequential.3 However, they
do not find any local alignment effects in European and German parliament elections.
The same pattern of preferential transfers is documented also in Portugal by
Migueis (2013), but again, when looking at the electoral outcomes in national elec-
tions using a similar RD strategy, no alignment effect was found.
Lastly, Martinez-Bravo (2014) presents a theoretical model and data from the
democratization years in Indonesia, showing that appointed local officials may have
gone to great lengths (using heavy campaigning and vote-buying) to attract votes
for the district mayoral elections. While controlling thoroughly for observables, her
identification leaves room for potential selection.
Thus, I contribute to this literature with robust evidence that directly elected
lower-tier politicians provide electoral advantages at higher tiers. Moreover, the
setting I exploit allows for a more nuanced discussion than was possible in previous
studies, about the mechanisms and conditions under which this alignment effect
emerges. Contrasting a turnout quorum referendum with typical parliamentary
elections I show that an effect is picked up only when voters’ choices are observable,
which helps to overcome the voter commitment problem (Robinson and Verdier,
2For documented presidential coattail effects in the U.S., see Cohen et al. (2000), Mattei and
Glasgow (2005), Ge´lineau and Remmer (2006) and Golder (2006).
3One explanation is that when elections are on the same day, voters incur smaller cognitive
costs if they choose the same party, while if elections are sequential, voters update and adjust their
choice to ensure a power balance through divided government
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2013).4 The small lag between the local and the first nationwide elections rules out
pork-barrel spending and mitigates the issue of voters’ time-inconsistent preferences.
I show also that vote-buying norms can be conducive to the alignment effects found.
Moreover, I put forth the role of local competition in preventing incumbents from
monopolizing the vote-rigging machine. Overall, the evidence suggests local officials
provide the often invoked political capital and provides some explanations for why
this type of alignment effect has not been found before.
A second related literature investigates the voter participation decision. Why
and how people vote are central questions in political economics. The voter paradox
(we observe positive turnouts despite the near-zero benefits of the individual vote),
has been explained through concepts like the utility from voting (e.g. fulfilling a
civil or moral obligation, see Riker and Ordeshook, 1968) and social norms (e.g.
social pressure, see Funk, 2010). As for externally enforced voting decisions, votes
can be gained through targeted spending (e.g. Manacorda et al., 2011; Pop-Eleches
and Pop-Eleches, 2012), exploiting media biases (e.g. Durante and Knight, 2012;
Durante et al., 2014) and, importantly, through active mobilization and vote buying
(e.g. Finan and Schechter, 2012). I show that local officials exert a direct influence on
turnout in favor of their parties, with potential ripple effects in subsequent elections.
The paper also contributes to the literature on political processes in young
democracies by showing that even in countries well into transition, the miscon-
duct of directly elected local politicians can impinge on democratic freedoms, by
means of aggressive voter mobilization, vote buying and electoral fraud (Keefer and
Vlaicu, 2008, Finan and Schechter, 2012, Martinez-Bravo, 2014).
3 Institutional Setting
3.1 The Romanian Electoral System and Politics in 2012
Romania is a young semi-presidential democracy, ruled by a government account-
able to the Parliament. As head of state, the president is an active player in internal
politics: he oversees the balance of powers, has the right to appoint the prime min-
ister and to veto laws. The president is directly elected every five years in a runoff
majority vote. The parliamentary elections run on a list system of independent
candidatures, based on a closed list proportional representation system, with a min-
4The voter commitment problem refers to the possibility that voters may receive favours or
money from politicians in exchange for their promise to vote in a certain way, but may default on
that promise when the vote is secret.
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imum vote share of 5% required for any party to get seats.5 A multiparty system
has been in place since 1990, with as many as 39 parties and alliances registered
for the 2012 parliamentary elections. However, the most prominent parties in 2012
were the former communist Social Democratic Party (PSD), the liberals - National
Liberal Party (PNL) and the centrist Liberal Democratic Party (PDL).
The incumbent president in 2012, Traian Basescu, although de jure politically
unaffiliated, enjoyed strong support from the centrist PDL and was generally re-
garded to be its unofficial leader.6 From December 2008 until April 2012, all the
cabinets represented coalitions with the centrists. For most of this time, the social-
democrats and the liberals were in the opposition. In February 2011, the latter forged
a coalition - the Social-Liberal Union (USL), also joined by the Conservative Party -
PC. Presided by the PSD and PNL leaders Victor Ponta and Crin Antonescu, USL
made it a first priority to remove the centrist government and the president Basescu
from office.7
The year 2012 was an electoral year: local elections were held on June 10, and
parliamentary elections on December 9. In light of these electoral events, the two
rivals, the centrist party and the social-liberal coalition, had large stakes from staying
in power and taking power, respectively. The coalition gained momentum in April
2012, when a newly formed centrist cabinet fell short of majority support in the
Parliament and was dismissed through a motion of no confidence.8 Shortly after,
Victor Ponta took office and formed the social-liberal coalition government, which
immediately initiated the legal procedures to suspend president Basescu from office.
These entailed a quick succession of controversial institutional reforms, leading to a
full-blown political crisis.9 The impeachment of the president was to be decided at
the national referendum in July 2012.
5In the proportional representation system, legislative seats get allocated to each party in pro-
portion to the number of votes the party receives. The closed-list system means that each party has
an internal method for deciding the candidates put forth for elections, and each voter effectively
casts only one vote for the party in each chamber, for the candidate decided a priori by the party.
6Article 84 in the Romanian Constitution stipulates that the president cannot be a member of
any political party while in office. However, before taking office in 2004, Basescu had been been
the president of one of the parties that merged in 2007 to found PDL.
7USL Founding Document issued on 5 February 2011 outlines the alliance’s political agenda.
The first objective reads: ‘To remove from power, in a democratic manner, the current clientelistic,
corrupt and inefficient regime’
8In February 2012 the prime minister who, at that time, was a favourite of the president, was
forced by popular protests to step down from office. His centrist government had lost popular
support following the austerity measures in 2010 (e.g. 25% public sector wage cuts).
9Constitutional court processes were changed and the national ombudsman was replaced with
another, who had ties to the social-liberals. This made it easier to pass government ordinances
facilitating the president’s impeachment. Ponta’s initiatives and the June 2012 political crisis are
described in Politeanu (2012) and some accounts of it are also available at:
http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2012/06/romanian-politics-0 (in English)
197
3.2 The 2012 Impeachment Referendum
On 4th July, the social-liberal union submitted to the Parliament an official request
to impeach the president on grounds of unconstitutional conduct in office.10 On
6th July, a Parliament majority voted in favor of impeachment, with his recall from
office to be decided in a national referendum.11 The referendum was held on the
29th July, when Basescu’s popularity was at an all-time low, owing to the draconian
austerity cuts by at least 25% in public sector wages in 2010. Opinion polls just
ahead of the referendum anticipated his removal from office.12
Importantly, the referendum law in Romania stipulated a quorum rule: a mini-
mum turnout of 50% was necessary to validate the referendum.13 On the day of the
referendum, a staggering 87.52% voted “YES” for having Basescu removed.14 How-
ever, only 46.24% of the 18 million registered voters cast their ballot, and therefore
the referendum was ruled invalid by the constitutional court. The president resumed
his duties shortly.
The president had withstood an impeachment referendum before, in 2007, when
74.48% of voters agreed to keep him in office. The turnout in the first referendum
was 44.45%, but no quorum rule was in place at the time. Figure 1 shows a brief
chronology of political and electoral events leading up to the referendum.
3.3 The Role of Mayors in National Polls
Romania’s local administration is organized into 41 counties (and the capital, further
divided into urban localities (cities and towns) and rural localities (communes and
villages). The local administration falls in the remit of mayors and local councils.
As head of the local public administration, the mayor enjoys the highest status in
the civil servants hierarchy and in the community (particularly in rural areas).15
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/29/romanians-unlikely-impeach-president-
traian-basescu (in English)
10Basescu was accused of having taken over too many of the government’s attributions and to
have attempted influencing the justice courts. The official document’s title is ‘Solicitare privind
suspendarea din functie a presedintelui Romaniei, Traian Basescu’
11Basescu was immediately suspended from his attributions and Crin Antonescu, leader of the
liberals, became interim president.
12Around 67-70% of respondents would vote him out, and just over 50% would cast their
vote (53% in rural and 52% in urban areas) according to a survey conducted by the Group
for Social-Behavioral Studies ”Avangarde”: ”Operations Research” Survey 23-25th July; See
http://bit.ly/1O8r35T (In Romanian)
13Law No.3/2000, article 5(2).
14The exact question on the ballots was ”Do you agree with the dismissal of the president Traian
Basescu?”
15Article 66 of Law No. 215/2001 Art. stipulates that ”the mayor has a position of public
authority. He/She is the head of public local administration and of the locality-specific public
administration apparatus, which he/she manages and controls”
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Mayors are directly elected every four years through a first-past-the-post system.16
Once elected, mayors assume office almost immediately.17
Importantly, mayoral candidates can run for a separate party, a coalition, or as
independent candidates. For instance, at the 2012 local elections, 42.39% of the
seats were won by the government coalition, but an additional 11.9% of the seats
were taken by candidates representing the social-democrats separately, and 8.3%
by separate liberal candidates. The local competition between parties within the
governing coalition was allegedly forced by quarrels over local administration seats.
This has implications for the treatment definition (see section 4.1).
The mayor’s political alignment flags the locality’s political leaning, and is thought
to predict the parties’ local performance in national elections (Buti, 2012; IRES,
2012).18
Mayors are believed to have an active role in higher-tier elections, where they mo-
bilize voters through: 1) campaigning and “get-out-the-vote” strategies (Seceleanu,
2009); 2) pork-barrel spending (e.g. Pop-Eleches and Pop-Eleches, 2012 investigate
the EURO 200 program for supplying the needy with computers, Pop-Eleches and
Pop-Eleches, 2012; EFOR, 2013 document the clientelist allocation of infrastructure
funds). 3) facilitating vote-buying and electoral fraud, since as heads of the local
administration they have direct access to the vote-rigging apparatus.
Vote buying is a common practice in Romania, particularly in rural, more tightly-
knit and less educated communities. Votes are bought for eggs and buckets all the
way to mobile phones, livestock or cash (Volintiru, 2012).19 The 2012 elections,
particularly the impeachment referendum, were fraught with allegations of electoral
fraud (Freedom House, 2013). An undercover journalist published his phone conver-
sations with small town mayors, passing for a government coalition representative
just ahead of the polls (Biro, 2012). The mayors hinted to unorthodox practices:
“You give them [the voters] a snaps, a sandwich, a pie. We’d rather you [the party]
sent us money.”, or “Evening after evening we went with the people in taverns.
We’ll have 75% [turnout]”. Conversely, the president’s party’s mayors mentioned
organized distractions to keep voters away from the polling stations.
16This system was first applied in the local elections on 10th June 2012. Until 2008, mayors
were selected in a majority two-round election. The Law No. 129/2011 changed this to a first-
past-the-post-system. Local councillors are also directly elected on the same day as the mayor, up
to a number of seats determined by the population size.
17Mayors’ mandate is validated in court in maximum 20 days after the local elections, as stip-
ulated in article 63, Law No. 215/2001. Mayors can assume office right after taking the oath of
duty, as soon as their mandate is deemed valid by the court.
18In 2000 legislative and local elections, the vote share correlation was 40% (Klasnja, 2014).
19(Volintiru, 2012) shows details on these and other practices documented from face-to-face
interviews with local officials and party members.
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Additionally, several mayors were indicted in a most controversial referendum
corruption trial against a minister, member of the social-democratic party, sentenced
for electoral corruption to reach a 60% turnout target (National Anticorruption Di-
rectorate Press Release 2013).20 Court files revealed a variety of fraudulent practices:
ballot-stuffing (including votes attributed to out-migrants and deceased), violent
threats to get or to impede votes, double-counting and the fraudulent use of the
mobile ballot box which circumvented monitoring devices.21 Several mayors from
the president’s party were also indicted for electoral misconduct.22
Overall, the rich anecdotal evidence reveals the (likely illicit) influence of local
officials in national polls. The formal analysis below sets out to establish whether and
how this influence was turned into a significant alignment bonus in the referendum
and parliamentary elections.
4 Data
In order to estimate the impact of partisan alignment of mayors on the referen-
dum outcomes and parliament election outcomes, I combine several sources of data
aggregated at locality level:
i) Electoral data from 2012 local elections, the national impeachment referendum
and legislative elections. This data is publicly available from the Romanian Electoral
Authority (AEP). From this data I extract: the vote shares for mayoral candidates,
underlying my running variable in the RDD; the referendum outcome variables: the
turnouts by locality (defined as the share of ballots cast from the total number of
registered voters) and the ‘YES’ vote shares (the percentage of votes in favour of
dismissing the incumbent president of the total number of votes cast); parliamentary
election outcomes: turnouts by locality and party vote shares by locality. I also
use the turnout in the 2007 impeachment referendum and the number of mayoral
candidates at the 2012 local elections as electoral controls in the regressions.
ii) Census data from 2011 and 2002 Romanian Population Censuses. This data is
publicly available online from Statistics Romania. Using this source I construct the
20http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24437209 (In English)
See also “Top Romanian minister Liviu Dragnea receives suspended prison sentence of 1 year for
fraud in 2012 referendum to dismiss ex-president Basescu” http://english.hotnews.ro/, accessed 15
May 2015.
21Princeton political scientist Grigore Pop-Eleches describes the context of the referendum and
the fraud means on U.S. political science blog http://themonkeycage.org/ in the article ”Post-
Election Report: Romanian’s Presidential Impeachment Referendum, and a Request for Help in
Identifying Potential Fraud” posted on 9th August 2012.
22See e.g. http://bit.ly/1Or9UCg, Romania Libera, published 30 July 2012 (in Romanian).
(In Romanian)
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first set of pre-treatment locality-level covariates: the locality log population size, the
share of voting-age population, the share aged over 65, the share of Romanians, the
gender shares, the share of high school and university educated, the unemployment
rate. For a slightly smaller sample, I also have a number of additional covariates:
the shares of illiterate, the share working in agriculture and in public administration,
the proportion of migrants working abroad.
iii) Fiscal data from 2011. This data from the Ministry of Regional Development
is available at locality level, including: total income (own taxes, intergovernmental
transfers, subsidies), total and split public expenditure (on education, health, and
public services). These form the second set of covariates.
4.1 Defining treatment
A locality is treated if the newly elected mayor is aligned with the governing coali-
tion. Alignment here assumes the support for the social-liberal union’s manifesto,
i.e. interest in ousting the president and the representation of the coalition in all
elections.
To reiterate, 1979 top-two mayoral candidates represented the governing coali-
tion, while some ran for a separate party within it: 706 for the social-democrats, 554
for the liberals, and 47 for the conservatives. It is known that these these separate
candidates were in disagreement with the coalition over local administration offices,
but it is unclear to what extent they still had their interests aligned with the govern-
ing coalition. While the social-democrats were the main drivers of the referendum,
the position of the independent liberals and conservatives was relatively ambigu-
ous.23 Therefore, to compare the level of engagement in the referendum, in Table
1 I present the turnout in narrow (comparable) races between the different parties,
including independent liberals and conservatives. Not only is the only significant
difference in turnout in races between social-democrats and liberals/conservatives,
but the average turnout in localities where a social-democrat took office is 64.6%
compared to 56.2% in liberal/conservative localities. Given the much lower turnouts
in liberal/conservative narrowly won localities, I place these candidates in the control
group in the main specifications.
Therefore a locality is aligned with the governing coalition (henceforth G-aligned)
if the mayor is either from the governing coalition or from the social-democrats and
G-unaligned otherwise.
23Also, they were the strongest party in politics. The social-democrats alone won 11.9% seats
in the local elections, while the other two combined secured 9.65% of seats. Moreover, PSD leader
Victor Ponta was head of the cabinet and also the main proponent of the reforms facilitating the
impeachment.
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In the robustness section 6.3 I also present the results with liberals/conservatives
in the treatment group (where, in light of the contrasting electoral behaviour of lib-
eral/conservative led localities, I expect the alignment effect to be underestimated).
In alternative specifications, I also control for races against liberals and conserva-
tives, and I also exclude these races from the sample.
4.2 Sample selection
The treatment definition above has some implications for the sample selection. The
complete dataset contains 3181 localities with information about the 2012 elections.
Firstly, I exclude localities with only one local candidate and those where the winning
candidate obtained a vote share above 80%, which is unproblematic since assessing
the effect of mayors’ partisan alignment relies on identification from close electoral
races. These account for 11.4% of all races.24 This is also useful because estimates
using higher order polynomial control functions used later on in the RD are sensitive
to extreme values of the assignment variable, and may therefore be biased (Gelman
and Imbens, 2014).
Secondly, I restrict the sample to those localities where a candidate aligned with
the governing coalition was either winner or runner-up, irrespective of the number
of candidates running in that locality. This leads to the exclusion of an additional
421 races, or 13.2% of all localities. I also drop 9 observations due to missing data
for the covariates.
This sample definition comes with a caveat: localities will select into the sample
based on the degree of popular support for the aligned candidate, i.e. depending on
the running variable. The internal validity problem is that, while still using narrow
races, I might compare a G-winner with, for instance, 47% vote share with a G-
runner up of 37% share (this will depend on how many candidates split the votes in
local elections), which is not a narrow enough comparison.
Brollo and Nannicini (2012) choose a cleaner identification from two- or three-
candidate races over sample size. However, the pool of two-candidate races is also
a potentially selected sample, and a much smaller one. In this case this strategy is
less feasible, because in Romania elections are traditionally disputed amongst many
parties. In the 2012 mayoral elections, some races had up to fifteen competitors and
there were merely 154 (6.4%) two-candidate races and 479 (20%) three-candidate
races against G, which means estimations based on these samples might have low
24However, their inclusion does not change the results qualitatively, since the identification of
the alignment effect comes from localities close to the cutoff, as explained in detail in the next
section. Ade and Freier (2013), for instance, exclude races where the victory margin is larger than
60%.
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statistical power. The question is essentially how to resolve this trade-off between
internal validity and precision.
Appendix Table A1, showing comparative statistics between the races with a
victory margin within 5 percentage points and the two-candidates races, reveals that
two-candidate localities have slightly lower population, higher per capita revenue,
and, importantly, lower education levels and expenditures (around 1 percentage
point significant difference in share with high education). Thus, apart from the
higher per capita revenue, the other observables suggest two-candidate localities
could be more susceptible to manipulation. Consequently, the results from these
samples, which I present in section 5.2, could display an upward selection bias.
Thus, my main strategy is to use the entire sample, where, in some specifications,
I also control for the number of candidates and for the joint vote share of the first
two ranked candidates (as this should help to pick up the alignment estimate only
from the closest races). The advantage with this approach is enhanced statistical
power and external validity against the restricted alternatives.
4.3 Descriptive statistics
The sample thus defined contains 2386 localities with mayoral races against a G-
aligned candidate, of which 2116 are small rural localities (with 3263 inhabitants on
average), and 270 are large urban localities.
Table 2 displays some comparative statistics in national elections outcomes and
locality characteristics in the sample of races against G-aligned candidates, for all lo-
calities and separately for rural and for urban ones. Referendum turnout is markedly
larger in localities where the G-aligned candidates won (58.3%) than where they
lost (47.2%). This difference is larger in rural localities (12 percentage points) and
smaller in urban localities, which also have generally lower turnout - below the
quorum rule. Interestingly, this contrasts with the voters’ electoral behaviour at
the impeachment referendum in 2007, where turnout was significantly lower in G-
aligned localities. However, the share of votes in favour of impeaching the president
is very similar in all groups, around 86%.
In terms of parliamentary outcomes, it is evident that localities where G won
the mayoral race have larger turnout and vote shares for G. The turnout difference
is close to 3 percentage points.
Table 2 also shows that G-aligned and unaligned localities are largely similar in
pre-treatment characteristics. While most p-values associated with the differences
in means are large, non-aligned localities are slightly more ethnically diverse and
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have larger per capita fiscal revenues and expenditures owing to somewhat larger
subsidies (by a margin of 40 RON, approximately 9 EUR per capita).
These fiscal revenue differences could influence voters’ political attitudes, and
thus drive both the probability of electing a certain candidate as well as the electoral
outcomes. However, they are less problematic in the RDD if the fiscal variables don’t
change discontinuously at the victory threshold.
Therefore, in Table 3, I zoom in on those races within 5 percentage points of
the victory threshold. The average difference in referendum turnout remains signif-
icant in rural areas. However, almost all the differences in pre-treatment covariates,
including the previous referendum turnout, between G-aligned and unaligned rural
localities vanish, except the share of people in higher education, which is larger in
G-aligned localities. A few differences in revenues and expenditures persist in the
urban sample. Therefore, in order rule out that the few small differences confound
the RDD estimates, I test formally the discontinuities in pre-treatment character-
istics in the validity section 5.2. I also present the main estimates including these
covariates on the right hand side in the results section.
5 Identification Strategy
I use closely-contested mayoral elections to identify the impact of mayor alignment
with the governing coalition on referendum and parliamentary outcomes: locality
turnout and locality vote shares. Hence, I exploit the sharp regression discontinuity
design as in Lee (2008), comparing referendum outcomes in localities where an
aligned candidate barely won with those where an aligned candidate barely lost the
mayoral race. The vote margin between the aligned and the unaligned candidate is
the running variable, based on which treatment is assigned, and the locality is treated
if the aligned candidate vote margin is larger than the threshold 0. The vote margin
is determined by: 1) the localities’ characteristics (e.g. voters’ preferences and
choices); 2) pure chance. Lee (2008) showed that, as long the conditional probability
density function of the running variable (conditioning on individuals’ characteristics)
is continuous, the pre-treatment characteristics are independent of treatment status
in a tight neighbourhood around the threshold (local independence). This means
that the variation in treatment status is due to chance, as in a natural randomized
experiment.
In the case of voting, the identification strategy is based on the fact that, as long
as this assumption holds, in closely contested elections, the electorates’ (localities’)
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characteristics are similar in all respects except for treatment status. This is due
to the inherent uncertainty about the final vote count, which, in principle, makes
it impossible for the candidates (or voters) to control the vote margin perfectly. In
simple terms, in very closely-contested elections, the partisan alignment treatment
is as good as randomly assigned. Therefore, the average treatment effect can be
estimated as the expected difference in referendum outcomes between treated and
non-treated localities around the threshold. Below I expand on the econometric
specifications and I also provide validity tests to confirm the random assignment.
5.1 Econometric specifications
In two-party races against aligned candidates, let dGi be the vote share difference
in locality i between the G-aligned and unaligned candidates. This vote margin
is the running variable: if the dGi is positive, then the G-aligned candidate wins
the elections; if it is negative, he is the runner-up. The victory threshold is then
dG∗i = 0. For races in close proximity to this cutoff, the Average Treatment Effect
(ATE) of partisan alignment is gauged from the discontinuity in observed outcomes
at the cutoff. This can be estimated using the following simple linear regression
model in tight intervals around the cutoff:
yi = α + β ·G winsi + εi, (1)
with G winsi = 1 [dGi ≥ 0] and E [εi|dGi] = 0,
where i indexes the locality and the dependent variable yi is one of two outcomes:
1) referendum turnout and 2) “YES” vote share, in locality i. βˆ is the estimated
ATE of partisan alignment and 1 [.] is the identity function.
I restrict the sample to intervals where the vote margins lie in the intervals [-2.5;
+2.5] and [-5; +5] percentage points. Since I use data from one election year, these
intervals yield quite small samples, trading off precision for validity.
An alternative estimation method which allows me to use the entire sample is a
spline polynomial approximation with different parameters on the left and right of
the threshold:
yic = α+ β0 ·G winsic +
p∑
k=1
δk · dGkic +G winsic
p∑
k=1
βk · dGkic + γ′Xic + θc + εi, (2)
where i indexes the locality and c indexes the county; yic is either the refer-
endum turnout, or the share of “YES” votes, or the turnout and share votes for
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G in parliamentary elections; Xic is a vector of locality covariates and θc includes
county fixed effects, included in some regressions to account for the fact that the
victory thresholds may be county-specific;25 p is some order of the polynomial in the
victory margin dGi (control function), which accounts for voters’ preferences away
from the victory threshold. Following the literature, I add the following in the list of
covariates: 1) a set of demographic characteristics including the (log) size of popula-
tion of the locality, the age, gender, ethnicity, education and unemployment rate by
locality; 2) a set of fiscal pretreatment characteristics, including locality per capita
revenues and expenditures; 3) pre-treatment electoral characteristics: the number of
candidates and the turnout in the previous impeachment referendum, in 2007 (the
Data section contains a more detailed account of the covariates).26 Standard errors
are clustered at county level.
5.2 Validity analysis
The RDD in elections has been used extensively in the literature, most notably to
investigate incumbency advantages. A few recent studies have raised concerns with
respect to the validity of the design, particularly in the U.S. close elections, where,
e.g. Caughey and Sekhon (2011) have shown that stronger competitors are more
likely to win elections by a narrow margin. Eggers et al. (2015) have surveyed a
large number of electoral contexts and refuted the incumbency advantage in various
countries, concluding that the U.S. case is an exception, and that the RDD is a
sound approach in electoral analysis, provided that the main assumptions withstand
thorough testing.
The coefficient βˆ provides the unbiased estimate of the impact of partisan align-
ment on referendum outcome y if: 1) there is a discontinuity in treatment at the
zero cutoff vote margin. 2) potential outcomes are a continuous function in the
running variable at the threshold (Hahn et al., 2001). While this is an untestable
assumption, Lee (2008) has shown that this can be replaced by a milder assump-
25Moreover, they account for the fact that counties have traditionally supported preponderantly
certain political parties, and for the political alignment of the elected county council president.
26The electoral RD literature includes similar characteristics. E.g. Pettersson-Lidbom (2008)
estimates the impact of left- vs. right- wing party control on economic outcomes, controlling for a
number of predetermined characteristics e.g. income, population size, proportion of people below
15, and proportion of people above 65. Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) also use a RDD to estimate
the difference in economic outcomes between localities with a Republican or a Democrat mayor.
Their covariates include percentage white households, percentage with a college degree or more,
household income, as well as predetermined fiscal outcomes in year t-1: total revenues per capita,
total taxes per capita, total current expenditures per capita, total full-time employees per 1000
residents.
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tion, namely that the probability density function of the running variable should be
continuous at the cutoff, implying:
i) Locality unobservables do not vary discontinuously at the cutoff dpx∗l = 0.
While this cannot be tested directly, one can test the continuity of locality observed
pre-treatment covariates at the threshold.
ii) The assignment mechanism is perfectly followed. This requires that candi-
dates are not able to sort perfectly around the threshold (i.e. they cannot perfectly
manipulate the vote share so as to win or lose elections). It is unlikely that candi-
dates have perfect foresight on the number of ballots needed to tip the elections in
their favor. However, below I perform standard tests to confirm the validity of this
and the first assumption.
Going back to the treatment discontinuity, this condition is clearly satisfied be-
cause all winning candidates take office immediately after elections.27
Testing assumption i) requires looking for jumps in the locality observable char-
acteristics around the threshold. Smooth locality covariates around the threshold
would be reassuring that the RD estimate measures the average treatment effect of
mayor alignment. A condensed test is to predict one of the outcomes using only the
set of covariates, and to estimate the RD model with the predicted, instead of the
realized outcomes, on the left-hand side. Insignificant RD estimates would confirm
that covariates vary continuously around the cutoff.
This is confirmed in appendix Table A2, which presents the results from races
against G, for predicted referendum turnout. I present the results from estimating
model 1 (using a bandwidth of 5 percentage points in columns 1, 4 and 7) and
model 3, without fixed effects (columns 2, 5 and 8) and also including county fixed
effects (columns 3, 6 and 9). The outcomes are predicted by including successively:
i) the subset including age, gender, education and ethnicity, unemployment status
covariates (columns 1-3); an additional subset of fiscal covariates (columns 4-6);
iii) an additional subset containing electoral covariates (columns 7-9). Panels A,
B and C present races in all, rural, and urban localities, respectively. None of the
RD coefficients are significant, suggesting that the observable characteristics should
not confound the treatment effects. RD estimates for each individual covariate also
suggest that almost all the pretreatment characteristics are continuous around the
threshold (Table A3 in the appendix, for rural localities only). There are some sig-
nificant differences in the share in higher educationand health expenditure, which
remind that the close races disputed amongst any candidates may not be narrow
27In very few cases, mayors have given up their seat well into their mandate, so this does not
affect the identification, because the outcomes are realized shortly after the elections.
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enough to ensure a good counterfactual. When including these covariates in the
main estimations, where, as shown in the results section, they do not change the
treatment effect estimate much. In addition, the two-candidate races estimations
should provide complementary evidence to mitigate this concern. While not ir-
refutable proof that unobservable characteristics vary continuously at the threshold,
this evidence lends more credibility to the second assumption above.
The assumption of random assignment into treatment would be breached if may-
oral candidates had perfect control over vote margins. Suppose aligned mayors ma-
nipulated the ballots to obtain an otherwise unattainable positive vote margin. Then
the partisan alignment treatment effect would be confounded by the characteristics
of candidates or places that enabled the manipulation, if they also altered national
elections. One ‘symptom’ of such manipulation could be the discontinuity in the
probability density function of running variable, i.e. the vote margin (McCrary,
2008). As pointed out in Lee (2008), with imperfect manipulation the treatment
effect can still be identified, under the assumption of continuous conditional proba-
bility density function. McCrary (2008) developed a complementary test, based on
the fact that Lee’s assumption implies the continuity of the density function for the
running variable. McCrary obtained smooth approximations of the running variable
probability density functions to the right and to the left of the cutoff. The estimate
of the discontinuity of probability density functions at the threshold can be used to
test the null hypothesis of zero discontinuity.
In the case of mayoral elections, even if some candidates turn to vote buying to
influence their winning probability, it is unlikely that they have complete control
over final vote shares. Moreover, in closely-disputed elections, both candidates have
the interest and the means to monitor each other. Nonetheless, graphical evidence
of the distribution of vote margins is customary in testing the assumption of no
perfect sorting around the threshold. Appendix Figure A1 displays the histograms
for the running variable (Vote margin for G-aligned candidates), for all localities
and separately by rural and urban localities. There is a visible, albeit small, dif-
ference in percentage localities with a G-aligned candidate just below and above
the threshold. This is salient particularly in rural electoral races. To understand
whether this is a problematic discontinuity, Figure A1 also displays McCrary’s poly-
nomial approximations of the probability density functions for all races of interest.
A slight difference in the vote margin density for G-aligned candidates resembles the
patterns in the histograms. However, the confidence intervals on the two sides of the
threshold overlap, and the test statistics (t=1.03 for all, 1.21 for rural, 0.96 for ur-
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ban localities) confirm that the zero discontinuity cannot be rejected and alleviates
concerns of perfect sorting.
6 Results
6.1 Main estimates
This section presents the main estimations of the impact of mayors’ partisan align-
ment on outcomes in the national impeachment referendum and parliamentary elec-
tions, identified from closely contested elections.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the essence of my findings. The figures plot regression
function approximations for the referendum outcomes (Figure 2) and parliamen-
tary outcomes (Figure 3) in races against G-aligned candidates. The approxima-
tions of the underlying regression functions use the data-driven selection of bins in
Calonico et al. (2015).28 Only Figure 2 displays a discontinuous increase in refer-
endum turnout above the zero vote margin threshold, in races where a G-aligned
candidate narrowly wins (Figure 2a, right). The sharp increase in turnout above the
threshold is even more pronounced in rural localities, with the discontinuity estimate
around 5 percentage points (Figure 2b, left). In urban areas, however, turnout is
lower in barely successful G-aligned localities.29 No discontinuous jump in turnout
is present around the cutoff in legislative elections, which is consistent with the fact
that turnout was not an objective in these polls (Figure 3).
In terms of vote shares, not only is there no discontinuity in the “YES” vote share
at the referendum (Figure 2, right), but G vote shares in senate elections seem to
be almost smooth around the cutoff.30 The figures are suggestive of fundamental
differences in incentives and voter mobilization at the two elections, which I discuss
further below after estimating the alignment effects from RD regressions.
The main estimation results are displayed in Tables 4 (referendum outcomes) and
5 (parliamentary outcomes). The tables display a range of RD estimators, structured
in three panels: Panel A shows results from all localities, Panel B restricts the sample
to rural, and Panel C to urban localities.
The RD estimates from six specifications in both tables are displayed as follows:
i) Columns (1)-(2) and (7)-(8) present OLS estimations in the tight intervals [-2.5;
28The Stata command from the robust data-driven regression discontinuity package developed
by Calonico et al. (2015) is rdbinselect, using the evenly-spaced bins method.
29However, note that there is a lower density of winning G-aligned candidates in cities
30The same graphs with vote shares for G in the Lower Chamber are very similar and are
available on request.
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+2.5] and [-5; +5] percentage points around the threshold; ii) Columns (3) and
(9) present estimates from robust local linear approximations with the optimal bin
selection as in Calonico et al. (2014); iii) columns (4)-(6) and (10)-(12) present
the results from 3rd order polynomial approximations with full samples, where the
polynomial parameters are allowed to differ on the two sides of the cutoff; columns
(5)-(6) and (11)-(12) include locality covariates and columns (6) and (12) further
include county fixed effects.31
In Table 4, Panel A, the first estimate from the most restricted bandwidth in-
dicates that G-aligned localities have 3.1 percentage points higher turnout that
unaligned localities. Increasing the bandwidth decreases this estimate to around 2
percentage points, and none of the estimates in columns (1) - (4) are statistically
significant. The effect of mayor alignment on turnout is large and significant in the
specifications that allow for covariates and county fixed effects. The turnout pre-
mium from alignment with the governing coalition is 5.4 percentage points in the
sixth column. On the other hand, all RD estimates of the difference in the share
of “YES” votes are close to zero and insignificant. This evidence is in line with a
turnout maximizing objective of the governing coalition in the presence of a partic-
ipation quorum rule, as the theories of quorum referenda predict (e.g. Herrera and
Mattozzi, 2010).
Panel B zooms in on races in rural localities. The turnout differences between
communities with aligned and non-aligned mayors are clearly wider. All RD esti-
mates are significant, and are around 5.3 percentage points in the tightest interval
around the threshold and 6.2 percentage points in specifications with county fixed
effects, and controlling for locality pre-treatment characteristics. The inclusion of
covariates changes the estimate slightly from 4 to 5 percentage points. This is likely
not a significant difference, but it does raise the question of whether treatment is
truly randomly allocated. To reiterate, the issue is that a narrow top two candidates
race is not the same as a narrow just two candidates race, and selection of G-aligned
winner could play a role. Table 2 showed that most characteristics in the rural sam-
ple are the same in G-aligned and unaligned localities. However, as seen in appendix
Table A3 which shows separate RD estimation for all covariates, the share in high
education is slightly larger in G-aligned narrowly won localities. Assuming what the
literature typically shows, that lower educated people are more easily manipulated,
31The estimation results with varying polynomial orders are similar, and are displayed in Table
9. Note also that introducing an additional set of covariates (share illiterate, share migrants, share
working in agriculture and in public administration) makes the sample slightly smaller, but the
results from that sample do not change when including these covariates. These results are not
reported, but are available upon request.
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one would expect the alignment estimate with no control for covariates to be un-
derestimated. This is consistent with what columns 4 and 5 display. Nevertheless,
just-two candidates races are discussed in section 6.3.
The county fixed effects also increase the coefficient’s size. This is almost entirely
driven by three counties. once these counties are excluded from the sample, the
estimates are more consistent across specifications and the inclusion of county fixed
effects does not alter the RD estimate size.32
The RD estimates in Panel C, from urban races show the opposite: there seems
to be a negative turnout premium for G-aligned localities, although imprecisely es-
timated because of the small sample size. However, the reduction in magnitude in
columns (5)-(6) suggests that the difference could be explained by municipality or
county characteristics. Thus, the assumption of random assignment into alignment
clearly does not hold in the urban sample (as anticipated by the significant differ-
ences in predetermined characteristics in Table 2). As in the full and rural samples,
the RD estimates for the share of “YES” votes are not significant. Overall, there
is a marked positive impact of partisan alignment on turnout. This effect is in line
with the interests of the governing coalition to obtain the validating quorum, and
it is driven exclusively by rural localities.33
Turning to the parliamentary elections in Table 5, the striking difference is that
all RD estimates of mayoral alignment are close to zero and insignificant in all sam-
ples. These polls used closed lists, meaning that in each chamber and college (part
of a city and/or a group of villages), the voter had one vote for the candidate from
his preferred party. Hence, the voting decisions were arguably more complex than
in the referendum. The absence of an alignment premium for turnout is expected
given that turnout is not an objective. One possibility would be that, if government-
aligned winning parties have the means to mobilize more voters, both the vote shares
in their favor and turnout in their localities may exceed those in unaligned localities.
However, the alignment estimates are also insignificant for vote shares in all specifi-
cations and samples. More specifications with varying polynomials are reported in
32The results excluding these three counties are available upon request. These counties do not
seem to differ from the rest in terms of average number of local competitors, the vote share of top
two parties in local elections, nor composition of races.
33Since the president’s party had opposing interests, they may have tried to lower turnout.
Treatment can thus also be defined as P-alignment. Appendix Table A4 reveals that the president’s
party close winners have lower turnout than close runner-ups, driven by rural localities. The
magnitude of discontinuity estimates in slightly smaller than the analogous ones in Table 4. The
estimates are only significant when controlling for covariates and county fixed effects. However,
in this sample, most close races are between P and G, a competition which can result in lower
alignment benefits, as discussed further in section 6.2. The usual validity checks hold for the
P-alignment treatment, and available upon request.
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Table 12, columns (1)-(3), where the alignment estimates for parliamentary turnout
and vote shares are similarly small (slightly larger and significant only when fitting
a linear control function). The conclusion from these estimations is that there is a
much smaller impact, if at all, of alignment with the governing coalition on outcomes
in the legislative elections that took place six months after the local elections. In
section 7 below I explore these results further, looking at whether a larger turnout
at the referendum may have persisted in parliamentary elections.
The positive alignment effect at the referendum may not be entirely surpris-
ing given the lack of popular support for the president at the time, and the 50%
participation target, which the governing coalition needed for an almost certain vic-
tory. The more intriguing issue is how this mobilization was achieved in just over a
month after the local elections and why, like in all previous studies, it is absent from
subsequent national elections. In the space of one month pork-barrel spending on
visible public projects would not have been feasible, but promises and expenditures
on public projects may have ensued before the parliamentary elections. Vote buying
and active “get-out-the-vote”strategies may have been used for both elections, as
observers’ reports show.
So what explains the asymmetry in these results? The most straightforward
explanation could be that promises and vote buying can only overcome the voter
commitment problem in the referendum, where turnout is easily observed, especially
in small rural communities (see Nichter, 2008, for a discussion on why turnout buying
is more likely to occur than vote buying). In the case of legislative elections, the
voters may receive the benefits offered by the parties, but may still vote as they
wish, since the vote is secret. This, of course, assumes the existence of vote buying
practices, which, are widespread in many developing and transition countries. Below
I conduct some heterogeneity tests to further highlight the role of vote-buying and
also the local competition, or the power of local parties to keep the party in office
in check.
6.2 Mechanisms
Exploring the differences across narrow races can give some idea about what drives
the results and why the alignment effects have not been picked up in previous studies.
In delivering votes, the corruption environment may matter, as well as the the
party’s experience in office in the past. For instance, as trial evidence and election
monitoring reports showed, one method used was ballot stuffing in the names of
people that could not vote, either because they were working abroad at the time of
the election, or were deceased. Thus, in Table 6 I conduct a heterogeneity analysis
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based on: the pre-treatment share of people who worked abroad (Panel A), pre-
existing stated vote-buying norms (Panel B); party incumbency (Panel C). For space
considerations, I focus only on referendum turnout in rural localities as the outcome,
since all RD estimates for the vote shares and parliamentary outcomes are close to
zero.
The results in panel A suggest that localities with migrant shares above the
median 5% display larger and significant alignment effects in the expected directions
in two out of three specifications. Note that the results are opposite to what one
would expect in the absence of manipulation: an additional migrant is one less vote,
so turnout should naturally be smaller.
The same holds for localities with more widespread vote buying practices. I use
the 2011 Romanian Electoral Surveys data which asks individuals about electoral
practices, including vote-buying. Not all localities are represented in the survey,
hence I construct a county level measure of vote-buying norms. The share of people
who report vote buying ranges from 6.25% to 87% with a standard deviation of
21%, which offers a good amount of variation. I divide counties by the median
share of voters who admitted to have been asked to sell their vote (25%). The
alignment premium seems higher in counties where vote buying is perceived as a
more common practice (and insignificant in two specifications in low-vote buying
prevalence counties).
Finally, the RD estimate is also consistently larger in localities where G was not
in office in the previous mandate.34 While the differences between localities where G
was the incumbent before and those where G was a newcomer may not be statistically
significant, this at least rules out differential voter responses to past pork-barrel
spending in places where G was already in office. One potential explanation for
this result is that the new G leadership needs to prove their loyalty to the party,
which could attract future grants that help keeping their position. This may also
flag a tendency to target swing voters (a` la Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987), rather
than strongly supportive localities where G is incumbent.
If one believes electoral fraud and vote buying account for the alignment effect,
the party in office still needs unhindered access to the vote rigging apparatus. This
may not be straightforward if the other parties, particularly the challengers for
local office, have opposing interests and enough power to restrain the incumbent’s
misconduct. This points to the role of local competition (which brings about checks
34To capture the interaction between G’s victory and G incumbency, here the treatment is 1 if
G wins the race and the locality had a G mayor before 2012, and 0 if G loses the race regardless
of party incumbency in their locality; in the case of non-incumbency, the treatment is 1 if G wins
and the locality had a mayor from a different party before 2012
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and balances) for the effect of party alignment. However, since RD estimation relies
by default on races closely disputed, how should one go about finding a variation
in local competition? The referendum setting brings the advantage that while all
parties competed for local offices, only G and P actually competed at the referendum.
Moreover, the liberals/conservatives represent a special case of local competition, but
national alliance with G. Thus, P had high incentives to monitor G’s activity around
the referendum, and vice-versa, while the liberals/conservatives may have been more
slack (note that this was preempted by the turnout differences in the various races
in Table 1).
In Table 7 I show RD estimates from close races between: i) G and P (panel A);
ii) G and any parties except P (panel B); iii) G and liberals/conservatives (panel C).
The results in the three panels are fairly different: in races between G-aligned and
P, the two parties with the largest stakes, the effects are very small and insignificant
(except in the specification with county fixed effects). By contrast, when G wins
over other parties than P, and in particular the liberals/conservatives, they get a
significant turnout advantage (large and positive estimates). This is in line with the
logic of tighter checks in the G versus P race, and potentially offsetting efforts on
one another’s electoral activities (be they vote rigging or voter mobilization). On
the other hand, while the other parties may not influence turnout themselves, they
may not have kept the G-mayors in check.
These results do not have a causal interpretation because the top two competi-
tors’ parties are selected based on voter’s preferences. However, they are suggestive
of the role of competition in vote delivery, an issue previously overlooked. This
competition is even more important when all parties have strong stakes in national
elections, such as legislative elections. Thus, it is likely that the parties’ efforts to
attract votes may cancel each other out in constituencies where there is a balance of
powers, but not when a party dominates. Hence, in general, the RDD, which relies
on balanced races, may not pick up alignment effects not because they do not occur,
but because they occur away from the threshold.
6.3 Robustness Checks
In this section I return to the concerns about sample selection and treatment def-
inition enunciated in section 4. The main estimates are based on a sample of all
races where a G-aligned candidate comes first or second, regardless of how many
other candidates there are. This choice reflects a trade-off between internal validity
(sample selection based on voter preferences) and estimates’ precision (larger sam-
ple). The risk is that a narrowly won and narrowly lost race by G candidates may
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actually be quite different in unobserved characteristics (e.g. G wins with 47% to
45% votes and loses with 35% to 37%; the overall difference in support for G in the
two races is 12 percentage points).
In what follows I describe various sensitivity and robustness checks, all focused
mainly on the rural samples at the referendum, where the main alignment estimate
was identified.
Firstly, I run the RD regressions in a restricted sample of rural localities where
only two candidates (or up to three) candidates competed (an approach used in
the main estimations in Brollo and Nannicini, 2012). The results shown in Table 8
confirm that the estimates are qualitatively similar to the baseline results, although
imprecisely estimated due to the small sample size. The small sample estimates are
generally larger in magnitude, with the exception of the county fixed effects spec-
ification (6) in Panel A. This, along with the descriptives in Table A1 displaying
lower education levels in the small sample, raise concerns that the two-candidate
races represent themselves a selected sample. Thus these estimates might be (po-
tentially upward) biased. Another approach to use more of the original sample is
to also include in the main sample races where a G-aligned candidate came third
(an approach used in Migueis, 2013). Indeed, this reclaims roughly 200 additional
observations compared to the baseline sample and the estimates are similar, only
slightly larger than those in Table 4.
Secondly, I report the baseline RD estimates including control functions of vary-
ing polynomial orders, and the estimates displayed in Table 9 are consistent across
all the different specifications. In addition, there is a concern that excess vote shares
for G in local elections, may have generated a larger turnout if G supporters are
politically more active. The parliamentary election turnout results suggest this is
not the case, but as an additional test to dismiss a mechanical effect I proceed as
follows. I predict referendum turnout using the local election vote shares, and I
introduce this predicted variable as a control in the baseline RD regressions. The
RD alignment estimate is reassuringly unaffected (results available upon request).
Finally, I revisit the treatment definition, where I now include the winning inde-
pendent liberals/conservatives in the treatment rather than the control group. This
automatically excludes narrow races between social-democrats and liberals/conservatives.
As shown in Table 1 and also below in the heterogeneity tests, precisely these races
displayed a large difference in turnout between winning and losing G localities.
Hence, the redefined treatment is expected to at least deliver lower RD estimates
than the baseline specifications. Table 10 results show smaller effects on referen-
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dum turnout, significant only upon inclusion of controls and county fixed effects.35
Panels B and C in Table 10 look at the redefined treatment effect on parliamentary
outcomes, which remains insignificant. Overall these results again suggest that races
within the governing coalition are the main drivers of the alignment effect.
7 Persistence of alignment: government transfers
and following elections
7.1 Government transfers
The electoral advantage of alignment supports the political quid pro quo invoked
in the intergovernmental transfers literature. Study after study have shown that
transfers to local governments unequivocally follow the party in power. Accordingly,
in this section I replicate the RD strategy for investigating the alignment effect on
local government revenues after the 2012 local elections, consisting primarily of
government redistributed funds.36
In Table 11 I report RD estimates from the baseline specifications, where the
dependent variables are: Total locality per capita revenue (panel A); Locality-level
per capita revenue from local taxation (own income, panel B); Locality-level per
capita transfers for road infrastructure (panel C); Locality-level subsidies per capita
(panel D). In the first three columns these dependent variables are measured in 2012,
and in the last three columns they are measured in 2013.
The RD estimates are almost all positive and large, in particular for total locality
revenue per capita. The most striking result is that the alignment effect on total
revenue is larger and only significant in 2013. This is in stark contrast to total
revenue in 2011, the pre-treatment year, when if anything, they were lower for
localities won over by G in later local elections (see Tables 2 and 3, as well as
appendix table A2). This is not driven by an increase in local tax revenue, which is
not significantly larger in aligned localities. The difference can only be accounted for
by government subsidies and discretionary transfers. Since I have only local budget
data on subsidies, I look at the two potentially most visible to voters: roads and
other subsidies, which do not display significant alignment effects (although note
that again, at least in average terms, the balance of road subsidies has changed in
35I also redo the estimations with the original treatment, but only for localities where no can-
didate represented the coalition parties separately (perfect alignment between local and national
parties). The results are very similar to those in Table 10 and are available upon request.
36Data on discretionary government transfers is not available for 2012-2013, therefore I use
different categories of local revenues, which contain discretionary transfers.
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favour of aligned localities). It is perhaps not surprising that the alignment premium
for total revenue is smaller in 2012 than in 2013, since the G government only took
office in May and the reshuﬄing of local administration seats only in June.
These results, at least on total revenue per capita, suggest a gradual reversal of
the previous distribution of government funds, favouring G-aligned localities from
2012 onwards. Note also that these might underestimate the alignment bonus if
transfers are strategic, and higher in the years just before new local elections, i.e.
after 2013.37
7.2 Parliamentary elections
The core result in this paper is that local officials deliver votes for their parties
in national polls, plausibly through vote buying under weak competition and easy
enforcement of voter’s promises. This effect is not detectable in elections with strong
incentives for all parties and where voter’s commitment cannot be secured, like in
legislative elections. Yet, one could follow up asking whether the electoral advantage
earned in the referendum persisted in parliamentary elections. Voter habituation
and turnout anchoring through referenda have been documented before (Melton,
2014; Go´recki, 2013), therefore I use the two national polls to investigate an indirect
alignment effect.
OLS regressions in appendix table A5 indicate larger average turnouts in aligned
localities in legislative elections. However, the alignment coefficient all but vanishes
when controlling for referendum turnout, which is strongly and significantly corre-
lated with legislative election turnout. This indicates that raising the turnout once
might make it less costly to mobilize voters again. However, OLS incurs selection
bias, which can be overcome with the RD.
As seen in Table 5, the direct alignment effect on parliamentary turnout and
votes share was insignificant. In Table 12 columns 1-3, using the full rural sample
and varying polynomials, I show at best modest alignment effects in parliamentary
elections (significant only with the linear control function).
Then, I attempt to test whether the excess voters in aligned localities made
any difference in legislative elections. Hence, I use the sharp RD from close may-
oral race between aligned and unaligned localities as a source of exogenous vari-
ation in referendum turnout, conditional on locality and county characteristics.
Hence, I estimate a two stage least squares model as in Van Der Klaauw (2002),
where the baseline RD is the first stage, and the predicted referendum turnout
E[Turnouti|dGi] = βG winsi + f(dGi) is then used as the explanatory variable in
37This data is currently unavailable.
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the second stage:
Y parli = γ0 + γ1E[Turnouti|dGi] + k(dGi) + εi, (3)
where i indexes the locality and Y parli is either the parliamentary election
turnout or the vote share for G, k(dGi) is a control function that accounts for
voter’s preferences away from the local election victory threshold.38
The assumptions the narrowly-won alignment to be a good instrument are: i)
instrument relevance (clearly holds, as seen in the first stage reported in Table 4); ii)
instrument validity; i.e. alignment effects work exclusively through their impact on
referendum turnout. The insignificant RD results in Table 5 are reassuring in this
respect, but parties’ campaigns and power of persuasion may have made a difference
in referendum turnout and vote shares. The IV estimations will yield an unbiased
estimate at best if the exclusion restriction conditional on locality characteristics
holds.
Table 12, columns (4)-(6), displays the 2SLS estimates of referendum turnout on
parliamentary election turnout and vote shares. The estimates are somewhat larger
than the OLS estimates and are all significant, with 0.26 percentage points excess
turnout and 0.55 percentage points increase in G vote share in legislative elections
for 1 percentage point additional referendum turnout. Overall, the results support
the persistence, or “stickiness” of referendum turnout. The implication is that the
referendum with it’s asymmetric incentives was a successful mobilization exercise
for G, whose excess voters shifted the G vote share in the legislative elections, albeit
by a minor margin.
8 Concluding Remarks
To date there is no clear evidence on whether and how local officials provide political
capital for their parties, a frequent assumption in the voting and intergovernmental
transfers literatures.
I provide robust evidence from an RD with closely-contested local elections that
mayors bring electoral advantages for their parties in national polls. This effect may
occur and may be detected in some favorable conditions: when the voter commit-
ment problem can be easily overcome (hence, I identify an effect in a participation
38In Van Der Klaauw (2002) this identification strategy is used to examine the impact of college
financial aid offers on students’ decisions to enrol into university, where the authors explores
financial aid offer discontinuities along a college aid score calculated for every students
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quorum referendum but not in legislative elections); when vote buying and electoral
fraud are entrenched norms (as effects are picked up only in rural areas and areas
where vote buying is more widespread); and when other local competitors have in-
centives and power to monitor the incumbent. These partisan alignment effects may
ensue in other contexts, but may not have been detected by previous studies due
to the aggregation of results and the fact that they may occur in less competitive
environments, i.e. away from the victory threshold in the RD.
I also present some evidence that partisan alignment produced an increase in
aligned local government revenues, although I cannot causally link this to the in-
crease in turnout. Furthermore, aligned localities seem to have increased revenues
in the year following the referendum. Also, they generated higher voter mobilization
in the referendum, which was partly transferred to the following national election.
These findings have important policy implications along at least two dimensions.
Firstly, these findings raise concerns about the legitimacy of the political capital that
local officials provide for the national parties, particularly in young inexperienced
democracies. To the extent that voter mobilization involves illicit means like vote
buying and electoral fraud, it undermines the most vital democratic freedom. This
is the case in many developing countries, as well as countries in transition, where
the legacy of the former autocratic regimes is still felt to this day, raising questions
about how to institute healthy democracy (Keefer and Vlaicu, 2007; Martinez-Bravo,
2014). I contribute to this ongoing debate by showing that directly elected local
officials can tamper with voters’ choices. In this case, the referendum, the very
expression of direct democracy, was turned into an instrument of manipulation,
which may have propagated to the following national elections
Secondly, these results raise questions about the use and design of referenda as
instruments for exercising healthy direct democracy. Referenda are nowadays in-
creasingly used as policy-making tools in Europe and in the United States (Casella
and Gelman, 2008). In line with the theory (see e.g. Herrera and Mattozzi, 2010),
the high quorum requirement of 50% introduced asymmetric incentives for voter mo-
bilization. As a result, the aligned localities boosted participation, while unaligned
localities may have encouraged vote apathy. One way to address this issue is by
balancing mobilization incentives, through setting a low participation quorum. This
is precisely what happened in Romania following the 2012 electoral year, when the
Parliament voted a new law that reduced the referendum participation quorum to
30%.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1 Timeline of electoral events
Note: The P Government was formed by the president’s party (the democrat-liberals). The G
Government was formed by the social-liberal union, the main opponents to the president’s party
rule.
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Figure 2: G-alignment and referendum outcomes
(a) All localities
(b) Rural localities
(c) Urban localities
Note: The figure displays the polynomial approximations of the referendum turnout (left) and
“YES” vote share (right) plotted against the running variable on the X-axis (Victory Margin for
G in races against G).
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Figure 3: G-alignment and Parliamentary election outcomes
(a) All localities
(b) Rural localities
(c) Urban localities
Note: The figure displays the polynomial approximations of the referendum turnout (left) and
“YES” vote share (right) plotted against the running variable on the X-axis (Victory Margin for
G in races against G).
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Table 1: Referendum Turnout in races within 5 percentage points from the victory
cutoff
Race (Top 2 parties) G wins SD wins P wins L/C wins Difference
Panel A: Races between G and P, SD and P, P and L/C, SD and L/C
G(=SD+L/C) vs P 0.547 0.528 0.019
(0.152) (0.159)
n=82 n=68
SD vs P 0.541 0.507 0.034
(0.118) (0.179)
n=20 n=17
P vs L/C 0.451 0.453 -0.002
(0.191) (0.117)
n=12 n=13
SD vs L/C 0.649 0.562 0.087*
(0.152) (0.133)
n=25 n=17
Panel B: Main G treatment= party SD or coalition SD+L/C
G(=SD or SD+L/C) vs P 0.546 0.524 0.022
(0.145) (0.162)
n=102 n=85
G(=SD or SD+L/C) vs L/C 0.650 0.551 0.101**
(0.149) (0.139)
n=26 n=18
Note: The table displays the comparison in means in referendum turnout between localities for
different narrow races. SD stands for social-democrats, L/C is liberals/conservatives, P stands for
the president’s party. Standard deviations are reported in parantheses. The differences in means
are reported for each type of race in the last column. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Rural races heterogeneity: migration, vote buying and incumbency.
Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Poly. Approx. Full sample OLS Poly. Approx. Full sample
Panel A: Migration
Share work abroad <5% Share work abroad >= 5%
G wins -0.008 0.031 0.070** 0.051** 0.040 0.061***
(0.027) (0.035) (0.029) (0.025) (0.028) (0.020)
Obs. 98 906 906 145 1,210 1,210
Panel B: Vote Buying Norms
County share vote buying <= 25% County share vote buying > 25%
G wins 0.025 0.012 0.050** 0.052*** 0.068** 0.073***
(0.026) (0.031) (0.020) (0.015) (0.025) (0.023)
Obs. 155 1,283 1,283 88 833 833
Panel C: Incumbency
G mayor in 2008 Other mayor in 2008
G wins 0.014 0.008 0.043* 0.040* 0.056** 0.066***
(0.028) (0.035) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.017)
Obs. 152 1,371 1,371 180 1,401 1,401
Controls No No Yes No No Yes
County FE No No Yes No No Yes
Specification [-5; +5] 3rd Ord. 3rd Ord. [-5; +5] 3rd Ord. 3rd Ord.
Poly. Poly. Poly. Poly.
Notes: The table displays RD estimates of the effect of governing coalition (G) alignment on
referendum turnout in rural localities, by: the share of migrants abroad (Panel A) below median
in columns (1)-(3) and above median columns (4)-(6); the share who report vote buying (Panel B)
below median in columns (1)-(3) and above median columns (4)-(6); whether G was in office before
2012, in columns (1)-(3), or not, in columns (4)-(6). Estimates from simple linear regression in a
small interval around the cutoff in columns (1) and (4). Estimates using polynomial approximations
on the full sample, without controls, with controls and with county fixed effects in columns (2)-
(3) and (5)-(6). The measure of perceived vote prevalence is computed based on the Romanian
Electoral Surveys 2011 questions on people’s observations or perceived incidence of vote buying.
Standard Errors clustered at county level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Rural races heterogeneity: different parties’ races
Turnout
(1) (2) (3)
OLS Poly. Approx. Full sample
Panel A: Races between G and P
G wins 0.028 0.007 0.052***
(0.022) (0.027) (0.016)
Obs. 161 1,359 1,359
Panel B: Races between G and non-P
G wins 0.044 0.081*** 0.058**
(0.031) (0.028) (0.025)
Obs. 82 757 757
Panel C: Races between G and L-C
G wins 0.100* 0.144** 0.039
(0.049) (0.057) (0.030)
Obs. 39 322 322
Controls No No Yes
County FE No No Yes
Specification [-5; +5] 3rd Order 3rd Order
Poly. Poly.
Notes: The table displays RD estimates of the effect of governing coalition (G) alignment on
referendum turnout in rural localities in different close races: between G and P (Panel A), between
G and other parties except P (Panel B) and between G and the liberals/conservatives (Panel
C). Estimates from simple linear regression in a small interval around the cutoff in column (1).
Estimates using polynomial approximations on the full sample, without controls, with controls
and with county fixed effects in columns (2)-(3). Standard Errors clustered at county level in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Rural Alignment and referendum turnout. Robustness to race structure
Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS Local LR Poly. Approx. Full sample
Panel A: Two-candidates races in rural localities
G wins 0.125* 0.106* 0.062 0.100 0.127 0.018
(0.052) (0.049) (0.069) (0.091) (0.081) (0.093)
Obs. 6 9 63 150 150 150
Panel B: Two- and three-candidates races in rural localities
G wins 0.017 -0.016 0.056 0.043 0.088** 0.104**
(0.068) (0.057) (0.059) (0.053) (0.040) (0.047)
Obs. 18 34 230 604 604 604
Panel C: All G races in rural localities
G wins 0.048** 0.034* 0.038* 0.044** 0.058*** 0.068***
(0.023) (0.017) 0.038* (0.021) (0.015) (0.015)
Obs. 120 247 934 2,301 2,301 2,301
County FE No No No No No Yes
Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Specification [-2.5; +2.5] [-5; +5] CCT 3rd Ord. 3rd Ord. 3rd Ord.
Opt. h Poly. Poly. Poly.
Notes: The table displays RD estimates of the effect of governing coalition (G) alignment on
referendum turnout in rural localities, in different races: two-candidate races (Panel A); three-
candidate races (Panel B); nearly all G races (including those where G came third, Panel C).
Estimates from simple linear regression in a small interval around the cutoff in columns (1)-
(2). Estimates from local linear regression using the Calonico et al. (2014) robust bias-corrected
confidence intervals in column (3). Estimates using polynomial approximations on the full sample,
without controls, with controls and with county fixed effects in columns (4)-(6). The controls in
columns 5-6 and 11-12 include demographic, labor market, fiscal and electoral characteristics of
the localities. Standard Errors clustered at county level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Table 9: Alignment and referendum turnout. Alternative polynomials
Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poly. Approx. Full sample
Panel A: All localities
G wins 0.055*** 0.066*** 0.016 0.050*** 0.025 0.041**
(0.011) (0.008) (0.017) (0.010) (0.020) (0.016)
Obs. 2,386 2,386 2,386 2,386 2,386 2,386
Panel B: Rural localities
G wins 0.058*** 0.072*** 0.028 0.062*** 0.044* 0.050***
(0.011) (0.008) (0.017) (0.010) (0.024) (0.017)
Obs. 2,116 2,116 2,116 2,116 2,116 2,116
County FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Specification 1st Ord. 1st Ord. 2nd Ord. 2nd Ord. 4th Ord. 4th Ord.
Poly. Poly. Poly. Poly. Poly. Poly.
Notes: The table displays RD estimates of the effect of governing coalition (G) alignment on
referendum turnout in rural localities, using alternative polynomials orders. All localities (Panel
A) and rural localities (Panel B). Estimates using polynomial approximations of first order in
columns (1)-(2), second order in columns (3)-(4) and fourth order in columns (5)-(6), without
controls, with controls and with county fixed effects. The controls include demographic, labor
market, fiscal and electoral characteristics of the localities. Standard Errors clustered at county
level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10: Alignment, referendum and parliamentary outcomes. Alternative treat-
ment
Referendum and Parliamentary Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS Local LR Poly. Approx. Full sample
Panel A: Referendum Turnout rural
G or L-C wins 0.021 0.021 0.011 0.009 0.035** 0.057***
(0.028) (0.020) (0.022) (0.026) (0.016) (0.014)
Obs. 114 238 1,002 1,961 1,961 1,961
Panel B: Parliamentary Turnout rural
G or L-C wins 0.001 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.013 0.020*
(0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011)
Obs. 114 238 855 1,961 1,961 1,961
Panel C: Senate G Vote shares rural
G or L-C wins 0.017 0.013 -0.008 -0.015 -0.005 0.008
(0.021) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.014)
Obs. 114 238 825 1,961 1,961 1,961
County FE No No No No No Yes
Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Specification [-2.5; +2.5] [-5; +5] CCT 3rd Ord. 3rd Ord. 3rd Ord.
Opt. h Poly. Poly. Poly.
Notes: The table displays RD estimates of the effect of governing coalition (G, including inde-
pendently running liberals/conservatives) alignment on referendum (Panel A) and parliamentary
outcomes (Panels B and C) in rural localities. Estimates from simple linear regression in a small
interval around the cutoff in columns (1)-(2). Estimates from local linear regression using the
Calonico et al. (2014) robust bias-corrected confidence intervals in column (3). Estimates using
polynomial approximations on the full sample, without controls, with controls and with county
fixed effects in columns (4)-(6). The controls in columns (5)-(6) and (11)-(12) include demographic,
labor market, fiscal and electoral characteristics of the localities. Standard Errors clustered at
county level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 11: Alignment and locality revenues in 2012-2013 (rural). RD Estimates
Locality Fiscal Revenues
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Poly. Approx. Full sample OLS Poly. Approx. Full sample
Panel A: Total per capita income
2012 2013
G wins 166.063 85.920 108.883 301.383*** 228.842 222.262*
(111.149) (135.762) (110.568) (105.005) (141.873) (129.179)
Obs. 243 2,116 2,116 243 2,116 2,116
Panel B: Local tax per capita revenue
2012 2013
G wins 43.751* 38.782 10.930 60.135* 27.611 -9.310
(25.823) (29.835) (26.446) (32.027) (35.162) (31.781)
Obs. 243 2,116 2,116 243 2,116 2,116
Panel C: Per capita road subsidies
2012 2013
G wins 4.478 0.665 2.533 2.962* 1.059 2.158
(2.762) (3.291) (3.680) (1.634) (2.004) (1.955)
Obs. 243 2,116 2,116 243 2,116 2,116
Panel D: Per capita other subsidies
2012 2013
G wins 32.176 46.623 32.947 38.521* 25.499 15.901
(19.290) (28.030) (24.470) (19.388) (26.597) (22.926)
Obs. 243 2,116 2,116 243 2,116 2,116
Controls No No Yes No No Yes
County FE No No Yes No No Yes
Specification [-5; +5] 3rd Ord. 3rd Ord. [-5; +5] 3rd Ord. 3rd Ord.
Poly. Poly. Poly. Poly.
Notes: The table displays RD estimates of the effect of governing coalition (G) alignment on local
revenues and government transfers after the referendum in rural localities. Revenues from 2012 in
columns (1)-(3) and from 2013 in columns (4)-(6). Estimates from simple linear regression in a
small interval around the cutoff in columns (1)-(2). Estimates from local linear regression using
the Calonico et al. (2014) robust bias-corrected confidence intervals in column (3). Estimates
using polynomial approximations on the full sample, without controls, with controls and with
county fixed effects in columns (4)-(6). The controls in columns (5)-(6) and (11)-(12) include
demographic, labor market, fiscal and electoral characteristics of the localities. Standard Errors
clustered at county level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 12: Alignment and referendum turnout impact on parliament elections out-
comes. RD and IV estimates.
Electoral Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reduced form RD 2SLS
Poly. Approx. Full sample 2SLS
Panel A: Referendum Turnout Parliamentary Turnout
G wins 0.023*** 0.014 0.011
(0.005) (0.010) (0.011)
Referendum turnout 0.308*** 0.331*** 0.273**
(0.068) (0.068) (0.111)
Obs. 2,116 2,116 2,116 2,116 2,116 2,116
R-squared 0.474 0.475 0.475 0.544 0.542 0.546
Panel B: Referendum Turnout Senate G Vote Share
G wins 0.040*** 0.016 0.003
(0.008) (0.012) (0.017)
Referendum turnout 0.579*** 0.577*** 0.403***
(0.088) (0.092) (0.122)
Obs. 2,116 2,116 2,116 2,116 2,116 2,116
R-squared 0.483 0.485 0.486 0.544 0.545 0.565
Panel C: Referendum Turnout Lower Chamber G Vote Share
G wins 0.037*** 0.019 0.015
(0.008) (0.012) (0.018)
Referendum turnout 0.535*** 0.525*** 0.377***
(0.089) (0.095) (0.126)
Obs. 2,116 2,116 2,116 2,116 2,116 2,116
R-squared 0.480 0.482 0.482 0.549 0.550 0.560
First stage F - - - 38.680 29.820 17.290
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Specification 1st Ord. 2nd Ord. 3rd Ord. 1st Ord. 2nd Ord. 3rd Ord.
Poly. Poly. Poly. Poly. Poly. Poly.
Notes: The table displays OLS estimates of the impact of G alignment on parliamentary out-
comes (columns 1-3) and two-stage least squares estimates of the impact of referendum turnout on
parliamentary elections turnout (columns 4-6) in rural localities. All estimations use polynomial
approximations based on the full sample, with varying polynomial orders (first order in columns 1
and 4, second order in columns 2 and 5, third order in columns 3 and 6). All regressions include
locality controls and county fixed effects. Standard Errors clustered at county level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 239
A Appendix
Figure A1 G Vote Margin Distributions and McCrary Density Tests
(a) All localities
(b) Rural localities
(c) Urban localities
Note: The figure displays the histograms (left) and McCrary density plots (right) for the running
variable (Victory Margin) in races against G. All localities: discontinuity estimate 0.128, standard
error 0.124. Rural localities: discontinuity estimate 0.177, standard error 0.146. Urban localities:
discontinuity estimate 0.260, standard error 0.277.
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics. Races within 5% victory margin vs. two-candidate
races.
Races against G
5% margin 2-cand p-value
Panel A: Outcomes
Turnout 0.543 0.519 0.161
Share YES 0.867 0.850 0.003
Turnout Parliamentary Elections 0.433 0.450 0.102
G Vote Share in Senate 0.612 0.612 0.993
Panel B: Covariates
No. candidates in local elections 5.336 2.000 0.001
Turnout Local Elections 44.554 47.181 0.000
Sum % first 2 candidates 79.199 1.000 0.009
Log Population 8.170 7.769 0.000
Share adult population 0.770 0.771 0.915
Share over 65 0.206 0.206 0.955
Share males 0.496 0.497 0.390
Share high education 0.050 0.038 0.004
Share high school 0.163 0.143 0.001
Share Romanians 0.883 0.879 0.784
Unemployment rate 0.052 0.049 0.510
Per capita revenue 1,405.645 1,594.426 0.069
Per capita own revenue 473.531 490.976 0.582
Per capita roads funds 12.749 10.798 0.706
Per capita subsidies 130.420 101.823 0.299
Per capita expenditures 1,317.394 1,429.516 0.183
Per capita expenditures education 369.123 333.459 0.031
Per capita health expenditures 10.294 11.179 0.771
Per capita public expenditures 148.956 193.998 0.078
N max 280.000 152.000
Note: The table displays the comparison in means in outcome variables (Panel A) and locality
characteristics (Panel B) between the sample of close races (under 5 percentage points victory
margin) and two-candidate races sample, for races against G. The p-values for the differences in
means are reported (significant differences marked in bold).
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Table A3: The continuity of observable characteristics at the victory threshold.
Rural localities
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3)
Log Population -0.017 0.031 0.047
(0.074) (0.087) (0.077)
Share adult population -0.001 -0.003 0.000
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Share over 65 -0.006 -0.009 -0.002
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Share males -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Share high education 0.006** 0.005 0.005*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Share high school 0.008 0.008 0.007
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Share Romanians -0.003 -0.022 -0.014
(0.019) (0.023) (0.021)
Unemployment rate -0.002 -0.004 -0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Per capita revenue 62.148 -41.792 -97.802
(132.769) (131.854) (119.491)
Per capita own revenue 37.214 32.446 22.186
(32.706) (35.631) (30.034)
Per capita roads funds -4.939 -4.708 -1.727
(6.482) (4.130) (3.737)
Per capita subsidies 15.674 32.145 23.867
(42.222) (38.168) (38.181)
Per capita expenditures 8.868 -102.439 -153.092
(109.500) (113.434) (101.119)
Per capita expenditures education -7.938 -17.967 -24.555
(21.392) (20.310) (18.783)
Per capita health expenditures -4.422 -6.910* -7.269*
(3.576) (4.056) (3.980)
Per capita public expenditures 0.827 2.182 -7.197
(26.317) (35.064) (36.894)
No. candidates in local elections -0.040 0.050 -0.008
(0.216) (0.230) (0.228)
Turnout referendum 2007 0.776 -0.749 -1.088
(1.392) (1.708) (1.416)
Sum % votes first 2 candidates 0.487 0.432 0.774
(1.665) (1.417) (1.487)
County FE No No Yes
Specification [-5; +5] 3rd poly. 3rd poly.
Notes: The table displays RD estimates from regressions with covariates as the dependent variable
and G wins as the main independent variable, exclusively in rural areas.
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Table A5: The impact of local alignment and referendum turnout on parliament
elections turnout. OLS estimates
Outcomes in Parliamentary Elections
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Turnout
G wins 0.028*** -0.016*** -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Referendum turnout 0.365*** 0.266***
(0.028) (0.031)
Obs. 2,116 2,116 2,116
R-squared 0.019 0.386 0.546
Panel B: G Vote Share Senate
G wins 0.103*** 0.058*** 0.051***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.006)
Referendum turnout 0.374*** 0.404***
(0.059) (0.043)
Obs. 2,116 2,116 2,116
R-squared 0.141 0.350 0.553
Panel C: G Vote Share Lower Chamber
G wins 0.101*** 0.054*** 0.050***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007)
Referendum turnout 0.392*** 0.411***
(0.058) (0.048)
Obs. 2,116 2,116 2,116
R-squared 0.129 0.346 0.548
Controls No No Yes
County FE No No Yes
Notes: The table displays OLS estimates of the effect of G alignment and referendum turnout on
parliamentary outcomes. Standard Errors clustered at county level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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